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General Introduction
This dissertation contributes to a growing literature that analyzes the way fi-
nancial markets are structured and the trading process itself. Ever since the
inception of organized financial markets, their design has been in constant evo-
lution, adapting to new technologies and regulation in order to provide investors
with the most efficient and effective way to trade securities. Especially the last
decades have witnessed some dramatic changes owing to advances in computing
power and communications technology, and further stimulated by a transforma-
tion in the regulatory framework. This dissertation touches upon three of these
recent changes: increased transparency, market fragmentation and the rise of
opaque trading mechanisms.
Most financial securities, especially equities, are now traded on electronic
platforms through transparent limit order books. As a result, overall trans-
parency in financial markets increased steadily. The move to electronic trading
has also been accompanied by a fragmentation of the market. Whereas traders
used to be constrained to trading on the listing exchange, they can now trade on
a multitude of trading venues. Furthermore, following the greater transparency
of today’s markets, several tools have been developed that allow traders to hide
their intentions by trading opaquely. Traders can do so either by using specific
order types, labeled hidden orders, or by trading on completely dark venues, so-
called dark pools. This dissertation contributes to the literature on transparent
limit order markets in Chapter 1, by investigating why short-term returns can
be predicted using public order book information. The analysis is extended in
Chapter 2, which examines whether information from other trading venues can
be used on top of information from the own venue to predict returns, thereby con-
tributing to the literature on market fragmentation. Chapter 3 aims to bridge
two related streams in the literature by studying the interaction between the
two distinct ways to trade opaquely: trading with hidden orders on transparent
trading venues and trading in completely dark trading venues.
The remainder of this general introduction is structured in two parts. First, a
brief description of the trading landscape and different types of traders is meant
to be a general introduction into the world of securities trading. Second, a chap-
ter overview discusses the specific contributions of this dissertation.
1
2 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Traders and the Trading Landscape
In this research market variables are studied that are affected by the trading
process and trader behavior. This section therefore provides an introductory
overview on financial market organizations and the different trader types that
populate the market. The most general distinction in market designs is between
quote-driven markets and order-driven markets. In quote-driven or dealer mar-
kets, traders have to trade via one or multiple intermediaries, also called dealers.
These dealers quote ask prices at which traders can buy a certain amount of the
security (the depth), and bid prices at which they can sell. In this type of market
liquidity is thus determined by the willingness of dealers to transact.
Many financial markets, however, are now organized as order-driven mar-
kets. In such markets there are no designated intermediaries, instead traders
interact directly with each other. For instance, most stocks have a continuous
trading session throughout the trading day that is organized as a so-called limit
order market. Traders in these markets have the choice between two basic order
types: market orders and limit orders. A market order to buy (sell) a security is
similar to what is available in a dealer market: it immediately executes against
the best outstanding orders on the ask (bid) side of the limit order book. A limit
order is a priced order that can be either marketable or non-marketable. A mar-
ketable limit order has a limit price that is set such that it immediately executes,
and thus behaves as a market order. While a non-marketable limit order does
not immediately execute upon its submission, but instead is added to the already
outstanding orders in the book. These limit orders can then get executed later
(against future market orders) according to a set of priority rules. Usually price
and time priority is enforced, meaning that first orders at better prices get ex-
ecuted, and at the same price those orders that were submitted first also get
executed first. In this type of market liquidity is determined by the willingness
of traders to submit limit orders. The limit order book is the mechanism that is
central to the trading process in all chapters in this dissertation.
Besides limit order books other types of order-driven markets also play a role
in today’s trading landscape. Some stocks are traded in periodic auction mar-
kets, and on a number of exchanges there is also an opening and closing auction
to determine the opening and closing price, respectively. In addition to being
traded on the main market, some stocks are also traded in satellite markets that
employ a crossing network mechanism. This means that buy and sell orders are
matched as much as possible (periodic or continuously), but the price at which
they execute is derived from the main market. Finally, orders can also be in-
ternalized by broker/dealers when the latter trade against orders of their clients
in-house.
An important aspect of market organization is also whether the market is
concentrated or fragmented. In a concentrated market there is only a single
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trading mechanism where all potential buyers and sellers meet. In a fragmented
market there are multiple trading mechanisms by which transactions can be ex-
ecuted, possibly catering to different traders. For instance, institutional traders
generally have much larger order sizes compared to retail traders. As such there
have always existed parallel trading mechanisms to facilitate these institutional
transactions, such as the upstairs market where brokers used to arrange these
so-called block trades. When trading moved to an electronic platform, facilitating
block trades has been the driver behind the inception of dark pools. Of course,
markets can also be fragmented when trading venues with a similar design com-
pete with each other, as is the case when multiple limit order books compete for
order flow. While Chapter 1 focuses on a concentrated market, Chapters 2 and 3
describe such a fragmented market setting.
Transparency is another feature of market design. We distinguish between
two types of transparency: pre-trade transparency and post-trade transparency.
Pre-trade transparency generally refers to the extent of information that is dis-
played to market participants about the available liquidity against which can
be traded. For instance prices and depths, or the identity and behavior of the
traders who have submitted orders. In limit order markets traders can generally
observe price and depth information to a great deal (while traders remain anony-
mous), as it is a requirement for the proper functioning of such a market. It is
also mandated to a certain extent by regulators. Other trading venues, such as
dark pools, are non-transparent or opaque by design. The display of large orders
would alert the market and can lead to a hike in trading costs for these orders.
Post-trade transparency refers to the reporting of transactions to market par-
ticipants. For many markets, transaction reporting is mandatory in real-time,
provided some exceptions. In this dissertation, transparency generally refers to
pre-trade transparency.
All of the chapters describe, at some point, the behavior of traders, for which
we rely on theory models. In these models traders are classified into different
categories along a number of dimensions. Most importantly, traders can be clas-
sified according to their motivation. The two main trader types are informed
traders and liquidity traders. Informed traders have private information about
the value of a security that other traders do not possess. As they want to exploit
their information advantage by trading on it, prices become informative. Liq-
uidity traders trade for non-informational reasons, e.g., because they experience
shocks to their endowment. Sometimes traders with other motivations are also
distinguished, such as predatory or parasitic traders, who want to exploit the
knowledge that they have about the orders of other trades, e.g., by front-running
large orders.
Another distinction between traders is from the point of view of a transac-
tion. Each transaction has an ‘active’ side and a ‘passive’ side. The active side
has initiated the trade by demanding/taking liquidity with a market(able) order,
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while the passive side has facilitated the trade by supplying/providing liquid-
ity with a limit order. When both orders are matched a trade gets executed.
In limit order markets, whether a trader is a liquidity demander or supplier is
endogenously determined, as traders can choose between different order types.
Professional liquidity suppliers are referred to as market makers. Other dimen-
sions according to which traders are classified include size (large traders versus
small traders), speed (fast traders versus slow traders) and trading technology
(human traders versus algorithmic traders). High-frequency traders (HFTs) are
both fast and algorithmic in nature. Finally, both in theory and in practice it
can be important to distinguish between retail traders and institutional traders.
Retail traders are characterized by a smaller transaction size, a lower level of
sophistication and are generally perceived to be ‘uninformed’, while institutional
traders can have large (parent) order sizes and may be more sophisticated.
Chapter Overview
Over time financial markets have become increasingly transparent. The amount
of information that is disseminated to market participants in real-time is now
greater than ever. The sale of market data and direct access feeds is also a
growing source of revenues for trading venues (Cespa and Foucault, 2014). Mar-
ket data are the primary input for many trading algorithms. Information from
trading venues is thus likely to be relevant for many traders. Previous research
shows that one way in which information from the limit order book can be used
is to predict very short-term returns (see e.g., Harris and Panchapagesan, 2005;
Cao, Hansch, and Wang, 2009; Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014). In
Chapter 1 of this dissertation we show for a sample of 88 stocks listed on the
Spanish stock market in 2003 that we can predict intraday returns using im-
balances between the bid and ask side of the limit order book. A more liquid
bid than ask side predicts positive returns, and vice versa. Since this is a robust
finding across markets and over time, we empirically examine what drives return
predictability. We distinguish between two potential explanations: (1) the order
choice hypothesis, and (2) the informed trading hypothesis. According to the first
explanation traders adapt their order choice on the basis of the state of the order
book, i.e. they become more (less) aggressive when the book on their side of the
market is thicker (thinner) (see e.g., Parlour, 1998; Ranaldo, 2004). This causes
transitory price effects, and thus returns are predictable over a short term. The
second explanation entails that informed traders submit orders to the limit or-
der book and naturally cluster on one side of the market, which causes the book
to become informative (see e.g., Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar, 2005; Kaniel and
Liu, 2006). This information is then later on incorporated into prices. Our evi-
dence is more in line with the former explanation. First, we find that the bulk of
return predictability is transitory, as longer horizon returns are less predictable.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 5
Second, we do not find a clear intraday pattern as we would expect when pre-
dictability is driven by informed limit orders. Finally, cross-sectional analysis
reveals that predictability is negatively related to informed trading, and posi-
tively to the depth of the order book. The latter is in line with the order choice
hypothesis, as queue-jumping activity (switching in the order choice) is more
likely in deeper, more competitive order books.
Chapter 2 extends this analysis to a fragmented market. In a fragmented
market there is not a single venue where all trading activity concentrates. In-
stead, multiple trading venues compete for order flow. This is exactly the type of
setting in which trading currently takes place in both the US and European mar-
kets. In the US, Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) allows for com-
petition between exchanges, Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs) and
dark pools. In Europe, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
has abolished old member state concentration rules, and encouraged competi-
tion between trading venues. Newly established Multilateral Trading Facilities
(MTFs), such as Bats Chi-X and Turquoise, are now competing with traditional
Regulated Markets (RMs). In addition, orders can be internalized by Systemaic
Internalizers (SIs) and a large part of volume is executed in the unregulated
Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. See, e.g., Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel
(2015) and Gresse (2015) for implications of fragmentation for market quality
in Europe. Our focus here is only on the so-called lit market, in which trading
venues (RMs and MTFs) with transparent limit order books compete for order
flow. Using a sample of 30 stocks listed on Euronext in 2009-2010 we show that
on each of the lit trading venues where the stocks are traded (Euronext, Chi-X,
Turquoise and Bats), as well as on the consolidated market (taking all the or-
der books together) returns are predictable with imbalances obtained from the
own venue. On top of that, imbalances obtained from other trading venues also
contribute to return predictability on the own venue, the more so when these
imbalances are recorded at more competitive prices. We also show that prices
from different trading venues tend to adjust to each other. These prices are not
determined in isolation of each other, and are bound by no-arbitrage relation-
ships as they are for the same security. Euronext, which is the listing exchange,
dominates in price discovery as returns on Euronext are least predictable by the
adjustment measure that we use. By contrast, returns on Turquoise and Bats
are most predictable. Lastly, we show that imbalances on a trading venue can
better predict returns on another trading venue when it has a relatively larger
market share, at least when the former venue is an MTF and the latter is the list-
ing exchange. As MTFs attract a larger fraction of trading activity they become
more relevant in terms of order choice considerations. This better integration in
the market causes their order book to become a better predictor of returns.
In Chapter 3 we broaden our view to the entire market, including also dark
trading venues, and mechanisms to trade opaquely in general. In contrast to the
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limit order books studied in Chapters 1 and 2, dark trading venues are (by defi-
nition) non-transparent. This means that traders submit orders to these venues
without being able to properly assess the liquidity that is available, i.e. there is a
large uncertainty about the execution probability of their order (for an overview
of the literature on dark trading, see Degryse, Tombeur, Van Achter, and Wuyts,
2013). In addition, lit trading venues offer traders with the possibility to submit
hidden orders, and by doing so create a pool of opaque liquidity that is embedded
in the lit market (De Winne and D’Hondt, 2007; Bessembinder, Panayides, and
Venkataraman, 2009). One of the primary advantages of these opaque trading
mechanisms is that they allow traders to hide their trading intentions. As over-
all transparency of financial markets has grown with the increased reliance on
electronic order books so have exposure costs. These are costs associated with
the display of orders in financial markets and they can arise for various reasons.
In general, these arise because other traders (who are not a natural counterparty
for the trader) observe the displayed order and react to it in an unfavorable way
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005; Buti and Rindi, 2013). Managing exposure
costs is thus key to reducing overall trading costs. Using a sample of 27 Dutch
index stocks from November 2007 until September 2010 we investigate whether
both types of opaque trading (trading with hidden orders on otherwise trans-
parent venues versus trading in completely dark venues) are complements or
substitutes to each other. We find that they are substitutes, but dark trading is a
better substitute for hidden order trading than the other way around. Both types
of opaque trading are also driven by different market conditions. Hidden order
trading is relatively more important when markets show a greater volume, are
less deep and have a lower spread, and when less traders use Smart Order Rout-
ing (SOR) technology, which is a type of algorithm used to trade automatically on
different trading venues. Dark trading is relatively more important when mar-
kets have lower overall volume and more traders rely on SORs. Both types of
opaque trading are negatively affected by algorithmic trading.
Finally, it should be noted that we aim to make each chapter readable as
a stand-alone paper. This approach implies some repetition between chapters,
however. In particular, Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 use roughly the same method-
ology to predict short-term returns, and part of the related literature is also sim-
ilar. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 use a comparable dataset, and thus the institu-
tional details are the same.
Chapter 1
Limit Order Book
Information and Return
Predictability
1.1 Introduction
Order-driven markets, governed by public and electronic limit order books, are
by now widely used mechanisms to transact financial securities, particularly so
for equities (Jain, 2005). Through the limit order book (henceforth also referred
to as ‘the order book’ or ‘the book’) market participants can submit orders and
are simultaneously updated about the liquidity available in the market. Traders
can generally observe in real-time bid and ask prices and their associated depths
up to a certain level in the book. Previous research shows that short-term intra-
day returns are predictable using observable information from the state of the
order book in a number of markets: the New York Stock Exchange (Harris and
Panchapagesan, 2005), the Australian Stock Exchange (Cao, Hansch, and Wang,
2009) and the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Jain, Jain, and McInish, 2011; Yamamoto,
2012).
Our goal is to examine what actually drives this type of return predictability.
More specifically, we distinguish between two potential explanations. On the one
hand, when traders use the state of the book to condition their order submis-
sion strategy on, the book may generate predictable patterns in order flow. This
could in turn cause predictable, but short-term, price effects. On the other hand,
if informed traders submit limit orders to the book they can make the book in-
formative on the fundamental value of a security, thereby causing returns to be
predictable. In the latter case order book information should also have a perma-
nent impact on prices.
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We obtain data from the Spanish Stock Market Interconnection System (SIBE)
for the full calendar year 2003. These stocks are traded continuously on a limit
order book platform without any designated market makers, which makes the
market structure purely order-driven. Moreover, during this period there was no
competition from alternative trading venues, so this environment allows a clean
analysis to test limit order book theories. Similar data are used by Pascual and
Veredas (2009a), Pascual and Veredas (2009b), Theissen and Wuyts (2010) and
Pardo and Pascual (2012).
To examine the drivers of predictability we first verify its existence. To do so
we take snapshots of the limit order book every 5 minutes. For each snapshot,
we compute three types of measures capturing information about different levels
of ask and bid prices, and depth offered at each price. Our first measure is the
Slope of the limit order book, as defined in Naes and Skjeltorp (2006), Intuitively,
this measure combines price and depth information into one number and can be
interpreted as an elasticity. Second, we use theDepth (X) measure from Degryse,
de Jong, and van Kervel (2015), which captures depth available in the limit order
book within a certain interval of X basis points around the midquote between
best ask and bid.1 Third, we apply the cost of a buy and sell trade, CT , of a
given size (e.g., the mean trade size). Each measure is computed for both the
ask and bid side in the book and we include the imbalance between both sides at
snapshot t−1 in our empirical specification as a potential predictor of short-term
midquote returns over the interval between t−1 and t. We address predictability
of these short-term returns on the basis of these book imbalances by considering
the adjusted R2 of the time series regression that is estimated for each stock
and for each month in the sample. Using the R2 as a metric to asses intraday
return predictability in in line with previous research by, e.g., Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2005) and Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009).
We show that all our measures of book information can predict short-term
returns and predictability is larger when using those measures that are limited
to top-of-the-book information. As more information from deeper in the book is
captured in a measure, the predictive ability of this measure decreases. This
suggests that the most relevant information for future prices is concentrated
at the top of the book, while deeper in the order book limit orders are more
unrelated to future prices.
Having verified predictability we turn to the main contribution of our re-
search, which is to address the sources of return predictability. Previous research
discusses two potential explanations, but does not make an effort to disentangle
between both. The first explanation is related to how traders adapt their order
choice and starts from the observation that in a limit order market, traders can
choose whether to submit a market order or a limit order, and furthermore can
adjust the aggressiveness of their order. As shown in Parlour (1998), traders
1We also use ticks and the half-spread to define X but results are similar.
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face a trade-off: while a limit order implies a better price, it also faces execution
risk. Due to time priority rules, the probability of execution for a limit order
decreases when there is already a large number of outstanding orders at its side
of the book. By the same logic, when a large number of orders is available on
the opposite side of the order, chances are higher that the trader will submit a
limit order, since the probability that traders on the opposite side submit market
orders increases (and thereby the probability of execution of his limit order). Par-
lour shows that even in the absence of asymmetric information and with a ran-
dom arrival of trader types, systematic (and thus predictable) patterns in order
flow emerge. Empirical evidence confirms such patterns: Ranaldo (2004) shows
that a thicker (thinner) book on the same (opposite) side induces traders to sub-
mit more (less) aggressive orders. Furthermore, Pascual and Veredas (2009b)
find that the frequency of patient traders increases with the thickness of the
depth on the opposite side, while it decreases in the thickness of the depth on
the same side. Patient traders base their order choice mostly on the state of
the book at their side, while impatient traders pay more attention to the depth
on the opposite side.2 Not only newly arriving traders have to make an order
choice decision. Many traders are present in the market for a longer time and
employ dynamic order submission strategies, which means that they frequently
cancel and resubmit orders. When they do so, they are likely to become increas-
ingly aggressive insofar their previous orders remain unexecuted, and hence are
more likely to switch to price-improving limit orders or market orders when the
market is heavier on their side (or vice versa). In sum, the state of the book af-
fects traders’ order choice considerations, and thereby leads to short-term price
changes. But any price effect that is purely due to order flow patterns that are
predictable on the basis of order choice should be transitory (Goettler, Parlour,
and Rajan, 2005). Indeed, if the fundamental value of the stock has not changed,
arbitrageurs drive the price back to its fundamental value. Hence, if order choice
and patterns are driving return predictability, we should observe no permanent
effect of book imbalances. We refer to this first explanation as the ‘order choice
hypothesis’.
The second potential source for the return-imbalance relationship relies on
informed traders submitting orders to the book, and hence we dub it the ‘in-
formed trading hypothesis’. Whether or not informed traders use limit orders
or only rely on market orders as a part of their strategy is open to debate. For
instance, Glosten (1994), Rock (1996) and Handa, Schwartz, and Tiwari (2003)
argue that informed traders do not submit limit orders if their private informa-
tion is short-lived, because there is a large probability that their limit orders
would remain unfilled. Harris (1998) conjectures that the use of market orders
2Other theoretical and empirical work on the relation between the state of the order book and
order choice includes Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull, and White (2000),
Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005), Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2008) and Duong, Kalev, and Krishna-
murti (2009).
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by informed traders depends on transaction costs on the one hand, and on the
persistence of their informational advantage on the other hand. A number of
theory models argue that informed traders can also submit limit orders. Kaniel
and Liu (2006) find that, under certain conditions, informed traders are more
likely to submit limit orders instead of market orders, even to an extent that
limit orders convey more information than market orders. First, the higher the
probability that the information is long-lived, the lower is the execution risk, fa-
voring limit orders. Second, the larger the mispricing in the market, the higher
are potential losses of non-execution, suggesting a greater favor towards mar-
ket orders. Third, more uninformed traders increase the profitability of a limit
order, but increase the profitability of a market order even more. Further, in
the model of Ros¸u (2015), an informed trader decides between a limit and mar-
ket order based on the magnitude of her information advantage. Traders with
a large information advantage then opt for a market order, those with a smaller
advantage submit a limit order. Also in the model of Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan
(2009), informed traders tend to submit limit orders, but their liquidity supply
is inverse related to (fundamental) volatility. Beber and Caglio (2005) find that
informed agents act strategically and that their order submission strategies are
partly dependent on market conditions. In circumstances where the probability
of information based trading is high, they submit limit orders at a price further
away in the book in order to hide their information. Through an experimental
design, Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005) find evidence that informed traders
use both market and limit orders. They document a heavier use of market orders
by informed traders at the beginning of the trading period, since mispricing is the
largest then, and potential profits are greatest, consistent with predictions from
Kaniel and Liu (2006). As prices are moving closer to their true market values,
however, informed traders use more limit orders, because the additional expected
profits from market orders decrease. Because the risk of being ‘picked off ’ (ad-
verse selection risk) is much smaller (or non-existent) for informed traders, this
makes them natural liquidity suppliers. Hence, even the more distant levels may
contain information.
If informed traders submit limit orders, then the state of the book resulting
from these orders should reflect this information, and thus the book becomes
more helpful in predicting future returns. Moreover, by incorporating their in-
formation into the limit order, prices become more and more efficient during the
course of trading. Therefore, if asymmetric information is present, one should
also observe a stronger and permanent price effect.
We address the question of what drives return predictability in three comple-
mentary ways. First, based on the reasoning above, we study predictability at
short versus longer horizons. If returns are only predictable at short horizons,
predictability is likely driven by short-term price pressure due to order choice
considerations. If returns are also predictable over longer horizons based on the
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same limit order book information, this is akin to a permanent price effect and
suggests that returns are predictable because the limit order book contains fun-
damental information. Second, we examine whether predictability varies over
different periods in the trading day. The motivation for this approach is that
informed traders are known to be more active at the beginning and near the
end of the trading day (see, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Garvey and Wu,
2009). Their activity at the beginning of the trading day is driven by the size
of their informational advantage as overnight information increases asymmetric
information. In addition, Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005), Kaniel and Liu
(2006) and Ros¸u (2015) predict that under these circumstances informed traders
are more inclined to resort to market orders and less to limit orders. If informed
traders thus cause returns to be predictable, predictability based on the book
should be lower at the start and end of the trading day. Third, we perform panel
data regressions where we regress the adjusted R2 from the prediction models
on a number of explanatory variables, including a measure of informed trading,
quoted depth, volatility and trading volume.
Our results show that evidence is more in line with the order choice hypoth-
esis. First, we find that for all our measures return predictability based on book
information increases from 1 minute intervals up to 10 or 15 minute intervals.
After that return predictability diminishes again for most measures, while it does
not disappear. But there are remarkable differences between large and small
stocks. For smaller stocks return predictability is quite low at short horizons,
and then further increases up to 30 minutes. For large stocks we find the oppo-
site pattern. These results suggest that there is both a transitory component to
return predictability as well as a permanent component. The transitory compo-
nent can be attributed to order choice considerations. Newly arriving traders are
crowded out due to time and price priority rules: as more liquidity piles up on one
side of the book traders on that side become more aggressive in order to obtain a
satisfying execution probability. If they post a limit order at the end of the queue
their risk of non-execution is relatively higher compared to jumping the queue
and improving the best quoted price on their side of the book. To the extreme,
traders observing a crowded book on their side may switch from limit orders to
market orders in order to secure their trade. Similarly, traders on the opposite
side become less aggressive as their execution probabilities are relatively more
favorable. This kind of behavior can make returns predictable over a short hori-
zon. Because the price changes are unrelated to the fundamental value of the
security (informed) traders should jump in to revert prices back to their normal
levels. The decrease in return predictability over longer horizons suggests that
indeed some traders engage in strategies to remove transitory predictability. For
more actively traded stocks return predictability decreases at a faster pace.
Second, we find no obvious pattern of return predictability throughout the
trading day. When we divide the trading day into five subperiods of equal size,
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return predictability is larger in the second and third subperiod of the day, and
the lowest for the fourth subperiod. For both the first and fifth subperiod pre-
dictability is ‘intermediate’, while the informed trading hypothesis predicts it
should be the lowest.
Third, we show that predictability is cross-sectionally negatively related to
informed trading, i.e. the presence of more informed traders in a stock decreases
return predictability. Furthermore, return predictability is larger for stocks with
deeper order books. This is a strong indication that return predictability based
on book information is predominantly caused by temporary effects due to order
choice considerations. On the one hand, informed trading is associated with a
faster price discovery process. When prices temporary deviate from fundamen-
tal values they revert to normal levels faster when more informed traders are
present. On the other hand, deeper order books make queue-jumping behavior
relatively more attractive, as traders compete more heavily for order execution.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We start by explaining
how information from the limit order book can be used to predict returns in Sec-
tion 1.2. Next, we describe the dataset and institutional setting, and establish
return predictability in our sample in Section 1.3. Subsequently, Section 1.4 in-
vestigates the drivers of the return predictability. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Predicting Returns with Limit Order Book Information
1.2.1 Predicting Returns
To predict returns from order book information we use imbalances in liquidity
measures between the bid and ask side. When the bid (ask) side is more liquid
than the ask (bid) side this signals a heavier trading interest in the limit order
book on the buy (sell) side, and therefore we expect positive (negative) returns.3
We estimate the following time series model to evaluate predictability based on
order book information using various imbalance measures:
rt = β0 + β1bt−1 + ut. (1.1)
with rt the log return on the midquote mt between time t − 1 and t. We predict
quoted prices from the order book instead of transaction prices because, accord-
ing to our two explanations, these should be predictable from order book infor-
mation. We use the midquote of the best bid and ask price because bid and ask
prices are symmetrically affected. In addition, the midquote is often taken to be
an estimate of the fundamental value of a security and therefore frequently used
3The use of imbalances in market variables that can capture the buying and selling behavior
to predict short-term returns is not new (see, e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2002, 2005;
Chung and Hrazdil, 2012). We use a similar methodology by regressing returns on lagged imbalances
constructed from order book information.
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as a benchmark, for instance in the estimation of trading costs. bt−1 is a mea-
sures of order book imbalance at the end of interval t−1, ut is the error term. By
using order book imbalances at t− 1 we ensure that this information is available
to market participants to include in their decisions. We evaluate predictability
of returns by investigating the adjusted R2 of our models as well as the esti-
mated coefficients and their statistical significance. The higher the adjusted R2
is, the more public information on the limit order book helps in predicting re-
turns. Equation (1.1) is estimated per stock on a monthly basis. In other words,
we use all snapshots t in a given month for a given stock. This results in a panel
of adjusted R2 for the stocks and months in our sample. This allows us to ex-
plore both the cross-sectional and time series variation in predictability later in
Section 1.4.
Furthermore, following Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) and Chung
and Hrazdil (2012) we use raw returns rt as our dependent variable in our main
analysis. In contrast, Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009) use innovations in returns
from an autoregressive model to capture the unpredictable part in the returns,
while Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) include lagged returns in their
model. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when both these approaches
are used and are available upon request. We favor the use of the simplest version
of the model because it is most easy to interpret. We show that market partici-
pants can predict future price movements by using a single metric that captures
order book information.
We need to make a choice about the frequency at which these regressions
are estimated, i.e. a choice about the length of the interval [t − 1, t]. The choice
of the interval length matters since predictability is likely to differ for different
interval lengths. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) find that market
order imbalances can predict returns over smaller time intervals of less than
30 minutes, but as the interval length increases predictability diminishes. A
comparison of model estimates using different interval lengths also sheds more
light on the question of whether imbalances in the limit order book are caused by
informed traders submitting limit orders. Therefore we also investigate different
sampling frequencies: 1 minute, 2 minutes, 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 15 minutes
and 30 minutes, respectively dividing the trading day into 510, 255, 102, 51, 34
and 17 intervals (since trading in our sample takes place between 9 a.m. and
5.30 p.m.).
1.2.2 Limit Order Book Information
For our analysis, we require a measure that captures the state of the limit order
book at a given point in time. For this, we first take snapshots of the limit order
book every x minutes, a particular snapshot is represented by subscript t. Below,
we consider snapshots every x = 1, 2, 5, 10, 15 and 30 minutes. Next, we define
three measures of the state of the limit order book at t. Important to stress is
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that our measures not only capture the state at the best prices of the limit order
book, but also deeper into the book. We then focus in particular on the imbalance
between the ask and bid side of the limit order book. Given that we want to study
how the public limit order book, as observed by traders, helps to predict returns,
we do not include hidden depth in the imbalance measures.
Our first measure is the slope of the limit order book, as defined in Naes and
Skjeltorp (2006). Let paskj,t denote the ask price (in euro) at level j = 1, ..., J in
the limit order book at snapshot t, and qaskj,t the number of shares available at
that ask price. mt denotes the midquote. Symmetrically, pbidj,t and qbidj,t denote the
bid prices and available shares. The slopes at t, taking into account the first L
levels in the book at the ask side
(
Slopeask(L)t
)
and bid side
(
Slopebid(L)t
)
are
then computed as
Slopeask(L)t =
1
L
 ln
(
qask1,t
)
pask1,t
mt
− 1
+
L∑
l=1
ln(qaskl+1,t)
ln(qaskl,t )
− 1
paskl+1,t
paskl,t
− 1
 (1.2)
Slopebid(L)t =
1
L
 ln
(
qbid1,t
)
p1,tbid
mt
− 1
+
L∑
l=1
ln(qbidl+1,t)
ln(qbidl,t )
− 1
pbidl+1,t
pbidl,t
− 1
 (1.3)
The order book slope can be interpreted as an elasticity, i.e. the slope measures
how order book depth (shares that are supplied or demanded) changes as the
price changes. Larger slopes indicate more liquid order books. The scaled imbal-
ance between the bid and ask side of the limit order book slopes ImbSlope(L)t is
defined as
ImbSlope(L)t =
Slopebid(L)t − Slopeask(L)t
Slopebid(L)t + Slopeask(L)t
(1.4)
A positive slope imbalance indicates a more liquid bid side and hence more pa-
tient buying interest than selling interest. Note that by varying L, the number
of price levels in the limit order book taken into account to measure the slope,
ImbSlope allows to address the imbalance both close to the best prices, and fur-
ther in the limit order book. In our analysis we include L = 1, 3 and 5.
Our second measure is theDepth (X) measure from Degryse, de Jong, and van
Kervel (2015). It captures depth available in the limit order book in an interval
around the midpoint. More specifically, using the same notation as above, the
Depth (X) measure for the ask and bid side of the limit order book is
Depthask (X)t =
J∑
j=1
paskj,t q
ask
j,t 1
(
paskj,t < mt (1 +X)
)
(1.5)
Depthbid (X)t =
J∑
j=1
pbidj,t q
bid
j,t 1
(
pbidj,t > mt (1−X)
)
(1.6)
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where 1 (.) is an indicator function that is one if the expression in the brackets is
satisfied, and zero otherwise. Our scaled imbalance measure ImbDepth (X)t at
snapshot t is then defined as
ImbDepth (X)t =
Depthbid (X)t −Depthask (X)t
Depthbid (X)t +Depth
ask (X)t
(1.7)
To computeDepth(X), we need to define the interval of sizeX around the midquote
that we want to take into account. We consider intervals around the midpoint
from 30, 70 and 100 basis points (b.p.).4 The intuition for this measure is that a
low value for X captures depth at or close to the best quotes, while larger values
take into account a larger part of the limit order book. When only depth up to
a certain level of the order book can be observed in real-time this constitutes a
maximum boundary for each depth measure that we can calculate. In our sam-
ple this is the fifth level (see Section 1.3). For highly liquid stocks that have a
tight bid-ask spread and for which the distance between consecutive prices is rel-
atively short the maximum bound is encountered relatively more often, and for
lower values of X. But for illiquid stocks the maximum bound may never be en-
countered. By contrast, Depth (X) is often zero for low levels of X, which leaves
ImbDepth (X)t to be either undefined or zero. We choose to set ImbDepth (X)t to
zero for those observations, since the (zero) depth is in fact balanced and it al-
lows us to retain the complete time series. As the number of zero (or undefined)
depth imbalances for a stock-month combination grows too large, however, re-
sults become less meaningful. We therefore exclude estimation results of a given
stock-month combination from the sample for which the fraction of zero depth
imbalances exceeds a threshold (set to 50%, but results are similar when using
either no threshold, a 25% threshold or a 75% threshold).
Our third measure is based on the cost of a round trip trade CRT in Irvine,
Benston, and Kandel (2000). We compute the cost (in euro) of a buy transaction
of a particular size at snapshot t, CT ask (Size), as such capturing the ask side of
limit order book. The same is done for the cost a sell transaction of a particular
size CT bid (Size). We then define the scaled imbalance measure ImbCT (Size)t
at time t as follows:
ImbCT (Size)t =
CT ask (Size)t − CT bid (Size)t
CT ask (Size)t + CT
bid (Size)t
(1.8)
We subtract the cost of a trade on the bid side from the cost of a trade on the
ask side instead of the other way around, as with our previous measures. The
reason is that CT is a measure of illiquidity, while both the Slope and Depth (X)
are measures of liquidity. When we instead add CT bid and CT ask we get the cost
4We also considered two other ways to define the interval size X, measured in ticks and half-
spreads. Results are qualitatively similar using these alternative definitions and are available upon
request.
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of a round trip trade CRT , a frequently used measure of order book liquidity.
We consider trade sizes defined in different ways, more specifically the mean
trade size of the stock in the month in which the snapshot was taken, and the
mean trade size + 1 and 2 standard deviations. By including small and large
trade sizes, we again take into account the limit order book close to the best
quotes, as well as further way from the best prices. When the trade size exceeds
depth available on the visible quotes we assume, for the sake of simplicity, the
remainder of the trade can be executed at the final visible quote.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Institutional Setting
This study uses intraday data of stocks that are listed on the Spanish stock ex-
change, which is a purely order-driven market. Its trading activity is managed
through the electronic trading platform Spanish Stock Market Interconnection
System (SIBE). Investors submit their orders through brokers who are provided
with real-time information on trading activity and the state of the limit-order
book by SIBE’s Dissemination Information System (DIS). Continuous trading
takes place from 09.00 a.m. until 05.30 p.m. and call auctions determine the
opening and closing price. The minimum order size is 1 share and the tick size
is dependent on the trade price. It is e0.05 for stocks with a price above e50
and e0.01 for stocks with a lower price (all stocks in our sample). Three types
of updates in the limit order book can be distinguished: new orders, order mod-
ifications and order cancellations. Market orders are executed against the best
prices on the opposite side of the book and walk up or down the book until they
are completely filled. Market-to-limit orders are like market orders, but do not
walk up or down the book when the depth at the first best price is completely
used. Instead, they are stored at that price as a regular limit order. Limit orders
are recorded in the book at their limit price and can only be executed at that
price or better. Priority of execution is based on order submission time. The un-
matched limit orders summarize into the state of the book. The dataset contains
the book from the first until the fifth level, except for the invisible part of the
depth from iceberg orders.
1.3.2 Sample Description
Our sample contains all stocks that were part of the Open Market (Mercado
Open) and the New Market (Nuevo Mercado) from January until December 2003.
Stocks from the fixing markets are not considered because they do not trade in
a continuous limit order market. Stocks in the Latibex-segment, which contains
Latin-American stocks that are cross-listed in Spain, are discarded as well. We
remove stocks that have an average daily number of trades that is less than 10,
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and an average price below e0.5. Our final sample consists of 88 stocks. The
sample period covers all trading days for the stock during 2003, which is 250
days for most stocks.
We combine two data files in our analysis. One file contains data on the limit
order book and shows all updates of the first five levels in the book for each
stock in the sample, time-stamped to the nearest hundredth of a second. Every
update contains the five best prices at both sides of the book and their respective
depths. A second file contains all trades executed during the continuous trading
session. The trading data show price and size of each trade and are time-stamped
to the nearest second. Pre-opening or post-closing orders are not included since
the trading mechanism during this period is different from the one during the
trading day. Both book updates and trades are indexed. The index numbers and
time stamps allow for a perfect matching of trade and order book data. We only
consider observations during the continuous trading session.
Table 1.1 Panel A displays some descriptive statistics for the sample. The
cross-sectional mean, standard deviation, median, quantiles and 5th and 95th
percentile for a selection of daily stock characteristics (pooled across stocks and
days) is shown.
Our sample contains small as well as large firms, with a 5th and 95th per-
centile of daily market capitalization at 58 million euro and 17 billion euro re-
spectively. The median firm has a market value of 1.1 billion euro and a stock
price of 10 euro. There is also considerable variation in trading activity. The 5th
percentile of the number of transactions (euro volume traded) is merely 7 trades
(17,100 euro traded). By contrast, the 95th percentile is at 1,672 transactions
(64,947,610 euro traded) per day. The median stock has 82 transactions per day
with 828,880 euro transacted. The low levels of trading and quoting activity (an
average of 2,037 and median of 308 book updates per day) indicate that these
data are before the advent of high-frequency trading. For about 5% of the ob-
servations the daily spread is close to its minimum value of 1 tick. The mean
(median) spread is 5.79 (3.24) ticks, or 0.60% (0.40%) when measured relative to
the midquote. The PIN is a measure of informed trading discussed in Subsection
1.4.3.
Table 1.1 Panel B displays descriptive statistics for the liquidity measures
from our sample, based on daily observations of these measures (with the daily
measures being time-weighted averages across the trading day). The Slope of
the order book is the average of the bid and ask slope, and is decreasing as more
information from deeper in the order book is incorporated. The Depth (X) mea-
sure is defined at levels of depth relatively close to the midquote, as well as levels
of depth further down the order book. By definition, Depth (X) increases in X.
Depth (X) has observations of zero depth for X close to the midquote for stocks
with relatively large spreads. The mean (median) Depth (X) at 30 basis points
is 253,150 euro (30,820 euro), while the mean (median) at 100 basis points is
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for each of the 88 stocks in our sample: the mean, standard
deviation, median, 5th percentile, first quantile, median, third quantile and 95th percentile of selected
variables based on daily observations. Panel A presents statistics on the market value of the stock and
order book and trade characteristics. Volume and trade size are measured in thousands of euro. The
number of updates is the total number of order book updates during a day: trades, limit order submissions,
cancellations and modifications. Market value is measured in millions of euro. The percentage spread is
measured relative to the midquote. PIN is a measure of the probability of informed trading, and its
(monthly) estimation is detailed in . Panel B shows statistics on order book state (liquidity) measures.
Slope is an elasticity-based measure of order book liquidity that combines information from different
levels in the order book. It is the average of the slopes of the bid and ask side. Its value is divided by 100.
Depth (X) combines bid and ask depth expressed in thousands of euro and measured as X basis points
away from the midquote. CRT is the cost of a round trip transaction of a given size, either (1) the mean
trade size, (2) the mean trade size plus one standard deviation, (3) the mean trade size plus two standard
deviations. It is expressed relative to the total euro size of the transaction. Spread, Slope , Depth (X)
and CRT are time-weighted over the trading day. Price is volume-weighted over the trading day. Panel
C (Panel D)presents similar statistics as Panel A (Panel B), but then for 3 subsamples based on market
capitalization tertiles.
Panel A: Stock Characteristics
Mean St. Dev. P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95
Market Value 3,762.21 8,050.63 58.48 216.27 1,134.53 2,955.07 17,457.12
Price 12.44 9.84 1.27 4.83 10.14 17.14 34.66
Volatility 1.25% 0.81% 0.41% 0.73% 1.04% 1.52% 2.72%
Volume 12,357.96 42,190.72 17.10 131.87 828.88 4,986.17 64,947.61
Nr Trades 346.37 729.89 7.00 22.00 82.00 338.00 1,672.00
Trade Size 16.19 31.93 1.73 4.89 9.51 19.36 50.43
Nr Updates 1,174.87 2,039.18 21.00 75.00 308.00 1,382.00 5,452.80
Spread tick 5.79 8.92 1.04 1.77 3.24 6.67 18.35
% 0.60% 1.09% 0.11% 0.22% 0.40% 0.77% 1.83%
PIN 22.21% 11.18% 9.84% 15.05% 19.90% 25.82% 42.95%
Panel B: Order Book State/Liquidity Measures
Mean St. Dev. P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95
l.1 64.39 54.24 8.86 23.03 47.66 89.00 181.94
Slope l.3 22.30 18.37 3.40 8.22 16.65 30.78 61.87
l.5 13.55 11.07 2.11 5.07 10.16 18.69 37.33
30 b.p. 253.15 921.70 0.00 3.26 30.82 154.18 1,043.62
Depth (X) 70 b.p. 464.04 1,570.31 0.00 27.58 105.61 308.58 1,568.07
100 b.p. 504.14 1,610.78 3.41 46.11 140.66 346.25 1,757.91
m 0.87% 1.10% 0.14% 0.29% 0.57% 1.09% 2.53%
CRT m+sd 1.40% 1.66% 0.25% 0.51% 0.96% 1.76% 3.99%
m+2sd 1.71% 1.95% 0.32% 0.66% 1.20% 2.13% 4.66%
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Table 1.1 continued.
Panel C: Stock Characteristics by Subsample
Mean P5 Median P95 Mean P5 Median P95 Mean P5 Median P95
Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap
Market Value 259.97 21.39 111.15 810.36 1,270.06 307.90 1,096.72 4,118.19 9,840.90 1,421.34 4,277.69 36,764.37
Price 6.97 0.53 4.17 17.25 12.81 3.06 11.11 25.43 17.53 4.48 14.97 40.71
Volatility 1.35% 0.44% 1.13% 3.02% 1.12% 0.31% 0.92% 2.58% 1.29% 0.47% 1.06% 2.70%
Volume 299.17 6.64 94.87 1,218.81 2,007.36 47.57 757.06 7,039.29 35,120.91 684.76 8,115.76 179,606.98
Nr Trades 37.63 4.00 20.00 119.95 170.35 9.00 77.00 503.00 837.01 70.55 441.00 3,252.50
Trade Size 7.69 1.01 4.35 21.77 13.72 2.75 9.32 31.07 27.22 5.95 21.36 64.44
Nr Updates 131.51 15.00 60.00 455.00 509.83 30.00 271.00 1,518.50 2,905.60 315.00 1,943.00 9,044.05
Spread tick 6.77 1.00 3.50 24.25 6.71 1.14 3.61 21.73 3.85 1.05 2.59 10.22
% 1.08% 0.32% 0.86% 2.58% 0.51% 0.17% 0.39% 1.19% 0.23% 0.09% 0.19% 0.55%
PIN 25.88% 10.05% 23.02% 57.12% 21.57% 8.97% 19.87% 40.02% 18.71% 10.33% 17.11% 32.36%
AS 33.43% 1.70% 27.04% 82.05% 27.33% 2.56% 21.07% 76.29% 33.28% 1.34% 26.87% 82.88%
Panel C: Order Book State/Liquidity Measures by Subsample
Mean P5 Median P95 Mean P5 Median P95 Mean P5 Median P95
Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap
l.1 24.33 6.24 19.87 56.74 53.39 13.67 48.25 112.91 115.80 38.69 106.04 217.18
Slope l.3 8.56 2.40 7.06 19.73 18.67 5.52 16.86 38.80 39.78 13.65 36.72 73.66
l.5 5.23 1.51 4.33 11.95 11.36 3.47 10.25 23.54 24.04 8.31 22.25 44.36
Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap
30 b.p. 41.23 0.00 2.28 44.45 57.91 0.00 31.74 202.62 684.48 26.44 243.11 2,865.67
Depth (X) 70 b.p. 87.50 0.00 18.92 140.98 152.34 18.06 105.49 430.84 1,194.94 98.15 410.04 5,722.36
100 b.p. 108.27 0.42 34.43 191.04 187.10 32.82 139.94 490.56 1,262.66 129.04 442.02 5,797.44
Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap
m 1.58% 0.51% 1.25% 3.52% 0.74% 0.23% 0.57% 1.75% 0.30% 0.12% 0.25% 0.68%
CRT m+sd 2.40% 0.78% 1.94% 5.31% 1.28% 0.40% 0.99% 3.08% 0.53% 0.17% 0.44% 1.17%
m+2sd 2.88% 0.96% 2.35% 6.21% 1.58% 0.52% 1.26% 3.56% 0.67% 0.22% 0.58% 1.44%
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504,140 euro (140,660 euro). The cost of a round-trip transaction is the sum of
the cost to buy at the ask side CT ask and the cost to immediately sell at the bid
side CT bid, for a transaction of a given size and it is expressed relative to the size.
The mean (median) cost of a round-trip transaction of mean size is 0.87% (0.57%)
of the value of the transaction. This is a little bit more than the relative spread,
suggesting that the mean trade size consumes on average more depth than avail-
able at the best quotes. It increases up to 1.71% (1.20%) for a transaction size
equal to the mean plus 2 standard deviations.
We examine differences between subsamples of our stocks more closely in
Panels C and D of Table 1.1. We distinguish between three subsamples on the
basis of the free-float market capitalization: small cap, mid cap and large cap.5
The mean (median) market value in the small cap sample is 260 million euro (111
million euro), while it is 1.27 billion euro (1.097 billion euro) for mid cap stocks
and 9.841 billion euro (4.278 billion euro) for the large cap subsample. There
is also quite a large difference in trading activity and liquidity. The average
daily volume is 299,170 euro for small cap stocks, with only about 38 trades a
day and 132 limit order book updates. For large cap stocks the average daily
trading volume is much higher at 35,120,910 euro. The number of trades is
837 per day on average, and the limit order book is updated 2,906 per day –
order submissions, cancellations and modifications. The average relative spread
is 1.08% of the midquote for small cap stocks and 0.23% for large cap stocks.
Depth at 30 basis points (100 basis points) around the midquote is 41,230 euro
(108,270 euro) for small cap stocks and 684,480 euro (1,262,660 euro) for large
cap stocks. Values for market capitalization, trading activity and liquidity for
mid cap stocks are in between that of small cap stocks and large cap stocks.
However, they appear to be closer to that of small cap stocks than mid cap stocks.
In fact, the market capitalization and trading activity of our sample is dominated
by a handful of stocks, while the majority of stocks is rather illiquid. We exploit
the differences between different stocks in Section 1.4.
Summary statistics of the imbalances in the state of the book are presented
in Panel A of Table 1.2, based on daily time-weighted measures. For all mea-
sures the ask side appears more liquid than the bid side, as both the mean and
median are slightly negative. The mean (median) imbalance in the Slope of the
order book using the first level is -0.34% (-0.21%). The order book is on average
(median) 1.51% (0.00%) deeper on the ask side compared to the bid side at 30 ba-
sis points around the midquote, while the cost of a trade is on average (median)
0.98% (0.22%) higher on on the bid side than on the ask side. Furthermore, the
more information from deeper in the book is used to calculate imbalance mea-
sures, the greater becomes the imbalance between the ask and bid side. The
average (median) imbalance in Depth (X) amounts to -2.94% (-2.19%) at 100
5For each month we sort stocks into subsamples of equal size based on their free-float market
capitalization.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics: Imbalances in the Limit Order Book
Panel A presents statistics on the the imbalance in the state (liquidity) of the order book between the
bid and ask side (in percentage points), using the following three measures of liquidity. Slope is an
elasticity-based measure of order book liquidity that combines information from different levels in the
order book. Depth (X) combines bid and ask depth expressed in thousands of euro and measured as
X basis points away from the midquote. CT is the cost of a transaction of a given size, either (1) the
mean trade size, (2) the mean trade size plus one standard deviation, (3) the mean trade size plus two
standard deviations. The imbalance in order book Slope is defined in Equation (1.4), the Depth (X)
imbalance is defined in Equation (1.7) and the CT imbalance is defined in Equation (1.8). Imbalances are
time-weighted throughout the trading day. Panel B presents correlations between daily order book state
imbalance measures.
Panel A: Imbalances in the Order Book State
Mean St. Dev. P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95
l.1 -0.34 9.41 -10.97 -2.99 -0.21 2.41 9.49
Slope l.3 -0.56 5.76 -9.79 -2.67 -0.25 1.91 7.46
l.5 -0.60 5.56 -9.66 -2.63 -0.28 1.81 7.11
30 b.p. -1.51 18.65 -32.93 -9.77 0.00 6.65 27.82
Depth (X) 70 b.p. -2.33 26.11 -47.84 -16.79 -0.88 12.73 40.61
100 b.p. -2.94 27.70 -50.84 -19.00 -2.19 13.35 42.82
m -0.98 12.05 -21.63 -5.03 -0.22 3.71 16.92
CT m+sd -1.27 16.76 -30.64 -9.36 -0.55 7.28 25.46
m+2sd -1.26 17.81 -32.20 -10.63 -0.67 8.42 27.23
Panel B: Correlations in Imbalances in the Order Book State
Slope Depth (X) CT
l.1 l.3 l.5 30 b.p. 70 b.p. 100 b.p. m m+sd m+2sd
l.1 1.00
Slope l.3 0.44 1.00
l.5 0.43 0.97 1.00
30 b.p. 0.38 0.58 0.57 1.00
Depth (X) 70 b.p. 0.36 0.60 0.59 0.65 1.00
100 b.p. 0.33 0.59 0.59 0.53 0.87 1.00
m 0.48 0.72 0.70 0.59 0.60 0.57 1.00
CT m+sd 0.33 0.62 0.63 0.59 0.70 0.70 0.69 1.00
m+2sd 0.26 0.54 0.57 0.53 0.69 0.71 0.55 0.93 1.00
basis points around the midquote. Imbalances in the Slope of the book take less
extreme values, with a range from -9.66% to 7.11% between the 5th and 95th per-
centile when using the 5 best levels, compared to a -50.84% to 42.82% for Depth
(100). Do note that these are daily time-weighted imbalances and at higher fre-
quencies the imbalances can take on more extreme values.
Correlations between the imbalances are shown in Panel B of Table 1.2. All
imbalance measures are positively correlated. Correlations between intermedi-
ate and deeper order book imbalance measures are in general quite large: 0.97
for the Slope, 0.87 for Depth (X) and 0.93 for CT . Correlation between the top-
of-the-book imbalances and intermediate imbalances are lower, with 0.44 for the
Slope, 0.65 for Depth (X) and 0.69 for CT .
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1.3.3 Book Imbalances and Return Predictability
Table 1.3 shows that returns are statistically predictable using limit order book
information over 5 minute intervals. Recall that all models are estimated on a
per stock per month basis. We exclude, for each type of measure, all stock-month
combinations for which imbalances are not defined or equal to zero for more than
50% of the observations. This leaves us with a full sample for the Slope mea-
sure, 714 stock-month combinations for the Depth (X) measure and 863 stock-
month combinations for the CT measure. The first column present the average
coefficient of the imbalance measure, β1 in Equation (1.1) over all regressions,
while the second column presents the average t-statistic, which ranges between
4.57 and 7.79, depending on the model, with standard errors adjusted using the
Newey-West correction for serial correlation. The third column shows the per-
centage of regressions for which the imbalance measure was significant at the
5% level. Depending on the measure used, limit order book imbalances are sig-
nificantly related to future returns for 88% to 93% of the relevant sample. As our
main determinant of predictability we investigate the adjusted R2 in columns 4
to 9. The mean (column 4) varies between 1.46% and 2.77%, the median (column
7) between 1.30% and 2.36%. Furthermore, columns 5 and 9 present the 5th and
95th percentile. For the 5th percentile estimates are in the range -0.03% - 0.17%,
wile for the 95th percentile the range is 3.40% - 8.25%. The values are in line
with previous research on intraday return predictability using past order flow
or order book information (see, e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2005,
2008; Cao, Hansch, and Wang, 2009; Chung and Hrazdil, 2012). Note that there
is considerable variation in adjusted R2 across the sample.
Furthermore, measures that use information from deeper in the book have
lower predictive power than those that use information closer to the best prices.
For instance, the mean adjusted R2 from the Depth (X) measure declines from
2.57% at 30 basis points to 1.46% at 100 basis points. As more information from
deeper in the limit order book is aggregated in these imbalance measures the
adjusted R2s as well as the t-statistics and thus the number of statistically sig-
nificant imbalances decreases. Orders that are submitted deeper in the order
book appear to have a weaker relation to future price movements. When aggre-
gated together with more informative top-of-the-book orders the overall predic-
tive ability of the limit order book information decreases. The stronger relation-
ship between future returns and top-of-the-order-book imbalances also holds for
the Slope and CT , although less outspoken. For the CT the decline using deeper
order book information is not for all stock-months in the sample.
Our result that top-of-the-book information is most relevant confirms previ-
ous findings from Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009). Orders further down the order
book contain few relevant information with regard to the direction and size of
future short-term price movements, above what is included in orders at the best
levels of the book. There are two potential explanations for this finding, related
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Table 1.3: Return predictability at 5 minute intervals
This table presents estimates of the different models from Equation (1.1). The independent variable is
the return measured during a 5 minute interval (expressed in basis points). Explanatory variables are
imbalances in the order book as defined in Subsection 1.2.2. The models are estimated on a per stock and
per month basis for the 88 stocks in our sample, for a total of 1,056 stock-months. When an imbalance
measure is not defined or only has values that are different from zero for less than 50% of the observations,
we do not include the stock-month in our sample for that type of measure. For the slope measure we have
results for the full stock-month sample, for the Depth (X) measure we have 714 stock-months (67.61%
of the sample), for the CT measure we have 863 stock-months (81.72% of the sample). The first column
shows the average coefficient, the second column shows the average t-statistic based on Newey-West
HAC standard errors. The third column shows the percentage of regressions for which the coefficient of
the imbalance is significantly positive at the 5% level. Columns 4 to 9 show distributional characteristics
of the adjusted R2 that are estimated: mean, quartiles, 5th and 95th percentiles.
Coeff t-stat %sign Adj R2
Mean P5 Q3 Median Q3 P95
l.1 20.00 7.79 89.87% 2.77% 0.04% 0.74% 1.58% 2.79% 8.25%
Slope l.3 22.99 5.35 87.69% 2.39% 0.13% 0.82% 1.83% 3.30% 6.33%
l.5 22.32 5.31 87.69% 2.32% 0.08% 0.77% 1.77% 3.22% 6.16%
30 b.p. 5.86 6.39 92.86% 2.57% 0.17% 1.13% 2.36% 3.68% 5.64%
Depth (X) 70 b.p. 6.21 5.16 91.74% 1.90% 0.13% 0.92% 1.71% 2.63% 4.25%
100 b.p. 6.27 4.57 89.92% 1.46% 0.10% 0.69% 1.30% 1.98% 3.40%
m 8.68 5.37 91.66% 2.26% -0.01% 1.01% 2.12% 3.35% 5.05%
CT m+sd 8.12 5.64 90.27% 2.44% -0.02% 0.91% 2.07% 3.74% 5.98%
m+2sd 8.13 5.28 88.76% 2.14% -0.03% 0.73% 1.81% 3.23% 5.33%
to the two potential sources we put forward to explain why order imbalances can
predict returns. The first is related to informed trading in the limit order book.
If predictability is caused by informed limit order submissions and the top of the
order book is shown to be a better predictor of future returns compared to deeper
levels of the order book, then informed traders submit more orders to the top of
the book. Unfortunately we have little guidance on where in the limit order book
informed traders are more likely to submit orders. Informed traders may prefer
the top of the order book to increase their execution probability. But they may
also prefer to hide their information deeper in the book. A second explanation
is related to the order choice hypothesis. When patient traders decide on their
order aggressiveness based on the state of the limit order book, their decision has
the largest impact on prices when they switch from a limit order at the first level
(the top of the order book) to a more aggressive order (or vice versa). Therefore
imbalances at the top of the order book should be stronger related to future price
movements than imbalances deeper in the order book, at least in the short run.
We further investigate the potential sources of predictability using order book
information in the following section.
1.4 What Explains Return Predictability on the Basis of the Limit
Order Book?
We now address the question of what drives return predictability. Our main
question of interest is whether return predictability is due to informed trading
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in the limit order book and thus whether imbalances in the limit order book
carry fundamental information (the informed trading hypothesis), or whether
returns are predictable because imbalances in the limit order book cause traders
to generate short-term price pressure (the order choice hypothesis). We address
this question by conducting three analyses. In the first subsection, we compare
predictability over different time horizons. In the second subsection intraday
differences in predictability are considered. Finally, the last subsection looks at
determinants of predictability in a cross-sectional framework.
1.4.1 Predictability at Short versus Longer Horizons
In a first analysis, we study whether there is a difference in return predictabil-
ity over different horizons. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) find that
lagged market order imbalances lose their predictive ability over longer hori-
zons, as the coefficient estimate, t-statistic and adjusted R2 converge to zero.
They conjecture that autocorrelated market order imbalances cause the special-
ist to alter his prices because of inventory concerns. Arbitrageurs are able to
estimate order imbalances and their influence, but it takes a few minutes. As
a reaction, they engage in countervailing trades, which removes predictability
of returns. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) argue that these counter-
vailing trades make the market efficient after a period of 30 minutes or less. An
implication of their finding that lagged order imbalances cannot predict returns
at longer horizons, is that informed traders do not engage in predictable order
splitting, at least with regard to market orders. Market order imbalances do
not carry any fundamental information on future prices, i.e. any information is
instantaneously incorporated.
In order to evaluate whether order book state imbalances are informative, we
estimate our models from Equation (1.1) for different time horizons and compare
the results. We take snapshots of the book and calculate returns over intervals of
1, 2, 5, 10, 15 and 30 minutes. Results are presented in Table 1.4. Panel A shows
a summary of the results based on the full stock-month sample, using imbalances
in the order book slope, depth and the cost of a trade as a predictor (for each type
of measure we show results of 3 versions to compare the top of the order book
with the deeper book). As before, the average of the estimated coefficients and
t-statistics together with the accompanying number of regressions with signifi-
cant coefficients at the 5% level are shown in the first four columns. The last two
columns show the mean and median adjusted R2s. The adjusted R2, our main
measure of predictability, first increases with the time horizon, but subsequently
drops to lower levels. The initial increase suggest that not all price relevant in-
formation contained in the order book is instantaneously reflected into prices,
but the drop in adjusted R2s also shows that at least a part of the effect is tran-
sitory in nature. The transitory price effect of order book imbalances is because
traders choose their order aggressiveness on the basis of the current state of the
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order book. Because traders’ aggressiveness is correlated with price and quote
changes order book imbalances can predict future returns. When price move-
ments are unrelated to the fundamental value of the security arbitrageurs will
step in and submit orders against the direction of transitory price movements,
thereby decreasing predictability of returns over longer horizons. As shown by
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005) it may take time for arbitrageurs to
act on temporary price changes and remove predictability.
When comparing top-of-the-book measures with deeper order book measures
notice that predictability, as measured by the adjusted R2, is in general higher
for the former measures for most intervals. The top of the book seems to contain
most useful information on future price changes. The exception is the CT mea-
sure for which predictability is in general higher for the intermediate levels of
order book information. When looking at the pattern we observe a difference in
the decrease of predictability over time. In particular for the Depth (X) measure
the drop in predictability is less sharp when more information from deeper in the
limit order book is used. The mean and median adjusted R2 decreases between
5 and 10 minutes for Depth (30), but only decrease between 15 and 30 minutes
for Depth (100) and remains at relatively high levels. There are two potential
explanations. First, when informed traders submit more orders deeper in the
order book, limit order book measures containing more information from deeper
in the order book should contain more information, and hence bear a less tran-
sitory relation to future returns. Second, the state of the order book at the top
is likely to be most relevant to impact traders’ order submission decisions at the
top of the book, and therefore also the best bid and ask prices. The deeper state
of the order book should only affect order submission behavior that is not at the
top. However, by incentivizing traders deeper in the order book to be more or less
aggressive, indirectly also the state of the order book at the top is affected after
a while, and finally order submission behavior at the top, and hence prices – but
with a lag.
Note that while the magnitude of the coefficients is increasing over time hori-
zons, the statistical significance decreases. For instance, for the Slope the aver-
age t-statistic is monotonically decreasing over all intervals from a range of 8.17
- 8.59 for 1 minute intervals to 2.44 - 2.80 for 30 minute intervals. There is also
a sharp drop in the number of regressions for which the order book slope is sig-
nificant from 15 minute to 30 minute intervals, from 80.97% - 82.48% to 59.85%
- 62.97%. This decrease in statistical significance is at least partially determined
by the reduced power of the test. As the number of observations decreases (by a
factor 30) so does the estimation error increase.
We now turn to differences in subsamples based on market capitalization ter-
tiles. Panel B of Table 1.4 shows that there are remarkable differences in mean
and median adjusted R2 between small cap stocks and large cap stocks. For
small cap stocks predictability is the lowest at high frequencies and then in-
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Table 1.4: Return predictability at different horizons
This table presents estimates of the different models from Equation (1.1) for different time horizons [t-1,t]. The independent variable is the return
measured during time intervals of 1, 2, 5, 10, 15 or 30 minutes (expressed in basis points). Explanatory variables are imbalances in the order book
as defined in Subsection 1.2.2. The models are estimated on a per stock and per month basis for the 88 stocks in our sample, for a total of 1,056
stock-months. When an imbalance measure is not defined or only has values that are different from zero for less than 50% of the observations, we
do not include the stock-month in our sample for that type of measure. For the slope measure we have results for the full stock-month sample, for
the Depth (X) measure we have 715 stock-months (67.71% of the sample), for the CT measure we have 863 stock-months (81.72% of the sample). In
Panel A we present a summary of the results based on the total sample in five columns for different imbalance measures. The first column shows
the average coefficient, the second column shows the average t-statistic based on Newey-West HAC standard errors. The third column shows the
percentage of regressions for which the coefficient of the imbalance is significantly positive at the 5% level. The fourth column shows the mean
adjusted R2 and the median is shown in the fifth column.
In Panel B we present the mean and median adjusted R2 for the same models as in Panel A, but we break down results according to the market
capitalization of the stocks. Small cap stocks are those in the first tertile, mid cap stocks are those in the second tertile, and large cap stocks are
those in the third tertile according to the size of their free float market capitalization.
Panel A: Total Sample
Coeff t-stat %sign Adj R Coeff t-stat %sign Adj R Coeff t-stat %sign Adj R
Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med
Slope l. 1 Slope l. 3 Slope l. 5
1 min. 7.75 8.17 90.81% 1.66% 0.89% 8.90 8.59 88.73% 1.67% 0.85% 8.86 8.53 88.73% 1.64% 0.82%
2 min. 12.53 6.87 90.72% 2.10% 1.36% 13.72 7.25 88.35% 2.01% 1.38% 13.85 7.20 87.97% 1.98% 1.35%
5 min. 20.00 7.79 89.87% 2.77% 1.58% 22.99 5.35 87.69% 2.39% 1.83% 22.32 5.31 87.69% 2.32% 1.77%
10 min. 24.99 5.05 85.80% 2.73% 1.60% 35.48 4.14 86.36% 2.52% 1.99% 34.26 4.10 85.04% 2.43% 1.89%
15 min. 31.48 3.97 80.97% 2.67% 1.56% 38.55 3.50 82.48% 2.59% 1.95% 39.18 3.47 81.63% 2.51% 1.85%
30 min. 34.99 2.80 59.85% 2.28% 1.22% 47.50 2.47 62.97% 2.42% 1.55% 49.51 2.44 61.65% 2.32% 1.51%
Depth (30 b.p.) Depth (70 b.p.) Depth (100 b.p.)
1 min. 2.25 10.28 94.41% 1.69% 1.59% 2.21 7.76 93.01% 1.01% 0.89% 2.17 6.92 92.45% 0.76% 0.69%
2 min. 3.44 8.69 94.27% 2.15% 1.98% 3.47 6.71 93.43% 1.41% 1.20% 3.42 5.93 91.75% 1.06% 0.96%
5 min. 5.86 6.39 92.86% 2.57% 2.36% 6.21 5.16 91.74% 1.90% 1.71% 6.27 4.57 89.92% 1.46% 1.30%
10 min. 7.66 4.70 90.36% 2.53% 2.32% 8.55 4.03 86.87% 2.13% 1.93% 8.66 3.55 84.78% 1.64% 1.41%
15 min. 8.28 3.84 87.71% 2.44% 2.18% 9.35 3.36 82.68% 2.20% 1.76% 9.52 2.96 77.51% 1.71% 1.41%
30 min. 9.63 2.48 61.79% 1.99% 1.43% 11.12 2.32 60.53% 1.99% 1.43% 11.54 2.08 54.53% 1.62% 1.10%
CT (m) CT (m+sd) CT (m+2sd)
1 min. 3.26 7.96 92.47% 1.39% 0.91% 2.81 8.15 90.73% 1.35% 0.73% 2.74 7.53 90.50% 1.11% 0.63%
2 min. 5.14 6.94 92.13% 1.81% 1.49% 4.58 7.18 91.09% 1.85% 1.27% 4.51 6.65 90.05% 1.56% 1.06%
5 min. 8.68 5.37 91.66% 2.26% 2.12% 8.12 5.64 90.27% 2.44% 2.07% 8.13 5.28 88.76% 2.14% 1.81%
10 min. 12.40 4.24 90.54% 2.50% 2.33% 11.86 4.53 89.27% 2.77% 2.53% 12.07 4.29 88.12% 2.49% 2.19%
15 min. 14.82 3.66 88.34% 2.68% 2.30% 14.40 3.92 88.34% 2.93% 2.66% 14.46 3.68 85.68% 2.63% 2.34%
30 min. 18.48 2.66 69.32% 2.59% 2.02% 18.62 2.87 75.43% 2.89% 2.31% 18.93 2.71 73.01% 2.64% 2.05%
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Table 1.4 continued.
Panel B: Subsamples based on market capitalisation
Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap Small Cap Mid Cap Large Cap
Adj R2 Adj R2 Adj R2 Adj R2 Adj R2 Adj R2 Adj R2 Adj R2 Adj R2
Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med
Slope l. 1 Slope l. 3 Slope l. 5
1 min. 0.77% 0.24% 1.33% 0.83% 2.89% 2.22% 0.54% 0.26% 1.27% 0.79% 3.21% 2.75% 0.52% 0.25% 1.24% 0.76% 3.18% 2.66%
2 min. 1.23% 0.40% 2.01% 1.30% 3.06% 2.48% 0.86% 0.45% 1.84% 1.32% 3.34% 3.03% 0.83% 0.44% 1.80% 1.23% 3.30% 2.95%
5 min. 2.17% 0.83% 3.14% 1.71% 2.99% 2.04% 1.60% 0.98% 2.51% 1.95% 3.05% 2.74% 1.52% 0.92% 2.42% 1.84% 3.01% 2.69%
10 min. 2.40% 1.24% 3.29% 1.91% 2.48% 1.59% 2.29% 1.55% 2.82% 2.35% 2.44% 2.04% 2.18% 1.48% 2.69% 2.23% 2.41% 2.04%
15 min. 2.91% 1.64% 3.00% 1.95% 2.08% 1.09% 2.76% 1.97% 2.91% 2.30% 2.09% 1.47% 2.68% 1.91% 2.77% 2.25% 2.06% 1.46%
30 min. 2.83% 1.77% 2.68% 1.55% 1.31% 0.44% 3.16% 2.31% 2.71% 2.02% 1.37% 0.75% 3.10% 2.16% 2.53% 1.90% 1.33% 0.71%
Depth (30 b.p.) Depth (70 b.p.) Depth (100 b.p.)
1 min. 0.64% 0.35% 1.14% 0.97% 2.44% 2.36% 0.69% 0.47% 0.82% 0.67% 1.26% 1.14% 0.57% 0.37% 0.59% 0.51% 0.95% 0.91%
2 min. 0.93% 0.56% 1.68% 1.50% 2.89% 2.90% 1.05% 0.79% 1.27% 1.10% 1.64% 1.48% 0.87% 0.59% 0.91% 0.79% 1.23% 1.15%
5 min. 1.45% 1.13% 2.31% 2.12% 3.08% 3.08% 1.64% 1.39% 1.93% 1.81% 1.95% 1.74% 1.36% 1.10% 1.46% 1.35% 1.48% 1.32%
10 min. 1.73% 1.39% 2.54% 2.52% 2.75% 2.55% 2.08% 1.90% 2.37% 2.17% 1.93% 1.63% 1.77% 1.59% 1.81% 1.63% 1.47% 1.27%
15 min. 1.92% 1.72% 2.65% 2.41% 2.40% 2.07% 2.47% 2.16% 2.64% 2.31% 1.75% 1.34% 2.06% 1.88% 2.00% 1.81% 1.36% 0.97%
30 min. 2.06% 1.50% 2.33% 1.70% 1.69% 0.95% 2.74% 2.43% 2.54% 2.05% 1.31% 0.63% 2.45% 2.10% 2.00% 1.52% 1.08% 0.53%
CT (m) CT (m+sd) CT (m+2sd)
1 min. 0.53% 0.37% 1.22% 0.97% 2.62% 2.90% 0.49% 0.33% 1.03% 0.74% 2.76% 3.04% 0.44% 0.28% 0.82% 0.59% 2.26% 2.43%
2 min. 0.85% 0.66% 1.80% 1.64% 2.95% 3.12% 0.80% 0.59% 1.60% 1.24% 3.40% 3.69% 0.72% 0.51% 1.30% 0.98% 2.91% 3.09%
5 min. 1.54% 1.33% 2.49% 2.41% 2.80% 2.85% 1.43% 1.16% 2.39% 2.13% 3.70% 3.73% 1.28% 1.00% 2.00% 1.80% 3.34% 3.29%
10 min. 2.16% 2.03% 2.92% 2.87% 2.34% 2.12% 2.06% 1.88% 2.91% 2.81% 3.41% 3.19% 1.87% 1.64% 2.50% 2.28% 3.19% 3.12%
15 min. 2.69% 2.44% 3.23% 2.87% 1.95% 1.53% 2.55% 2.25% 3.21% 3.06% 3.02% 2.70% 2.29% 1.97% 2.76% 2.53% 2.87% 2.51%
30 min. 3.17% 2.76% 3.04% 2.45% 1.32% 0.71% 3.20% 2.77% 3.19% 2.65% 2.11% 1.45% 2.92% 2.36% 2.81% 2.21% 2.07% 1.49%
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creases for longer time horizons. For instance, the mean (median) adjusted R2
is 0.54% (0.26%) for Slope (l.3) at a 1 minute horizon, and then increases up to
3.16% (2.31%) at a 30-minute horizon. For large caps we observe a mean (me-
dian) adjusted R2 of 3.21% (2.75%) at a 1 minute horizon and 1.37% (0.75%) at
a 30-minute horizon. The pattern is similar for other measures. This opposite
pattern suggests that there is a large difference in predictability between stocks
of a different market capitalization, which can proxy for a different liquidity or
trading activity.6 For mid-cap stocks we find in-between results.
A faster decrease in predictability over time for larger stocks is in line with
the order choice explanation, and not with the informed trading explanation. If
predictability is transitory it decreases at a faster rate for more actively traded
stocks, as arbitrageurs or informed traders step in and remove predictability
at a faster pace. Then why does predictability increase at first, and why does it
increase slower for less actively traded stocks? Because it takes an order submis-
sion (or cancellation, or modification) to move the price. In our sample the order
book is not updated every minute for all stocks. In fact, from Panel C in Table
1.1 we observe that for large cap stocks there are on average (median) 2,905.6
(1,943) updates per day. But even for this subsample in the 5th percentile we ob-
serve only 315 updates. For mid cap stocks the average (median) drops to 509.83
(217), and for small caps it is only 131.51 (60), while there are 510 minutes in
a trading day. As a consequence, for less actively traded stocks it takes more
time for prices to adjust to the state of the book, while it also takes more time for
prices of these stock to revert and remove the transitory effect.
1.4.2 Time of Day Patterns in Predictability
We now proceed with our second analysis to address the determinants of return
predictability. In particular we study time of day patterns in predictability. To do
so we classify all observations for a stock into five subperiods of 102 minutes each
(1/5th of the trading day), based on the time of the day and re-estimate Equation
(1.1) for each of those five subsamples. By documenting the intraday pattern of
return predictability based on book information we aim to gain further insight
into the drivers of predictability.
We first document the behavior of a number of market variables throughout
the trading day in our sample. Figure 1.1 shows intraday patterns for volatil-
ity, the relative bid-ask spread, trading volume and the number of limit order
book updates during each of our intraday subperiods, based on 5 minute snap-
shots of the order book. To be able to compare the intraday pattern across stocks
and over time, we standardize these variables by subtracting the stock and day
specific mean, and dividing by the standard deviation. In Panel (a) we plot the
absolute value of the return, as a proxy for realized volatility over an interval,
6We also look at subsamples based on number of trades or volume and find a similar pattern.
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Figure 1.1: Intraday Patterns in Market Variables
This figure presents intraday patterns of a number of market variables. For each stock in our sample we
measure the market variable at each 5-minute observation and standardize variables by subtracting the
day-specific mean and dividing by the standard deviation. These figures show the mean values of these
standardized variables at five intraday subperiods of equal length (see Subsection 1.4.2), for the entire
sample. Panel (a) shows the intraday pattern of the absolute value of the price return and the quoted
bid-ask spread, while Panel (b) focuses on the volume and number of limit order book updates and Panel
(c) on the Depth (X) measure. Depth (X) combines bid and ask depth expressed in thousands of euro and
is measured as X basis points away from the midquote.
(a) Volatility and Spread (b) Trading and Quoting
and the relative bid-ask spread at the end of the snapshot as a proxy for liquid-
ity.7 Trading volume and the number of book updates (order book activity) are
plotted in Panel (b).
Consistent with previous research (see, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988;
Garvey and Wu, 2009) we find that these market variables show predictable U-
shaped (or reverse J-shaped) patterns throughout the trading day. The order
book is the most illiquid in the first period of the trading day when the bid-ask
spread is on average more than 0.4 standard deviations above its intraday mean
value. Then the market becomes more liquid throughout the day. Volatility is
also the highest at the start of the trading day and then decreases gradually
throughout the morning period. It is the lowest in the fourth subperiod, after
which it rises again. Volume and the number of order book updates follow a sim-
ilar pattern. The fourth subperiod is thus on average the quietest of the trading
day: it has the lowest volatility, the smallest bid-ask spread, lowest volumes and
lowest number of book updates. By contrast, trading and quoting activity are
concentrated in the first and final subperiod. The first subperiod is also the most
illiquid and most volatile of the day.
The (inverted) U-shape of liquidity, volatility and trading and quoting activ-
ity can be related to the existence of asymmetric information in financial mar-
7A similar pattern is obtained for other liquidity variables, i.e. Slope, Depth (X) and CRT .
Figures are available upon request.
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Table 1.5: Return predictability throughout the trading day
This table presents and analyzes estimation results of the different models from Equation (1.1) using subsamples based on the time of the day. We distinguish
between five periods of equal size throughout the trading day. The independent variable is the return measured during an interval of 5 minutes (expressed
in basis points). Explanatory variables are imbalances in the order book state as defined in Subsection 1.2.2. The models are estimated on a per stock and
per month basis for the 88 stocks in our sample, for a total of 1,056 stock-months. When an imbalance measure is not defined or only has values that are
different from zero for less than 50% of the observations, we do not include the stock-month in our sample for that type of measure. For the slope measure we
have results for the full stock-month sample, for the Depth (X) measure we have 715 stock-months (67.71% of the sample), for the CT measure we have 863
stock-months (81.72% of the sample) .In Panel A we present a summary of the results in five columns for different imbalance measures. The first column shows
the average coefficient, the second column shows the average t-statistic based on Newey-West HAC standard errors. The third column shows the percentage of
regressions for which the coefficient of the imbalance is significantly positive at the 5% level. The fourth column shows the mean adjusted R2 and the median
is shown in the fifth column.
In Panel B we present the mean difference in the adjusted R2 of the models estimated for different subsamples based on the time of the day. There are 9
subpanels, 1 for each different book imbalance measure we use. Each subpanel contains 5 rows and 5 columns. The {k, l}-element of such a subpanel is the
mean difference in adjusted R2 between the same model estimated for subperiod k and subperiod l, i.e. for each model j, the mean over all stocks i and months
m of R2i,m,j,k − R
2
i,m,j,l. By construction, values below the diagonal are the negative mirror image of values above the diagonal. In superscript we denote how
significant the difference in adjusted R2 is using a t-test, where *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. In subscript we use
the same notation to present results on the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Panel A: Summary of Results
Period Coeff t-stat %sign Adj R2 Coeff t-stat %sign Adj R2 Coeff t-stat %sign Adj R2
Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med
Slope l. 1 Slope l. 3 Slope l. 5
1 21.72 3.00 63.54% 2.47% 1.45% 34.71 2.60 65.15% 2.44% 1.83% 32.90 2.56 63.54% 2.36% 1.67%
2 19.01 4.77 68.56% 2.89% 1.95% 22.14 2.91 70.17% 2.99% 2.34% 24.00 2.88 69.41% 2.92% 2.27%
3 16.40 2.78 68.37% 2.77% 1.85% 18.59 2.97 71.12% 3.09% 2.24% 19.67 2.95 70.27% 3.05% 2.20%
4 13.63 2.83 60.61% 2.27% 1.45% 14.52 2.63 64.68% 2.54% 1.79% 14.42 2.60 63.83% 2.48% 1.74%
5 20.01 2.55 64.58% 2.37% 1.41% 21.53 2.73 66.57% 2.56% 1.70% 19.91 2.69 65.06% 2.50% 1.64%
Depth (30 b.p.) Depth (70 b.p.) Depth (100 b.p.)
1 7.31 3.05 78.57% 2.63% 2.14% 8.07 2.72 70.87% 2.45% 2.03% 8.26 2.44 66.53% 1.99% 1.56%
2 6.19 3.34 83.45% 3.21% 2.77% 6.28 2.63 72.83% 2.20% 1.78% 6.41 2.32 63.03% 1.68% 1.27%
3 4.60 3.29 82.89% 3.09% 2.68% 4.38 2.53 70.03% 1.93% 1.57% 4.61 2.27 61.62% 1.47% 1.14%
4 4.65 3.01 78.54% 2.76% 2.23% 4.60 2.30 61.06% 1.73% 1.26% 4.59 2.04 51.68% 1.28% 0.86%
5 7.07 3.25 78.85% 2.98% 2.43% 8.11 2.69 71.01% 2.22% 1.72% 7.89 2.33 59.66% 1.60% 1.22%
CT (m) CT (m+sd) CT (m+2sd)
1 11.85 2.69 69.69% 2.73% 2.24% 11.34 2.83 71.49% 2.82% 2.33% 11.85 2.68 70.80% 2.54% 1.98%
2 9.05 2.90 74.74% 2.97% 2.58% 8.29 2.97 75.20% 3.04% 2.52% 8.14 2.77 72.31% 2.63% 2.10%
3 7.88 2.84 73.49% 2.82% 2.45% 7.26 2.94 74.04% 2.86% 2.34% 7.06 2.72 69.76% 2.44% 1.95%
4 6.39 2.48 63.75% 2.26% 1.87% 6.44 2.65 65.35% 2.46% 1.71% 6.62 2.46 60.72% 2.10% 1.46%
5 8.88 2.70 70.20% 2.40% 1.98% 8.21 2.97 73.70% 2.87% 2.20% 8.14 2.81 69.29% 2.57% 1.90%
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Table 1.5 continued.
Panel B: Mean difference in adjusted R2 between periods
Slope l. 1 Slope l. 3 Slope l. 5
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.47%∗∗∗∗∗ -0.23%∗∗∗ 0.16% 0.10% -0.56%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.57%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.13% -0.15%∗ -0.57%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.62%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.15%∗ -0.18%∗∗∗
2 0.47%∗∗∗∗∗ 0.24% 0.63%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.57%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.56%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.02% 0.43%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.41%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.57%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.04% 0.43%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.40%∗∗∗∗∗∗
3 0.23%∗∗∗ -0.24% 0.39%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.33%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.57%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.02% 0.45%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.43%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.62%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.04% 0.47%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.44%∗∗∗∗∗∗
4 -0.16% -0.63%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.39%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.06% 0.13% -0.43%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.45%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.02% 0.15%∗ -0.43%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.47%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.03%
5 -0.10% -0.57%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.33%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.06% 0.15%∗ -0.41%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.43%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.02% 0.18%∗∗∗ -0.40%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.44%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.03%
Depth (30 b.p.) Depth (70 b.p.) Depth (100 b.p.)
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.69%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.55%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.23%∗∗∗ -0.44%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.09% 0.30%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.59%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.13%∗ 0.15%∗∗∗ 0.30%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.60%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.25%∗∗∗∗∗∗
2 0.69%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.10% 0.43%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.23%∗∗∗∗ -0.09% 0.21%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.48%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.03% -0.15%∗∗∗ 0.14%∗∗∗∗ 0.44%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.09%
3 0.55%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.10% 0.32%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.09% -0.30%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.21%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.27%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.18%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.30%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.14%∗∗∗∗ 0.30%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.05%
4 0.23%∗∗∗ -0.43%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.32%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.22%∗∗∗∗ -0.59%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.48%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.27%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.45%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.60%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.44%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.30%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.35%∗∗∗∗∗∗
5 0.44%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.23%∗∗∗∗ -0.09% 0.22%∗∗∗∗ -0.13%∗ -0.03% 0.18%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.45%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.25%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.09% 0.05% 0.35%∗∗∗∗∗∗
CT (m) CT (m+sd) CT (m+2sd)
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 -0.26%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.11%∗ 0.40%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.27%∗∗∗∗∗ -0.32%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.23%∗∗∗∗∗ 0.17%∗∗∗∗∗ -0.12% -0.26%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.18%∗∗ 0.22%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.14%∗∗
2 0.26%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.12% 0.60%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.48%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.32%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.09% 0.49%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.20%∗∗∗∗ 0.26%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.08% 0.47%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.11%∗
3 0.11%∗ -0.12% 0.49%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.36%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.23%∗∗∗∗∗ -0.09% 0.41%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.12% 0.18%∗∗ -0.08% 0.40%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.04%
4 -0.40%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.60%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.49%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.14%∗∗∗ -0.17%∗∗∗∗∗ -0.49%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.41%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.29%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.22%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.47%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.40%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.36%∗∗∗∗∗∗
5 -0.27%∗∗∗∗∗ -0.48%∗∗∗∗∗∗ -0.36%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.14%∗∗∗ 0.12% -0.20%∗∗∗∗ -0.12% 0.29%∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.14%∗ -0.11%∗ -0.04% 0.36%∗∗∗∗∗∗
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kets and the behavior of informed traders. Asymmetric information is generally
higher at the start of the trading day, when new information that has arrived
overnight still needs to be processed by market participants. During this period
the mispricing is the largest, creating an opportunity for higher trading profits
to informed traders. Kaniel and Liu (2006) and Ros¸u (2015) show theoretically
that informed traders are more likely to submit market orders under these cir-
cumstances. Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005) confirm in an experimental
setting that informed traders indeed submit more market orders at the start of
the trading day, and switch to limit orders later. If predictability is caused by
informed traders who submit limit orders, then return predictability should in-
crease during the trading day. Because informed traders may switch to market
orders also at the end of the trading day, when they hide among liquidity traders,
predictability should also be lower at the end of the trading day if the informed
trading hypothesis holds. Because it is unclear which intraday pattern is to be
expected if predictability is caused by traders endogenously adjusting their or-
der choice, we consider the analysis in this Subsection mainly as a test of the
informed trading hypothesis.
Table 1.5 Panel A shows a summary of estimation results for Equation (1.1),
estimated using the same nine imbalance measures as before, for each of the five
subsamples based on the time of the day. We use 5 minute returns and the table
representation is similar as before. Panel B examines more closely the differ-
ences in adjusted R2 between the different subperiods. In each row k we show
the mean difference in adjusted R2 between the model estimated for subperiod
k, and the other four subperiods (in one of five columns). A positive (negative)
difference indicates that the adjusted R2 for subperiod k is on average larger
(smaller) than the adjusted R2 for the subperiod from column l. In superscript
we denote whether this difference is significant according to a paired t-test. In
addition, we also apply the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test, of which
significance is indicated in subscript. For instance, in row 2, column 4 for the
Slope (l.1) measure, we find that the adjusted R2 is on average 0.63% higher in
the second subperiod, as compared to the fourth subperiod. Both the t-test and
Wilcoxon signed rank test indicate that this difference is significant.
In general we find that predictability is the highest during the second and
third subperiod of the trading day, and it is the lowest during the fourth subpe-
riod, which corresponds to the quietest period of the day. This could be due to
the fact that returns are less predictable when there is on average less trading
and quoting activity during a time interval, such as for small caps at the shortest
time horizons of Table 1.4 Panel B. Similarly, during the relatively calm fourth
subperiod of the trading day there is less trading and quoting activity within any
5 minute interval, which weakens the relation between the lagged state of the
order book and returns.
Interestingly, both the first and final subperiod of the trading day have inter-
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mediate predictability. This is not in line with the predicted pattern according
to the informed trading hypothesis. Furthermore, it is remarkable that there is
no (inverted) U-shape in predictability, as is the case for most market variables,
and that the largest differences in predictability are between the largely similar
middle subperiods. This suggests that predictability is not monotonically related
to a single market variable. In any case, multiple drivers of predictability are
likely to be a work, which leads to an ambiguous intraday pattern. For instance,
while liquidity traders condition their order choice on the state of the book, the
use of market orders by informed traders could remove transient price effects
that are the result of the former behavior, the more so at the start and end of the
trading day.
1.4.3 Cross-sectional Determinants of Predictability
In this subsection we turn to the third analysis to investigate the drivers of pre-
dictability. In particular, we are most interested in whether predictability is
related to informed trading. To measure informed trading we estimate the prob-
ability of informed trading (PIN ) developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996)
(see Appendix A for details). The PIN is an estimate of the probability that on a
given day within the estimation period an order comes from an informed trader.
We estimate the PIN for each stock and each month in the sample. The opti-
mization converges for 1,001 of 1,056 stock-months. The average PINi,m for all
stocks i and months m is 22.21%, ranging between 9.84% in the 5th percentile
and 42.95% in the 95th percentile (Table 1.1 Panel A). These values are in line
with previous literature (see, e.g., Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002; Duarte
and Young, 2009). From Panel B of Table 1.1 it is also clear that the PIN is the
largest for small cap stocks and smallest for large cap stocks, which is in line
with economic theory. If the informed trading explanation for return probabil-
ity is valid, we expect a positive relation between the PIN and our measures of
return predictability.
Since we obtain monthly results for our predictability and informed trading
measure we opt for a panel data analysis using the Fama-MacBeth approach.
This allows us to exploit the cross-sectional variation in predictability and in-
formed trading. Our main question is for which type of stocks the predictive
ability of order book information for future returns is larger. More specifically,
we estimate monthly cross-sectional regressions of R2i,m,j , the adjusted R2 of a
model using order book measure j of stock i for month m, on a number of stock
characteristics. We use the adjusted R2 obtained from estimation on 5 and 30
minute intervals. In order to account for autocorrelation in the error term we
use Newey-West adjusted standard errors. We estimate two specifications. In
the first one we control for the natural logarithm of the average market value
Ln(MVi,m), which correlates with a number of market variables that could im-
pact return predictability. The second specification replaces the market value by
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several stock characteristics: the natural logarithm of average euro depth quoted
at the best prices Ln(Depthi,m), the natural logarithm of the average daily euro
trading volume Ln(V olumei,m), the standard deviation of daily returns V olati,m
and the average daily relative bid-ask spread Spreadi,m. The models to be esti-
mated are then as follows (with ζi,m and ηi,m the error terms):
R
2
i,m,j = β0 + β1PINi,m + β2Ln(MVi,m) + ζi,m, (1.9)
R
2
i,m,j = β0 + β1PINi,m + β2Ln(Depth)i,m (1.10)
+β3Ln(V olumei,m) + β4V olati,m + β5Spreadi,m + ηi,m.
In particular, we are also interested in the effect of quoted depth on return
predictability. If the order choice hypothesis holds, then we expect returns to
be more predictable for stocks with deeper order books. Traders arriving to the
market are more likely to adjust their order choice when they observe a thick
order book on their side, e.g., by switching from a limit order at the back of the
queue to a price improving limit order or a market order. Indeed, deep order
books are indicative of a competitive liquidity supply. These are precisely the
circumstances that cause short-term returns to be predictable according to the
order choice hypothesis.
The estimation results of Equations (1.9) and (1.10) are presented in Table
1.6. Panels A and B show results for the adjusted R2 from the Slope measure
models, for 5 minute returns and 30 minute returns respectively, Panels C and D
for theDepth (X) measure, and Panels E and F for the CT measure. The first two
lines of each panel present coefficients and t-statistics for the PIN , our measure
of informed trading. In general, informed trading is negatively or insignificantly
related to return predictability based on order book information (with one ex-
ception in Panel F). This is a surprising result, as it contradicts the hypothesis
that return predictability is caused by informed traders that submit informative
limit orders to the book. Furthermore, we find in 16 out of 18 models that re-
turn predictability is significantly higher for stocks with deeper order books, in
line with the order choice hypothesis. Return predictability is thus transitory in
nature and is caused by traders adjusting their order choice as a consequence
of observed limit order book imbalances. The presence of more informed traders
for some stocks may actually help to reduce return predictability, as indicated by
the negative coefficients. Informed traders trade in the opposite direction of the
transitory price movement and drive prices back to the efficient price.
Furthermore, for 30 minute returns predictability is lower for stocks with a
larger market capitalization and higher trading volume, in line with Panel B
Table 1.4. When more traders are actively trading a stock, in the long run their
actions help to eliminate any mispricing that is the consequence of transient
price effects in the limit order book. For 5 minute returns, the effect of volume
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Table 1.6: Determinants of predictability
This table presents estimates of Equations (1.9) and (1.10). The models are estimated using the Fama-
MacBeth procedure using monthly regressions. The dependent variable is the adjustedR2 from the return
prediction models using order book imbalances. Results are presented for regressions using different
order book imbalances: Slope (Panels A and B), Depth (X) (Panels C and D) and CT (Panels E and F),
and different time horizons (5 minutes versus 30 minutes). The independent variables are the probability
of informed trading PIN (see ), the natural logarithm of market value, the natural logarithm of the
daily average euro depth at the best quotes (level 1), the natural logarithm of average daily euro volume,
the standard deviation of daily returns and the daily average relative bid ask-spread (time-weighted
throughout the trading day) (time-weighted throughout the trading day). All variables are winsorized at
the 1% and 99% level. t-statistics, adjusted for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure, are
presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: Slope at 5 minute intervals
l.1 l.3 l.5
PIN -0.016* 0.006 -0.026*** -0.015*** -0.005 -0.018***
(-1.90) (0.61) (-5.97) (-3.56) (-1.02) (-4.32)
Ln(MV) 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.005***
(3.99) (9.04) (-20.76)
Ln(Depth) 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(3.13) (6.03) (6.70)
Ln(Volume) -0.005** -0.000 -0.000
(-2.79) (-0.26) (-0.40)
Volat 1.455*** 0.529*** 0.531***
(5.82) (4.48) (4.79)
Spread -1.785*** 0.009 0.009
(-4.30) (0.04) (0.04)
Const 0.020*** -0.065 0.015*** -0.115*** 0.059*** -0.118***
(4.56) (-1.78) (8.76) (-10.96) (23.03) (-12.15)
Obs 989 989 989 989 989 989
R2 0.018 0.139 0.064 0.242 0.118 0.247
Panel B: Slope at 30 minute intervals
l.1 l.3 l.5
PIN -0.004 -0.018 -0.005 -0.023** -0.005 -0.023**
(-0.52) (-1.29) (-0.87) (-3.02) (-1.02) (-3.09)
Ln(MV) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(-12.29) (-16.62) (-20.76)
Ln(Depth) 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(5.25) (3.58) (4.08)
Ln(Volume) -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(-5.42) (-4.65) (-4.92)
Volat 0.334 0.015 -0.012
(1.37) (0.09) (-0.10)
Spread 0.455 0.723 0.641
(0.63) (1.39) (1.39)
Const 0.055*** -0.025 0.060*** 0.001 0.059*** 0.001
(14.68) (-1.08) (20.94) (0.07) (23.03) (0.09)
Obs 989 989 989 989 989 989
R2 0.092 0.193 0.111 0.184 0.118 0.173
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Table 1.6 continued.
Panel C: Depth(X) at 5 minute intervals
(30 b.p.) (70 b.p.) (100 b.p.)
PIN -0.017*** -0.006 -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.025***
(-3.51) (-0.92) (-6.25) (-3.82) (-7.78) (-5.14)
Ln(MV) 0.005*** 0.001 -0.000
(9.57) (1.01) (-1.31)
Ln(Depth) 0.004 0.009*** 0.007***
(1.71) (5.82) (5.43)
Ln(Volume) 0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(1.55) (-0.66) (-0.21)
Volat 0.080 0.290** 0.274**
(0.47) (2.53) (2.30)
Spread -1.849*** 0.616* 0.859***
(-6.41) (2.12) (3.31)
Const -0.006 -0.037** 0.022*** -0.079*** 0.025*** -0.062***
(-1.34) (-2.54) (5.86) (-6.75) (9.78) (-8.39)
Obs 704 704 943 943 974 974
R2 0.168 0.294 0.060 0.212 0.054 0.194
Panel D: Depth(X) at 30 minute intervals
(30 b.p.) (70 b.p.) (100 b.p.)
PIN 0.019 -0.001 -0.014* -0.037*** -0.011** -0.036***
(1.40) (-0.10) (-1.93) (-3.62) (-2.29) (-5.37)
Ln(MV) -0.001** -0.004*** -0.005***
(-2.95) (-8.25) (-11.85)
Ln(Depth) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(3.49) (7.36) (7.08)
Ln(Volume) -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(-4.60) (-6.81) (-5.78)
Volat -0.530*** -0.486*** -0.322***
(-3.72) (-5.22) (-3.49)
Spread -1.623* 1.402*** 1.965***
(-1.88) (3.11) (3.53)
Const 0.024*** 0.021 0.056*** -0.007 0.061*** -0.009
(4.47) (1.66) (10.97) (-0.82) (17.52) (-1.27)
Obs 704 704 943 943 974 974
R2 0.050 0.193 0.090 0.173 0.144 0.215
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Table 1.6 continued.
Panel E: CT at 5 minute intervals
(m) (m+sd) (m+2sd)
PIN -0.013** 0.005 -0.034*** -0.018** -0.035*** -0.021***
(-2.70) (1.17) (-5.65) (-3.10) (-6.74) (-4.34)
Ln(MV) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(12.64) (21.30) (16.26)
Ln(Depth) -0.002 0.005** 0.010***
(-1.33) (2.24) (4.66)
Ln(Volume) 0.003*** 0.003** 0.001
(4.13) (3.02) (1.05)
Volat -0.075 0.108 0.360**
(-0.84) (0.98) (2.59)
Spread -1.006** -0.344* -0.214
(-2.98) (-1.94) (-0.95)
Const 0.004** 0.010 0.006*** -0.063*** 0.009*** -0.098***
(2.35) (1.11) (4.94) (-4.58) (4.83) (-7.07)
Obs 878 878 964 964 980 980
R2 0.138 0.277 0.177 0.297 0.142 0.291
Panel F: CT at 30 minute intervals
(m) (m+sd) (m+2sd)
PIN 0.022*** -0.001 -0.004 -0.027*** -0.005 -0.029***
(4.99) (-0.10) (-0.76) (-3.62) (-1.11) (-4.09)
Ln(MV) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-8.86) (-13.26) (-9.19)
Ln(Depth) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.013***
(3.49) (4.04) (6.13)
Ln(Volume) -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(-4.60) (-7.10) (-6.31)
Volat -0.530*** -0.471*** -0.345**
(-3.72) (-3.38) (-2.23)
Spread -1.623* 0.037 0.214
(-1.88) (0.12) (0.51)
Const 0.048*** 0.021 0.061*** 0.041** 0.059*** 0.007
(13.28) (1.66) (16.57) (2.98) (12.25) (0.84)
Obs 878 878 964 964 980 980
R2 0.103 0.193 0.088 0.186 0.085 0.186
is not consistent across specifications. At this frequency trading volume could be
either increasing or decreasing predictability. Predictability is positively related
to volatility for 5 minute returns, but negatively for 30 minute returns. Returns
over longer intervals are inherently more difficult to predict for more volatile
stocks, but for shorter intervals the order book actually contributes in explaining
returns. Lower volatility stocks may exhibit more zero return intervals over
shorter time periods, which causes returns to be less predictable.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigate the relation between the state of the order book
as displayed on a trader’s screen and future returns. We first show that order
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book information can indeed be used to predict returns in the short-term. Fur-
thermore, measures that are confined to the information at the top of the book
(i.e. at or close to the best prices in the book) appear to be the best predictors.
As more information from deeper in the book is captured in a measure, the pre-
dictive ability of the measure decreases. This suggests that the most relevant
information for future returns is concentrated at the top of the book.
A more fundamental question is what drives return predictability on the ba-
sis of the book. We argue that two potential sources exist. On the one hand,
predictability in returns can be due to traders who condition their order choice
on the state of the order book. This creates systematic patterns in order flow
as patient traders are crowded out the order book. This can generate short-run
(‘transitory’) price effects. We call this the order choice hypothesis. On the other
hand, the presence of informed traders who submit limit orders is another po-
tential source of predictability (with ‘permanent’ price effects). As such, the limit
order book should reflect the private information and thus be informative about
future returns. This explanation is termed the informed trading hypothesis.
Our results indicate that return predictability is most likely caused by the
former effect, while evidence in favor of the informed trading hypothesis is weak.
First, looking at predictability at short versus longer horizons, return predictabil-
ity based on book information increases from a 1 minute until a 15 minute hori-
zon. But at horizons between 15 and 30 minutes, return predictability declines
again, while it does not completely vanish. As such, we find that there is both a
transitory component and a permanent component to return predictability. But
there are remarkable differences between large cap and small cap stocks. For
small cap stocks predictability is the lowest at short horizons, and then decreases
gradually for longer horizons. For large cap stocks we observe the opposite pat-
tern. This suggests that the bulk of predictability is transitory, and that pre-
dictability decreases much faster for actively traded stocks. Second, we find no
obvious and consistent intraday pattern for predictability. When we divide the
trading day into five subperiods, predictability is in general the largest for the
second and third subperiod, while it is the lowest for the fourth subperiod. Pre-
dictability is intermediate at the start and end of the trading day. While the
expected intraday pattern of predictability according to the order choice hypoth-
esis is unclear, we would expect to find the lowest predictability at the start and
end of the trading if predictability is caused by informed limit orders. Third, we
find cross-sectionally that predictability is negatively related to the probability
of informed trading, while for stocks with deeper (and thus more competitive)
order books predictability is higher. Furthermore, predictability of returns over
longer time horizons is much lower for more actively traded stocks. In sum, we
show that returns are predictable because the order choice of traders predictably
depends on the state of the order book. The effect of informed traders in the limit
order book is limited. By contrast, informed traders help to decrease predictabil-
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ity by trading in the opposite direction of the transitory price effect.
The Spanish stock market in 2003 presents a setting in which stocks are
traded in a single order book and, to our knowledge, orders are submitted mostly
by humans. This allows for a clean test of how limit order book theories deter-
mine the relation between the state of the order book and future prices, with-
out considerations of competition between order books and the interference of
(high-frequency) algorithmic trading. But during the last decade the market
environment has changed. Motivated by technological innovations and spurred
by new regulation the trading landscape has fragmented. Stocks around the
world are now traded simultaneously on multiple trading venues that compete
by offering different matching mechanisms, order types and transparency. Not
all traders have access to alternative trading venues, while others employ algo-
rithms, known as smart order routers, to split their orders over trading venues
automatically – using the observed state of the order books on these venues as
inputs (Foucault and Menkveld, 2008). The latter complicates the interaction
between the order book and prices on a single venue, but can also create new
interactions between prices and order books of different venues.
Furthermore, trading venues are now populated not only by human traders.
A significant portion of orders (and importantly, cancellations) are now submit-
ted by algorithmic traders. By design these algorithms condition their actions
on the current and previous state of the market. An important question is then
whether the presence of algorithmic traders increases predictability on the basis
of the order book by formalizing the order choice considerations that lead to tran-
sitory price effects into algorithms, or whether algorithms are able to better pre-
dict transitory price effects and trade in the opposite direction, thereby reducing
predictability. Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) show that algorithmic
traders may engage in the latter type of strategies. Another important consider-
ation for today’s markets is that one class of algorithmic traders, high-frequency
traders, has made competition on speed its core business. High-frequency traders
have taken order book interactions to a millisecond environment. Therefore, if
return predictability persists in today’s markets, it is likely to be found at these
higher frequencies. We leave these questions for future research.
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Appendix A: The Probability of Informed Trading
The probability of informed trading or PIN is a concept that originates from mi-
crostructure trading models (see, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley, Kiefer,
and O’Hara, 1996; Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman, 1996; Easley, Hvidk-
jaer, and O’Hara, 2002) in which traders sequentially arrive in a dealer market.
Each trader is potentially better informed about the fundamental value of the
security than the dealer (or liquidity supplier). The dealer cannot distinguish
informed traders from uninformed traders who trade for liquidity reasons and
must set his quotes so as to compensate him for the expected loss of trading
against informed traders. Informed traders only enter the market on days when
information events occur which is determined by nature on the beginning of each
trading day with probability α. Upon occurrence, the probability that the infor-
mation is bad news is δ, the probability that it is good news is 1 − δ. When an
information event occurs informed traders arrive in the market according to an
independent Poisson process with arrival rate µ. Uninformed buyers and sellers
arrive with rates B and S respectively. The probability on any day that an order
is from an informed trader is then given by
PIN =
αµ
αµ+ εb + εs
. (1.11)
The parameters of the model can be estimated via maximum likelihood. The
likelihood function is
L(θ|B,S) = (1− α)e−εb ε
B
b
B!
e−εs
εSs
S!
.
+αδe−εb
εBb
B!
e−(µ+εs)
(µ+ εs)
S
S!
(1.12)
+α(1− δ)e−εs ε
S
s
S!
e−(µ+εb)
(µ+ εb)B
B!
with B the observed number of buy orders, S the observed number of sell orders
and θ the parameters. Given the independence of the processes across trading
day, the likelihood function over N trading days is then
L(θ|M) =
N∏
d=1
L(θ|Bd, Sd) (1.13)
with (Bd, Sd) the number of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated orders for day
d and M = ((B1, S1), ..., (BN , SN )). Because estimating these parameters is
computationally burdensome, and to increase the probability of convergence we
follow Aktas, De Bodt, Declerck, and Van Oppens (2007) and simplify the log-
likelihood function to
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Log(L(θ|M)) =
N∑
d=1
{−2ε+Md ln(x) + (Bd + Sd) ln(µ+ ε)} (1.14)
+
N∑
d=1
ln
{
α(1− α)e−µxSd−Md + αδe−µxBd−Md + (1− α)xBd+Sd−Md}
with Md = min(Bd, Sd) + max(Bd,Sd)2 and x =
ε
ε+µ . Hereby we assume that the
arrival rates of uninformed buyers and sellers are equal: εB = εS = ε. We max-
imize the likelihood function over all trading days in a month Following Duarte
and Young (2009), we run the optimization five times, with randomly generated
different starting points for the parameters to avoid arriving at a local maximum
and then select the maximum of the five optimizations.
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Chapter 2
Limit Order Book
Information and Return
Predictability in a
Fragmented Market
2.1 Introduction
Imbalances between the bid and ask side of the limit order book have been shown
empirically to predict short-term intraday returns. Intuitively, bid and ask liq-
uidity capture unexecuted trading desires of patient buyers and sellers. Previ-
ous studies concerning return predictability from the order book state (i.e., pub-
licly observable information on prices and depth), however, focus on concentrated
markets, while it is a salient feature of present day financial markets that order
flow is fragmented across trading venues. Stocks are now traded not only on
the listing exchange, but also on a number of alternative trading venues.1 This
chapter extends research on intraday return predictability by including order
book information from multiple trading venues. We examine whether the state
of an order book can predict returns on the same, but also on other venues. In line
with previous research, we capture the state of an order book by the imbalance
1In the U.S. these are known as Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs), while in Europe
competition emerges in the form of Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs). Both types of venues
operate in a similar way: they largely employ transparent and fully automated order books that
match third party order flow. Next to these so-called lit trading venues there is also competition from
opaque or dark venues, such as dark pools. Furthermore, although limit order books of most trading
venues are essentially transparent, traders generally have the option to reduce their order exposure
by submitting (partially) hidden orders. De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) show that these orders can
provide a substantial part of liquidity in limit order books.
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between visible bid side depth and ask side depth.2 We also take into account
that the relative position of order books on the price grid can impact their pre-
dictive ability, and we document how prices across trading venues adjust to one
another during the trading day. Finally, we investigate how the predictive ability
of trading venues is affected by fragmentation of trading volume.
Using a sample of 30 stocks listed on Euronext Amsterdam, Brussels or Paris
over a one year period (October 2009 - September 2010), we show that informa-
tion obtained from the order book can predict returns within and across venues.
Both imbalances between the bid and ask side, as well as the relative position
of the quotes on the price grid matter. We explicitly investigate how the rela-
tive quote position can predict future returns by looking at the distance between
midquotes of different order books. We find that prices across trading venues
have a tendency to adjust to each other. In addition, we show that order book im-
balances from other venues are the strongest predictors of future returns when
the prices on these venues are more competitive (i.e. a higher bid price and a
lower ask price). Order book imbalances obtained from worse prices actually
predict reversals (as they have a negative relation with future returns). Our re-
sults suggest that some venues are leading in price discovery, while others are
followers. Returns on the latter venues are predictable mainly because they ad-
just to prices of the leading venues. Moreover, their order book has almost no
predictive ability for returns on other venues.. By contrast, returns on leading
venues are relatively less predictable, and both the imbalance in the state of the
book and its position on the price grid have predictive power for returns on other
venues.
Predicting returns (and other market variables) at high frequencies is impor-
tant for the many market participants who rely on algorithms to execute their
trades. Algorithms use market data as an input to generate trading decisions.3
In particular, for traders employing a market making strategy it is important
to assess the direction in which prices are likely to move. Managing their risky
inventories and assessing the information content of the order flow is at the core
of their business. Our results imply that optimally these traders should use in-
formation from multiple trading venues. Moreover, it is likely that those traders
who are active on multiple trading venues, such as cross-venue market makers,
arbitrageurs or brokers using smart order routing technology, play a key role in
generating cross-venue return predictability.
There are two potential explanations as to why the state of the order book
can predict returns. First, the order book may contain fundamental information
2We have no information about the hidden (unexecuted) liquidity in the order book. Market
participants can also only observe this part of the order book, although they can estimate whether
there is hidden liquidity present (and to which extent). Doing so would, however, take us beyond the
scope of this research.
3These market data appear to provide useful information for traders, as market data sales are a
growing source of revenues for trading venues (Easley, O’Hara, and Yang, 2013; Cespa and Foucault,
2014).
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that is impounded into prices with a lag. Second, and quite the reverse, the state
of the order book causes temporary price deviations as traders adjust their be-
havior to the state of the order book. This is because the state of the order book
influences the execution probability of their orders. They choose more (less) ag-
gressive orders when the book is thicker (thinner) on their own side of the order
book (with reverse predictions for the opposite side of the book, see, e.g., Parlour,
1998; Ranaldo, 2004; Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan, 2005). This explanation im-
plies that the order book predicts returns because it is transparent. Tombeur
and Wuyts (2015) find that the latter is also most likely to be the driver of return
predictability on the basis of the limit order book.
Both explanations for return predictability also suggest that the order book
on one venue can be used to predict returns on another venue. If the order book
contains fundamental information (e.g., because informed traders submit limit
orders on one side of the order book only), order book imbalances that are able
to predict returns on their own venue, should also be able to predict returns on
other venues. All venues are trading the same asset that is subject to the same
information shocks and signals. In efficient markets information that affects
prices on one trading venue should also affect prices on other trading venues.
Market makers that are active across multiple venues should adjust their quotes
on all these venues similarly. If not, then arbitrageurs can take advantage of this,
and prices adjust following their actions (Foucault, Kozhan, and Tham, 2015).
In the case that predictability is driven by order choice, when traders are con-
sidering multiple venues for their order submissions, it is the state of all relevant
order books that matters for their choice, and thus can predict returns. Relevant
order books are those that a trader considers for order submission himself, and
also those that are used by other traders; order execution probability depends
on his own choice and choices made by future traders. We show that returns
on the listing exchange (which has by far the largest amount of trading volume)
are more predictable using order book imbalances from alternative venues when
the latter have a larger market share. When market share is a measure of how
relevant a trading venue is, this is in line with predictability being driven by
endogenous order choice. Traders condition their order choice on the state of the
order book of an alternative venue relatively more when the state of its order
book matters. However, we find no evidence of returns on alternative venues
being more predictable from the order book state of the listing exchange during
these times of increases fragmentation, possibly because the state of the order
book on the listing exchange is always relevant.
Our research contributes to previous work that studies whether the state of
the book is informative on future price changes. Harris and Panchapagesan
(2005) find that the order book on the New York Stock Exchange contains in-
formation on future prices, and that the specialist uses his privileged knowledge
of the order book in his favor. Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009) show that the
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top of the order book contributes the most to return predictability. Jain, Jain,
and McInish (2011) show that the state of the order book can predict trade price
movements as well as future volatility. Yamamoto (2012) finds that imbalances
in the state of the order book can predict returns, but technical trading strate-
gies based on imbalances in the state of the limit order book cannot outperform
a buy-and-hold strategy. Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) use limit
order book imbalances as a proxy of short-term information that high-frequency
traders (HFTs) can use in their strategies. They show that, following an imbal-
ance, HFTs supplying liquidity submit orders on the thin side of the order book,
and thereby help to reduce predictability. But HFT liquidity demanders trade
in the direction of the order book imbalances, thus contributing to return pre-
dictability. Overall, the latter effect dominates, and HFTs as a group trade in
the direction of the order book imbalance. Tombeur and Wuyts (2015) find evi-
dence that the short-term return predictability phenomenon is caused by traders
who endogenously choose their order aggressiveness in response to the state of
the limit order book. This translates into predictable, but transient, midquote
changes.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
related literature and presents our main hypotheses. The method we use to
test these hypotheses is presented in Section 2.3, while Section 2.4 describes the
data. Next, we discuss results of our predictability models in Section 2.5. Finally,
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature and Hypotheses
2.2.1 Return Predictability on the Own Venue
Based on theory models two main reasons have been put forward to explain
why imbalances can predict short-term returns: (1) traders condition their order
choice on the state of the limit order book and this leads to predictable patterns in
the order book, (2) imbalances in the limit order book are related to fundamental
information, potentially because informed traders submit limit orders.
For the first explanation, Parlour (1998) shows in a dynamic model for a sin-
gle limit order book that arriving traders choose their order aggressiveness en-
dogenously, based on the current state of the limit order book. When the book
is deeper (thinner) on the own (opposite) side of the market, this decreases (in-
creases) the execution probability of limit orders that are submitted at the same
price, as these are executed on the basis of time priority. This generates pre-
dictable patterns in order choice. But since the original model features the re-
strictive assumptions of a one tick spread and fixed bid and ask quotes, it does
not allow to make any inference about patterns in quotes. In a similar setting,
but with an extended discrete price grid around the common asset value, Goet-
tler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005) show numerically that when traders compete for
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order execution also by choosing a limit price, they can submit more aggressive
limit orders to jump the queue and increase their execution probability. They
find that because of such behavior the midquote can deviate from the common
value. This is in line with the state of the order book predicting midquote re-
turns because of order choice.
Empirically, Ranaldo (2004) shows that traders submit more (less) aggressive
orders when depth on the own (opposite) side of the market is larger (smaller),
consistent with traders using the state of the order book in order to asses their ex-
ecution probability.4 When, as a result of their increased aggressiveness, traders
improve the best prices on their side of the market, or consume the full liquidity
available on the other side, this moves the midquote price (i.e. a non-zero return).
This explanation of return predictability implies that the price effect of the limit
order book state is transient. Only short horizon returns are predictable. After
some time other traders arrive and submit orders that drive prices back in line
with fundamentals.
The second explanation, fundamental information contained in the limit or-
der book, is usually related to the question of what kind of orders informed
traders use: do they demand liquidity or supply liquidity? Theory models argue
that under certain conditions informed traders tend to submit limit orders,5 but
empirically it remains a challenging task to find evidence in favor of this hypoth-
esis.6 If informed traders do submit limit orders they will tend to submit orders
on one side of the book only (when the security is undervalued by the current
4The finding that the state of the order book matters in explaining order choice also appears to be
robust across markets and over time. Similar results are for instance reported by Biais, Hillion, and
Spatt (1995), Griffiths, Smith, Turnbull, and White (2000), Beber and Caglio (2005), Cao, Hansch,
and Wang (2008), Duong, Kalev, and Krishnamurti (2009) and Pascual and Veredas (2009b).
5Traditional models of limit order markets assume that informed traders only demand liquid-
ity while uninformed traders provide liquidity and bear adverse selection costs, similar to a dealer
market (e.g., Glosten, 1994; Rock, 1996; Seppi, 1997). There are fewer models that allow informed
traders to endogenously choose between market orders and limit orders. Chakravarty and Holden
(1995) show that informed traders may use a combination of market and limit orders of opposite
sign, whereby the latter acts as a safety net. Kumar and Seppi (1994) argue that informed traders
use a combination of market and limit orders that is similar to uninformed investors in order to hide.
Kaniel and Liu (2006) find that informed traders prefer limit orders over market orders when their
informational advantage is long-lived. In the model by Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009) traders
first choose whether to acquire information, and then decide on their order. When the volatility of
the fundamental value is low informed traders are shown to provide liquidity at the best quotes.
According to Ros¸u (2015) informed traders prefer to submit limit orders when their informational
advantage is relatively small.
6A major challenge is identifying which traders are informed in the first place. Beber and Caglio
(2005) use the period before earnings announcements as a proxy for a period with increased informa-
tion asymmetries, and assume that buyers were more likely to be informed because prices rose after
announcements in their sample. They find that buyers more frequently submit non-aggressive limit
orders on the bid side of the order book. Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005) resort to an experimen-
tal setting to distinguish between informed traders and uninformed traders and show that informed
investors use market orders in the beginning of the trading period, when their informational advan-
tage is large, but switch to limit orders when the bulk of information has come to be incorporated in
prices. Kaniel and Liu (2006) measure order informativeness as the conditional probability that the
midquote increases (decreases) after a buy (sell) order, and show that for small and medium-sized
orders limit orders contain more information than market orders.
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bid price they may submit limit buy orders, when it is overvalued by the current
ask price they can submit limit sell orders). The argument goes that this could
cause imbalances in the state of the limit order book that are informative on the
fundamental value of a security. However, this explanation also implies that in-
formed traders do not succeed very well in hiding their informational advantage,
and yet price impact is not instantaneous. This in itself is puzzling and requires
prices to be inefficient for some reason.7 One could also argue that informed
traders would condition their order submission strategies on the current state of
the limit order book in a way that allows them to hide within uninformed limit
orders, which should make them less easily detectable than just by observing
order book imbalances.
There is an alternative mechanism that allows the order book to contain fun-
damental information without necessarily assuming that a fraction of limit or-
ders is submitted by informed traders. It only requires that rational uninformed
traders adjust their liquidity provision on a discrete price grid depending on the
information content assigned to the historical order flow. For instance, after a
buy order they adjust their beliefs upward and revise their limit orders accord-
ingly. They can do so either by submitting orders at higher bid and ask prices,
or alternatively by reducing the depth offered at the best ask price relative to
the best bid price. The latter is especially a valid strategy when the tick size is
discrete (so prices cannot continuously adjust) and new information causes only
a slight change in beliefs. Such behavior makes the depth imbalance contain
fundamental information. However, for this to cause returns to be predictable it
still implies that current bid and ask prices are not efficient.
Return predictability on the basis of limit order book information is in itself
sometimes also considered as evidence that the order book contains fundamen-
tal information. However, such a conjecture does not take into account that the
order book can also predict returns because it can generate temporary price devi-
ations due to predictable order choice. Tombeur and Wuyts (2015) find evidence
that this latter explanation for predictability is relatively more important, and
that fundamental information in the limit order book contributes only to a lesser
extent. Returns over longer time horizons are less predictable, indicating short-
term price reversals. Furthermore, stocks that exhibit more informed trading
have lower return predictability, which suggests that informed traders could ac-
tually help in removing short-term price pressure, rather than causing it.
7In models where rational risk-neutral traders are asymmetrically informed, information that
is contained in the order flow is instantaneously reflected into market prices and does not contain
any predictive power with regard to future prices, i.e. prices are efficient (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom,
1985). If the state of the limit order book contains fundamental information about future prices, then
current prices are not efficient, and it takes somehow time for the market to process this information.
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2.2.2 Return Predictability Across Venues
We now turn to the question of why order book information on one trading venue
should predict returns on another trading venue. The simplest explanation is
that prices for the same underlying cannot deviate too much because they are
bound by an arbitrage relationship. Therefore, returns across venues should be
correlated contemporaneously. A key role here may be for (HFT) market mak-
ers that are active on multiple venues for the same securities. Such traders
contribute to the interlinking of different limit order books. Menkveld (2013)
identifies a large HFT who employs essentially a market making strategy across
two venues, the traditional listing exchange (Euronext) and an entrant venue
(Chi-X). He finds that the entry of the HFT, who participates in more than 70
percent of trades on the entrant venue, coincides with a substantial increase in
the liquidity and market share of this venue. This type of trader, who actively
monitors multiple venues, causes information that originates on one venue to
have an effect on prices of other venues. van Kervel (2015) shows (both theoreti-
cally and empirically) that after a trade is observed market makers revise their
unexecuted limit orders on other venues in accordance with their updated be-
liefs. Also arbitrageurs can play a role in interlinking different venues. Foucault,
Kozhan, and Tham (2015) show that fast traders exploit short-lived arbitrage op-
portunities when market makers’ quotes are not updated simultaneously across
markets.
Arbitrage across venues and a similar information impact thus provide an ex-
planation of why returns across venues are contemporaneously correlated. But
the question is whether returns should also be correlated when they represent
temporary price pressure driven by order choice considerations. Because trad-
ing is anonymous it is impossible to distinguish between orders submitted (or
canceled) by informed and uninformed traders. Therefore each order book event
bears an information content. Market makers, or other traders interlinking dif-
ferent venues, can thus propagate both permanent and temporary price changes
across these venues.
There is also a direct connection between the state of the order book on one
venue and future returns on another venue. When the same asset is simulta-
neously traded on multiple venues, order choice also entails venue choice. As
in the single venue setting, order choice depends on execution probability, and
thus the state of all order books. In a static model without asymmetric infor-
mation, Foucault and Menkveld (2008) show that the absence of time priority
across limit order books allows traders to jump the queue (without increasing
their order aggressiveness) by submitting limit orders in a competing limit order
book. They also show that jumping the queue becomes relatively more attrac-
tive as more brokers employ smart order routing technology, which allows these
brokers to trade in the competing limit order book. In their model the use of
smart order routing technology increases the execution probability of orders in
50 CHAPTER 2. RETURN PREDICTABILITY IN A FRAGMENTED MARKET
the entrant venue relative to that of the incumbent venue. The model does not
directly allow to make empirical predictions concerning order book and price dy-
namics, but intuitively, queue-jumping between order books can explain return
predictability across venues. For instance, suppose a patient buyer8 encounters
a relatively thick bid queue on venue j, while the bid price on venue i is one tick
lower. Depending on the expected relative execution probabilities across venues
(which depends on the fraction of brokers using smart order routers according to
Foucault and Menkveld (2008)), it might be optimal to jump the queue at venue j
by submitting a price-improving limit buy order at venue i (at the same bid price
as venue j). This would result in a positive return on venue i. We therefore put
forward the following hypothesis.9
Hypothesis 1 Returns on venue i can be predicted by the lagged state of the
order book of venue j 6= i. In particular, a positive (negative) imbalance between
liquidity at the bid and ask side on venue j predicts positive (negative) returns on
venue i.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 illustrates the previous example graphically. The figure
shows, for two given hypothetical order books on venue i and venue j, the 9
potential situations for their relative position vis-a`-vis each other. The solid lines
represent the best depth queues on venue i (which are balanced), while the dotted
lines represent best depth queues on venue j (which show a positive order book
imbalance). As can be judged from the figure, the relationship between order
book imbalances and returns across venues is likely to depend on the relative
position of the bid and ask quotes on the price grid. The relative position of
quotes on the same side of the market (the bid side for buyers and the ask side
for sellers) determines whether incoming traders can jump the queue on venue j
by submitting orders on venue i. This can be a useful strategy for patient buyers
in the situation depicted in Panel (a), as venue j is shown to be very competitive
in comparison to venue i. But it is less likely for the situation from Panel (i), in
which the reverse is true. Here, jumping the queue on venue j does not cause a
positive midquote return on venue i. Instead, the opposite (traders jumping the
queue at venue i) is more plausible. Panel (e) depicts an intermediate scenario
in which queues of both venues are at the same prices. In sum, what matters
for traders when they decide to queue-jump between venues is not only the size
of the queue, but also their relative position in the price grid. Ceteris paribus,
queue-jumping should be more effective when traders can submit orders on a
venue that is quoting less competitive prices.
8A patient trader here refers to a trader who is more likely to submit a limit order because his
personal valuation of the asset is not ‘extreme’, and therefore his gains from trade are not high
enough to submit a market order. Patient traders therefore supply liquidity, i.e., they are market
makers.
9For clarity of exposition, in the remainder of the text we refer to the venue on which we want to
predict returns as venue i, and another competing venue of which we use limit order book informa-
tion as venue j.
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Figure 2.1: Order Book Imbalances and Quote Positions Across Venues
This figure shows the nine potential scenarios for the relative position of bid and ask prices on venue j
relative to venue i. The vertical axis displays the bid and ask prices, while the horizontal axis shows the
number of shares offered at these prices. The solid lines represents the depth (in the number of shares)
supplied at bid and ask prices on venue i (in this example always e9.98 and e10.02, respectively). The
dotted lines represent the depth supplied at bid and ask prices of venue j. The depth does not vary
between scenarios. Venue i always has a zero order book imbalance, while venue j has a positive order
book imbalance. The position of bid and ask prices on the price grid of venue j changes between potential
scenarios. The first row always presents a situation in which the best ask price of venue j is better than
that of venue i; in the second row the ask prices are equal; and in the third row the ask price of venue j
is lower than that of venue i. The first column always presents a situation in which the best bid price of
venue j is better than that of venue i; in the second column bid prices are equal; and in the third column
the bid price of venue j is always worse than that of venue i.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i)
52 CHAPTER 2. RETURN PREDICTABILITY IN A FRAGMENTED MARKET
Figure 2.1 also shows that taking into account the relative position of the
quotes on both venues is complicated because the position need not be symmet-
ric at the bid and ask side. Both in Panels (a) and (g), for instance, we expect
that patient buyers on venue j would want to skip the bid queue by submitting
a price improving limit order on venue i. For patient sellers on venue j, in Panel
(g), all else equal, they would prefer to submit a price-improving sell limit order
on venue j itself rather than adding to the queue of venue i. So for the situation
in Panel (g) we would unambiguously predict positive returns on venue i. By con-
trast, in Panel (a), although the depth queue is relatively small, patient sellers
on venue j can be tempted to jump the queue and submit a price-improving sell
limit order on venue i, which would cause a decrease in the (mid)quote of venue i.
Our description here is intuitive, but it captures the notion that the relationship
between the state of the order book on one venue and future returns on another
venue does not depend only on the relative depth of the bid and ask side, but also
on the relative position of the venue quotes, or the competitiveness of their prices.
Moreover, the relative position of the quotes itself contains information that can
be used to predict returns. This needs to be taken into account for the empirical
setup. Finally, note that even without competition or queue-jumping between
limit order books prices would tend to adjust to each other across venues since
they are for the same asset that is traded on all these venues, and thus prices
are bound by a no-arbitrage condition. Our conjecture that the position of the
quotes on the price grid matters for return predictability leads to the following
two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 The positive relationship between returns on venue i and the lagged
state of the limit order book on venue j 6= i is the strongest (weakest) when the best
quote on venue j 6= i is strictly better (worse) than the best quote of venue i.
Hypothesis 3 There exists a positive relationship between returns on venue i and
the lagged distance between the midquotes of venue i and venue j 6= i, where
distance is measured as the (signed) difference in midquotes. A symmetrical effect
exists for venue j.
2.2.3 The Effect of Fragmentation
Foucault and Menkveld (2008) argue that there is an important role for smart
order routing technology employed by brokers to connect different venues and
make competition among them viable. In their setting, when no brokers employ
smart order routing technology there is no incentive for liquidity providers to
jump the queue on the incumbent venue by submitting a limit order and provide
liquidity on the entrant. As more brokers use smart order routers the execu-
tion probability of limit orders on the entrant venue increases, and so does the
incentive to jump the queue. As such, the trader avoids having to join a queue
on the incumbent venue and becomes first in the queue on the entrant. This
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suggests that the expected execution probability of limit orders matters when
traders decide whether to jump the queue. As a rough proxy of expected exe-
cution probability on a venue we use its market share of trading volume (with
hindsight). When a trading venue j become more relevant for traders, the order
book of venue j becomes a more important determinant for order choice, and thus
its contribution for return predictability becomes larger.
Hypothesis 4 The positive relationship between returns on venue i and the lagged
state of the limit order book on venue j, is stronger when venue j has a larger mar-
ket share of trading volume.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Return Predictability on the Own Venue
We first establish that returns are predictable on each venue i using only lagged
order book imbalances of the own venue bit−1 as a predictor.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + u
i
t (2.1)
Log returns rit are calculated from midquote prices mit. Because our hypotheses
from Section 2.2 imply a symmetric prediction for both the best bid and ask price
we use the midquote as a shortcut. If returns are predictable because the order
book contains information the best bid and ask price are impacted the same. Re-
turn predictability due to order choice considerations similarly implies symmet-
ric effects on potential buyers and sellers. For instance, if buyers are predicted to
become more aggressive, then sellers should become less aggressive. In addition,
the midquote price is often used as a benchmark price by investors for measuring
transaction costs, as it is considered to be an estimate of the fundamental value
of a security.
Order book imbalances bit measure the difference between depth (in number
of shares) quoted on the bid side Di,bidt and on the ask side D
i,ask
t . Following
previous research we scale the imbalance by total depth offered on both sides of
the market.
bit =
Di,bidt −Di,askt
Di,bidt +D
i,ask
t
(2.2)
We use depth at the best prices because Cao, Hansch, and Wang (2009) and
Tombeur and Wuyts (2015) show that liquidity at the top of the book is the best
predictor of future returns.
We measure t in calendar time and use a 10 second sampling frequency. Tra-
ditionally longer time intervals have been used to predict returns (5 minutes is
common), but the advent of high-frequency trading has drastically increased or-
der book quoting activity. Because order book dynamics are the drivers of return
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predictability, we assume that if returns are predictable on the basis of order
book information, the relation is more outspoken at shorter time horizons.10 The
model is estimated per stock and per day.
Venues i for which we predict returns include both the listing exchange, Eu-
ronext (Enx), and alternative venues, Chi-X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and Bats
(Bat). In addition we also investigate return predictability at the level of the
consolidated market (Con). To do so, we calculate a European Best Bid and Of-
fer (EBBO), i.e. the best bid and ask prices across all venues, at each time t,
and from these prices a consolidated midquote price mCont . We also calculate the
order book imbalance at the consolidated level bCont .11
2.3.2 Return Predictability Across Venues
We extend the baseline model of Equation (2.1) to include order book imbalances
from other venues.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
Con\ibCon\it−1 + ui,t (2.3)
where i represents the venue for which we predict returns, and Con\i is the
consolidated market excluding venue i. This extended model allows us to see
whether order book imbalances from other venues can predict returns on venue
i, after controlling for the order book imbalance of venue i itself. This model is
therefore considered to be a test of hypothesis 1.
Furthermore, we try to disentangle which venues contribute the most to pre-
dictability of returns by estimating the following model for each venue i.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 +
∑
j 6=i
βjbjt−1 + ui,t (2.4)
Hypothesis 2 states that the predictive power of the order book state for fu-
ture returns depends not only on the imbalance between the bid and ask side, but
also on the relative position of the quotes of the different venues on the price grid.
When venue j is quoting a higher bid (lower ask) than venue i, patient traders
have relatively more incentives to jump the queue on venue j and increase their
10The choice of the sampling frequency entails a trade-off. When we choose intervals that are too
long, the relation between the lagged state of the order book and returns becomes weaker. Multiple
traders may enter the market and trade for liquidity or informational reasons, and as such the tem-
porary price effect of the order book state disappears. When we choose intervals that are too short,
there could be multiple periods in which no traders enter the market, and the relation between the
lagged state of the order book also obscures. Ultimately, the optimal interval length may depend on
the frequency with which traders enter the market. Across all the stocks in our sample we believe
10 seconds balances the desire to have traders entering the market with a reasonable probability in
any time interval, without having too much activity.
11At the level of the individual venues we remove observations for which there is only a price
quoted on one side of the order book (because we cannot calculate a meaningful midquote or imbal-
ance), which is a situation that can occur sometimes for less actively traded stocks on MTFs. At the
consolidated level we allow for the possibility that these one-sided quotes are (part of) the EBBO.
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liquidity provision on venue i. Hence, more competitive quotes cause the limit
order book of venue j to have a stronger predictive power for venue i returns.
We test this hypothesis by decomposing depth from competing venues into depth
that is quoted at better prices, depth quoted at the same price and depth quoted
at worse prices, relative to venue i. In particular, at each point in time t, for each
venue i we classify bid depth from all competing venues j 6= i (which constitute
the consolidated market excluding i, Con\i) as follows:
D
Con\i(B),bid
t =
∑
j 6=i
Dj,bidt 1(P
j,bid
t > P
i,bid
t )
D
Con\i(S),bid
t =
∑
j 6=i
Dj,bidt 1(P
j,bid
t = P
i,bid
t )
D
Con\i(W ),bid
t =
∑
j 6=i
Dj,bidt 1(P
j,bid
t < P
i,bid
t )
Ask depth is classified similarly. Superscripts Con\i(B), Con\i(S) and Con\i(W )
refer to depth at better prices, the same prices and worse prices than venue
i, respectively. Using depth from competing venues classified accordingly we
construct the following three order book imbalance measures.
b
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=0 if D
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otherwise
(2.5)
To test Hypothesis 2 we then estimate the following model.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
Con\i(B)bCon\i(B)t−1 + β
Con\i(S)bCon\i(S)t−1
+βCon\i(W )bCon\i(W )t−1 + ui,t (2.6)
According to this hypothesis, βj(B) should be more positive than βj(S), while
βj(W ) is implied to be the weakest effect.
To test for a direct effect of the relative positive of the quotes on the price
grid (in addition to the effect of order book imbalances), as hypothesized in Hy-
pothesis 3, we introduce a measure of relative distance between midquotes. We
56 CHAPTER 2. RETURN PREDICTABILITY IN A FRAGMENTED MARKET
measure, from the point of view of venue i, the distance from its midquote mit to
the midquote mjt of venue j as follows
djt =
mjt −mit
( 12 )(m
j
t +m
i
t)
(2.7)
The distance is expressed relative to the average midquote of both venues. As
before we construct for each venue i the consolidated order book of the competing
venues (Con\i). We then extend model (2.3) by adding the distance between the
midquote from the best alternative venue j and venue i. Hypothesis 3 predicts a
positive δj , as prices on different venues tend to adjust to each other.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
Con\ibCon\it−1 + δ
Con\idCon\it−1 + u
i
t (2.8)
And then we disentangle, similarly as before, which venues contribute to pre-
dictability the most.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 +
∑
j 6=i
βjbjt−1 +
∑
j 6=i
δjdjt−1 + u
i
t (2.9)
2.3.3 The Effect of Fragmentation
The predictive ability of the state of the order book of a venue for returns on an-
other venue is likely to be different across venues, across stocks and over time.
Hypothesis 4 states that part of the differences across trading venues and over
time could be explained by fragmentation of trading volume across venues. In
particular, an order book of a trading venue is expected to be better predictor of
returns on another trading venue when it has a larger market share. A larger
market share for a venue indicates that it is more relevant, and thus more con-
nected to the consolidated market, as traders route more orders to these venues.
Under such circumstances, a venue is more likely to matter. To test this hypothe-
ses we estimate the following models for each venue i and competing venue j in
the sample separately.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
jbjt−1 + δ
jdjt−1 + µ
jmsjt−1,τ
+γjbjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ + λjdjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ + uit (2.10)
where msjt−1,τ is the relative market share of venue j, considering only venue j
and venue i, on day τ . Important to note here is that this model is not a pre-
dictive model, as we use hindsight to determine market shares. Because we
aggregate market shares to the daily level we can no longer estimate the model
per day. Instead, we estimate the model using the full one year time series. The
implicit assumption is that all variability in predictive ability (and thus coeffi-
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cients) across days of both the order book imbalance bj and the distance dj can
be captured by the relative market share of the venues msjτ .
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Institutional Background
Today’s market structure has evolved from a largely consolidated system into
a market where order flow is fragmented over different trading venues. This
holds for U.S. markets, as well as European markets. MiFID is the legal frame-
work in which financial markets operate inside the European Economic Area
since November 2007. It has expanded the set of regulated trading venues from
the Regulated Markets (RMs), which encompass the traditional national stock
exchanges, to also include Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and System-
atic Internalizers (SIs). Both RMs and MTFs are multilateral trading venues
that match third-party order flow. Most of these venues are subject to pre-trade
transparency requirements (with some room for exceptions12) and thus operate
public limit order books that display a large amount of the orders that are sub-
mitted to their books. MTFs are similar to Electronic Communications Networks
(ECNs) in the U.S.
Our dataset contains Belgian, Dutch and French index stocks. Although they
have different nationalities, they have in common that they are all listed on
one of the Euronext exchanges (Brussels, Amsterdam or Paris), and are mainly
traded on the same four trading venues during our sample period: Euronext,
Chi-X, Turquoise, Bats and Nasdaq OMX.13 Chi-X started its operations in April
2007 and has been the most successful MTF in Europe. Turquoise, Bats and Nas-
daq OMX were all launched during the second half of 2008. These venues can
differ in a number of ways (e.g., fee structure, clearing house, latency or order
types), but in general they are quite similar; all operate on the basis of a public
limit order book.
2.4.2 Data and Sample
From the full sample of 85 French, Dutch and Belgian index stocks we select a
subset of 30 stocks, 10 of each listing exchange (Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels). On
each exchange we sort stocks into quintiles based on their level of fragmentation
12Four types of pre-trade transparency waivers can be granted which have allowed opaque trad-
ing to flourish in Europe in recent years. In addition, under certain conditions, MiFID allows opaque
transactions on the unregulated Over-the-Counter (OTC) market. Furthermore, post-trade trans-
parency obligations can be delayed for orders that are large in scale as compared to normal market
size.
13Nasdaq OMX Europe seized trading in May 2010 because it did not attract a large enough
market share. It is therefore not included in the sample. Stocks can also be cross-listed on other
venues, such as the London Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, Luxembourg Stock Exchange
or Bolsa de Madrid. Because the shares, currency and trading hours are generally different we do
not include trading on these venues in our analysis.
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of trading volume, and from each of those quintiles we pick the stocks with the
lowest and highest amount of trading volume. This approach ensures there is
variation on the dimensions of the listing exchange, market fragmentation and
overall trading activity. We use a one year time series for each stock, from Octo-
ber 2009 until September 2010.
Data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick History. The dataset has two
parts. The first part of the dataset contains trade and quote data from all venues,
timestamped to the millisecond. The second part contains order book data for
these venues, also timestamped to the millisecond, identifying prices and visible
depth up to the tenth best price available at every update in the limit order book.
A new update is disseminated each time a trader submits, cancels or modifies an
order at one of these prices. We apply standard data cleaning procedures (e.g.,
remove updates outside opening hours of the market, delete negative spreads,
. . . ) and use the updates to construct snapshots of the limit order books at pre-
specified time intervals (10 seconds) on each venue. For comparability reasons
across days we also remove trading days during which a stock is not traded for a
full day during exchange opening hours (i.e. December 24 and 31 for all stocks,
and days on which there is no activity for more than 20 minutes at the best prices
on Euronext, as these are likely trading halts).
2.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 presents for each of the 30 stocks in our sample the time series mean
for a selection of variables. Panel A presents the means for variables at the
consolidated market level for each stock. In the bottom six lines of the table
we show the cross-sectional average and median values for the full stock sam-
ple, as well as for the five stocks experiencing the highest fragmentation (HFrag
sample) and lowest fragmentation (LFrag sample). Fragmentation of trading
volume across the four lit venues in our sample is measured as one minus the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel, 2015). The av-
erage (median) stock has a fragmentation of 0.45 (0.48). High fragmentation
stocks have an average (median) fragmentation of 0.53 (0.52), while stock trad-
ing is much more concentrated for low fragmentation stocks, with an average
(median) fragmentation of 0.29 (0.31). The average (median) stock in the sample
has a market capitalization of 20 billion (6 billion) euro. The stocks listed on
Euronext Paris are in general larger in size, while those listed in Brussels are
much smaller. Similar observations can be made for trading volume, liquidity
(spread and depth), quoting activity (the number of order book updates at the
best prices, which includes order submissions, cancellations and trades) and the
average time since the last quote update for each snapshot of the limit order
book. The latter is larger than the average duration between quote updates (as
implied by the number of quote updates) because there are both active and calm
periods in the order book, and quote updates also tend to cluster in time. The
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics (time series averages) for each stock in the sample based on daily
observations for a selection of market variables. The last six lines of the table show the cross-sectional
averages and medians for all stocks (All), the five stocks that have the highest fragmentation (HFrag), and
the five stocks that have the lowest fragmentation (LFrag). Market capitalization is expressed in million
euro, volume in thousand euro. Price is the average midquote price (in euro). Spread is expressed in basis
points, relative to the prevailing midquote. Abs Ret is the average absolute 10-second midquote return
(expressed in basis points). Depth is the sum of bid and ask depth at the best prices in the consolidated
market, expressed in euro. Daily observations of the price, spread and depth are time-weighted averages
based on 10 second snapshots throughout the trading day. The number of quotes (NQuotes) is the number
of times the either the best bid and ask prices, or depth, at the consolidated market changes within the
trading day. The time difference since the last quote update in the consolidated market (TimeLast) is
the average time difference between a snapshot of the consolidated limit order book and the last time
it was updated because an order was submitted, modified or canceled at the best prices (measured in
seconds). Fragmentation (Frag) of trading volume is measured as one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) based on trading volume market shares of the four venues in the sample.
Panel A (1)
Ticker Stock Listing Frag Market Cap Volume
BNPP BNP Paribas PA 0.47 53,982 316,046
EDF Electricite´ de France PA 0.48 11,164 70,041
LAGA Lagarde`re Group PA 0.47 3,401 21,183
LVMH LVMH PA 0.48 21,969 125,455
SASY Sanofi PA 0.52 56,168 230,262
SEVI Suez Environnement PA 0.50 3,892 18,669
SOGN Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale PA 0.46 28,470 254,743
STM STMicroelectronics PA 0.47 3,686 38,540
TCFP Thales PA 0.43 2,805 17,964
TOTF Total PA 0.52 96,112 358,240
COR Corio AS 0.49 3,770 16,380
ELSN Reed Elsevier AS 0.48 6,343 33,941
FUGR Fugro AS 0.40 3,441 23,086
HEIN Heineken AS 0.51 17,944 62,186
ING ING AS 0.42 25,937 264,734
ISPA ArcelorMittal AS 0.50 42,420 367,768
PHG Philips AS 0.52 21,867 151,772
RDSa Royal Dutch Shell AS 0.50 75,211 203,427
SBMO SBMO AS 0.43 2,224 17,987
UN Unilever AS 0.56 34,178 176,198
ABI AB Inbev BR 0.50 60,319 111,834
ACKB Ackermans & Van Haaren BR 0.31 1,741 1,905
BEFB Befimmo BR 0.30 1,006 1,423
BEKB Bekaert BR 0.31 2,544 7,806
FOR Fortis/Ageas BR 0.34 5,776 28,886
KBC KBC BR 0.40 11,909 33,835
MSTAR Mobistar BR 0.42 2,704 9,803
NYR Nyrstar BR 0.22 923 8,593
OMEP Omega Pharma BR 0.32 841 2,036
UCB UCB BR 0.45 5,256 10,852
Average All 0.44 20266.74 99519.87
Median All 0.47 6059.55 33887.90
Average HF 0.53 45,254 195,732
Median HF 0.52 34,178 176,198
Average LF 0.29 1,411 4,353
Median LF 0.31 1,006 2,036
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Table 2.1 continued.
Panel A (2)
Ticker Price Spread Depth NQuotes TimeLast
BNPP 52.50 3.47 125,595 204,807 1.11
EDF 37.04 3.84 65,358 82,799 2.43
LAGA 28.90 8.01 52,167 60,872 4.14
LVMH 84.43 4.43 96,101 121,594 1.96
SASY 51.27 3.17 161,096 132,176 1.69
SEVI 15.24 7.12 71,122 43,857 5.32
SOGN 43.22 4.05 80,303 189,960 1.23
STM 6.33 6.02 47,018 87,502 2.95
TCFP 30.00 8.03 42,105 28,005 9.34
TOTF 40.76 2.50 134,595 176,198 1.09
COR 45.15 9.70 42,287 42,485 5.91
ELSN 8.77 4.74 46,561 53,675 4.17
FUGR 43.39 8.58 43,689 47,794 5.21
HEIN 34.75 4.48 90,954 54,993 3.95
ING 7.57 4.40 90,970 204,794 1.20
ISPA 27.11 3.62 147,566 200,195 1.05
PHG 22.37 4.67 156,935 100,724 2.31
RDSa 21.21 3.16 444,890 161,203 1.50
SBMO 13.57 9.57 72,947 38,208 4.89
UN 22.02 3.40 219,110 139,882 1.72
ABI 37.61 5.31 93,599 85,877 2.86
ACKB 51.98 24.05 25,205 28,192 32.10
BEFB 59.92 25.14 25,973 14,804 45.53
BEKB 128.32 15.29 47,677 21,803 15.85
FOR 2.46 11.91 57,343 67,813 7.51
KBC 33.36 13.29 47,384 41,030 20.28
MSTAR 45.01 9.69 34,680 24,472 11.46
NYR 9.24 21.62 57,388 16,575 15.52
OMEP 34.67 18.58 25,750 25,184 36.60
UCB 28.64 10.71 42,175 24,323 11.40
Average All 35.56 8.75 89618.22 84059.83 8.74
Median All 34.01 6.57 61373.00 57932.53 4.16
Average HF 34.23 3.64 152,538 120,795 2.15
Median HF 34.75 3.40 156,935 132,176 1.72
Average LF 56.83 20.93 36,399 21,311 29.12
Median LF 51.98 21.62 25,973 21,803 32.10
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Table 2.1 continued.
Note: Panel B shows statistics for the four different trading venues in the sample: Euronext (Enx), Chi-
X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and Bats (Bat). Market Share is the market share of daily trading volume.
NQuotes (Relative) shows the number of times the best prices or depths of the limit order book at each
venue is updates, relative to the total amount of best order book updates at all markets. TimeLast shows
the average time difference between a snapshot of the limit order book and the last time it was updated
because an order was submitted, modified or canceled at the best prices (measured in seconds). Distance
(Ask) is the distance between the best ask price of the order book, and the best ask price in the consoli-
dated market (measured in basis points relative to the ask price). Depth (Relative) shows the number of
shares available at the best prices of each venue, relative to the total amount of shares available at the
best prices of all venues.
Panel B (1)
Ticker Market Share NQuotes (Relative) TimeLast
Enx Chi Tur Bat Enx Chi Tur Bat Enx Chi Tur Bat
BNPP 0.69 0.23 0.03 0.05 0.23 0.32 0.22 0.23 14.33 2.28 6.41 3.65
EDF 0.67 0.25 0.04 0.03 0.25 0.35 0.19 0.22 16.45 5.56 13.34 9.63
LAGA 0.69 0.21 0.06 0.03 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.22 20.55 11.17 16.87 15.68
LVMH 0.67 0.24 0.05 0.04 0.24 0.33 0.25 0.18 16.23 4.42 8.53 8.12
SASY 0.64 0.25 0.05 0.06 0.25 0.31 0.20 0.23 14.18 3.73 8.81 5.85
SEVI 0.65 0.24 0.07 0.04 0.30 0.30 0.19 0.21 20.97 11.74 21.78 20.19
SOGN 0.70 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.32 0.26 0.21 13.59 2.84 5.59 4.29
STM 0.70 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.19 0.31 0.22 0.27 18.95 7.57 12.14 9.05
TCFP 0.72 0.20 0.05 0.03 0.29 0.28 0.23 0.21 28.97 21.98 31.69 30.13
TOTF 0.64 0.25 0.04 0.07 0.25 0.29 0.20 0.27 14.13 2.71 6.05 3.44
COR 0.66 0.23 0.08 0.03 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.18 23.77 17.94 24.15 24.76
ELSN 0.68 0.23 0.06 0.04 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.22 19.80 9.97 20.02 15.07
FUGR 0.75 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.20 20.76 13.88 22.33 18.83
HEIN 0.65 0.24 0.06 0.05 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.19 18.59 9.55 19.33 20.44
ING 0.73 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.26 13.51 3.06 9.90 4.42
ISPA 0.66 0.24 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.25 0.24 14.02 2.52 9.82 3.37
PHG 0.64 0.26 0.04 0.06 0.27 0.34 0.18 0.20 15.31 5.51 14.53 8.63
RDSa 0.66 0.25 0.03 0.05 0.28 0.28 0.15 0.29 14.02 3.80 13.05 4.78
SBMO 0.73 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.34 0.24 0.21 0.22 20.01 14.23 23.86 26.82
UN 0.60 0.27 0.04 0.09 0.25 0.28 0.14 0.33 14.67 4.71 13.82 5.47
ABI 0.64 0.27 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.34 0.22 0.24 17.50 6.20 18.46 10.52
ACKB 0.81 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.20 75.37 75.27 155.03 131.39
BEFB 0.82 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.30 0.30 0.21 0.18 93.46 116.03 228.67 225.69
BEKB 0.81 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.18 40.67 39.31 84.46 86.84
FOR 0.80 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.35 29.84 17.86 45.02 28.62
KBC 0.74 0.19 0.04 0.03 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.16 43.95 28.12 46.96 80.76
MSTAR 0.72 0.21 0.04 0.03 0.28 0.33 0.26 0.13 34.27 25.41 42.55 70.03
NYR 0.88 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.30 0.27 0.22 0.21 38.82 42.02 65.27 75.61
OMEP 0.80 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.17 83.80 83.17 97.63 201.28
UCB 0.70 0.23 0.04 0.04 0.28 0.35 0.21 0.16 33.98 23.60 65.54 62.81
Average All 0.71 0.20 0.05 0.04 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.22 28.15 20.54 38.39 40.54
Median All 0.69 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.21 19.91 10.57 19.67 17.25
Average HF 0.63 0.25 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.30 0.19 0.24 15.38 5.24 12.51 8.77
Median HF 0.64 0.25 0.04 0.06 0.25 0.30 0.20 0.23 14.67 4.71 13.82 5.85
Average LF 0.83 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.19 66.43 71.16 126.21 144.16
Median LF 0.81 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.18 75.37 75.27 97.63 131.39
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Table 2.1 continued.
Panel B (2)
Ticker Distance (Ask) Depth (Relative)
Enx Chi Tur Bat Enx Chi Tur Bat
BNPP 0.53 0.60 8.66 2.89 0.41 0.27 0.16 0.17
EDF 0.75 0.50 3.36 6.12 0.47 0.23 0.13 0.17
LAGA 0.58 1.01 3.57 9.24 0.43 0.21 0.20 0.17
LVMH 0.52 0.61 3.63 2.79 0.44 0.23 0.17 0.16
SASY 0.35 0.53 2.42 1.88 0.44 0.26 0.15 0.15
SEVI 0.61 1.08 3.83 3.67 0.45 0.26 0.16 0.14
SOGN 0.70 0.70 2.73 4.99 0.44 0.24 0.15 0.17
STM 0.99 1.31 3.01 3.12 0.39 0.19 0.23 0.19
TCFP 1.01 1.19 4.10 4.29 0.42 0.22 0.20 0.15
TOTF 0.39 0.48 2.32 1.23 0.42 0.27 0.16 0.16
COR 0.91 0.93 1.67 8.43 0.40 0.21 0.20 0.18
ELSN 0.65 0.82 1.91 2.78 0.46 0.23 0.17 0.14
FUGR 0.82 1.05 2.15 2.97 0.45 0.21 0.17 0.17
HEIN 0.44 0.57 2.02 5.11 0.45 0.25 0.16 0.14
ING 0.70 0.78 3.35 2.63 0.43 0.26 0.15 0.15
ISPA 0.54 0.64 4.12 1.71 0.36 0.25 0.20 0.19
PHG 0.40 0.59 2.60 1.98 0.45 0.28 0.13 0.13
RDSa 0.26 0.36 1.80 0.91 0.36 0.30 0.16 0.17
SBMO 0.76 1.79 5.81 9.09 0.45 0.22 0.17 0.16
UN 0.35 0.57 2.04 1.05 0.43 0.28 0.11 0.19
ABI 0.71 0.81 6.27 4.93 0.39 0.26 0.17 0.18
ACKB 1.25 8.73 16.72 29.94 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.32
BEFB 1.61 12.07 13.82 17.10 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.26
BEKB 0.97 5.91 26.37 24.98 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.25
FOR 1.36 3.63 26.82 12.06 0.40 0.22 0.18 0.19
KBC 1.49 4.07 6.34 24.98 0.37 0.22 0.16 0.24
MSTAR 0.74 1.63 7.96 18.23 0.35 0.19 0.19 0.26
NYR 0.93 10.21 14.40 29.63 0.45 0.19 0.15 0.21
OMEP 1.13 10.48 17.00 50.04 0.30 0.19 0.20 0.27
UCB 0.80 1.32 15.03 14.32 0.34 0.21 0.21 0.23
Average All 0.77 2.50 7.19 10.10 0.40 0.23 0.18 0.19
Median All 0.72 0.97 3.73 4.96 0.42 0.23 0.17 0.17
Average HF 0.39 0.55 2.28 2.25 0.44 0.27 0.14 0.15
Median HF 0.39 0.57 2.32 1.88 0.44 0.27 0.15 0.15
Average LF 1.18 9.48 17.66 30.34 0.31 0.20 0.21 0.26
Median LF 1.13 10.21 16.72 29.63 0.29 0.20 0.20 0.26
HFrag stocks are much larger in size, have higher trading volumes, are more
liquid, have more frequent quote updates and a smaller average time since the
last quote update than the LFrag stocks. The HFrag stocks are listed in Paris
(SASY, TOTF) or Amsterdam (HEIN, PHG and UN), while the LFrag stocks are
all listed in Brussels (ACKB, BEFB, BEKB, NYR and OMEP). In interpreting the
results we point to differences between the HFrag and LFrag stocks, but bear in
mind that these two subsamples differ on a wide array of characteristics.
Panel B of Table 2.1 presents means of variables that are measured on the
different venues: Euronext (Enx), Chi-X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and Bats (Bat).
Euronext has by far the largest market share (74% on average), while Chi-X is
the largest competitor with a 20% market share for the average stock. Turquoise
and Bats are relatively small, with a 4% average market share each. The dom-
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inance of Euronext is naturally more outspoken for LFrag stocks (83% market
share) than for HFrag stocks (63% market share). For HFrag stocks Chi-X has a
25% average market share, while it is only 11% for LFrag stocks. For Turquoise
and Bats the difference in market shares between HFrag stocks (5% and 6%) and
LFrag stocks (4% and 2%) is smaller.
Differences in quoting activity are less outspoken across venues, but the pat-
tern is rather similar. Chi-X appears to be the most active quoting venue, with
30% of the total amount of quotes for the average and median stock, followed by
Euronext (26%), and finally Turquoise and Bats, with both 22% of quoting activ-
ity. The fact that quoting activity is more similar across venues, is in line with
our expectations. When market makers adjust their liquidity provision on one
venue, e.g., in response to an information event, they should also adjust their
orders on other venues to avoid these becoming stale.
Liquidity is distributed similarly across venues. Both Euronext and Chi-X
quote prices that are generally close to the consolidated best price, at 0.77 and
2.50 basis points on average, while Turquoise and Bats are quoting worse prices,
at 7.19 and 10.10 basis points, respectively. But there is a large difference across
stocks. For HFrag stocks both Turquoise and Bats seem to have quite competitive
quotes. The relative amount of depth quoted at the best prices (not necessarily
depth quoted at the same prices) is generally the highest on Euronext, with on
average 40% of the total amount of shares offered, followed by Chi-X (23%), and
then Bats (19%) and Turquoise (18%). What is remarkable is that for HFrag
stocks on average only 14% and 15% of depth is provided on Turquoise and Bats
respectively, while for LFrag stocks this amounts to 21% on Turquoise and 26%
on Bats. One reason is that the quotes from Turquoise and Bats for LFrag stocks
are far less competitive, and thus this depth is situated deeper into the consoli-
dated book.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Return Predictability on the Own Venue
Table 2.2 presents a summary of results for Equation (2.1). The table shows
(by stock) the mean coefficient of the lagged order book imbalance, the mean
t-statistic (based on Newey-West standard errors) within parentheses and the
fraction of estimated coefficients that is significantly positive or negative within
square brackets. In general, coefficients are largely positive and significant. On
the consolidated market level on average 99 percent of coefficients are signifi-
cantly positive, with a mean t-statistic of 6.81 and adjusted R2 of 1.85 percent.
Returns of HFrag stocks are on average more predictable, with a mean t-statistic
of 8.35 and adjusted R2 of 2.55 percent; consolidated market returns of LFrag
stocks are the least predictable, with a mean t-statistic of 4.76 and adjusted R2
of 1.01 percent. As Table 2.1 shows, both stock subsamples do not only differ
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Table 2.2: Return Predictability on the Own Venue
This table shows results from the time series Equation (2.1) for the consolidated market, as well as
the four different trading venues: Euronext (Enx), Chi-X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and Bats (Bat). The
dependent variable is the 10 second midquote return on the consolidated market or the trading venue,
and the independent variable is the lagged order book imbalance on the consolidated market or the venue.
We estimate the equation on a daily basis for 30 stocks. Each line shows the average coefficient and the
average t-statistic (based on Newey-West standard errors) of the daily estimates, followed by the fraction
of days for which the lagged order book imbalance is significantly positive or significantly negative at
the 5% level for that particular stock, and finally the average adjusted R2. Coefficients of order book
imbalances are multiplied by 10,000 for readability. The last six lines of the table show the cross-sectional
averages and medians for all stocks (All), the five stocks that have the highest fragmentation (HFrag),
and the five stocks that have the lowest fragmentation (LFrag). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively, based on the average t-statistic. †, ††, † † † indicates that more than 20
percent, 50 percent or 90 percent of stock-days have either significant positive, or negative coefficients, at
the 5% level.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + u
i
t
Ticker rCont = α+ β
ConbCont−1 + u
Con
t r
Enx
t = α+ β
EnxbEnxt−1 + u
Enx
t
bCont−1 b
Enx
t−1
coeff R¯2 coeff R¯2
BNPP 0.78*** (6.61) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.52 0.76*** (5.95) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.24
EDF 0.47*** (6.50) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.55 0.64*** (7.69) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.20
LAGA 0.69*** (8.10) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.67 0.72*** (7.43) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.20
LVMH 0.60*** (6.72) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.68 0.73*** (7.12) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.90
SASY 0.62*** (8.13) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.39 0.63*** (7.37) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.95
SEVI 0.71*** (9.27) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 3.49 0.65*** (8.06) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.55
SOGN 0.65*** (4.96) [0.97]† † † [0.00] 0.87 0.81*** (5.46) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.05
STM 0.53*** (6.07) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.28 0.60*** (5.78) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.26
TCFP 0.48*** (5.87) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.41 0.57*** (6.05) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.49
TOTF 0.55*** (6.69) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.51 0.56*** (6.03) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.22
COR 0.45*** (5.96) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.40 0.56*** (6.34) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.69
ELSN 0.44*** (7.07) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.83 0.46*** (6.36) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.55
FUGR 0.51*** (6.07) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.44 0.61*** (6.48) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.75
HEIN 0.52*** (7.40) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.09 0.52*** (6.58) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.70
ING 0.77*** (5.36) [0.97]† † † [0.00] 1.07 0.80*** (5.06) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 0.91
ISPA 0.78*** (6.48) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.43 0.73*** (5.60) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.05
PHG 0.85*** (8.76) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.71 0.81*** (7.77) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.09
RDSa 0.67*** (10.86) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 4.08 0.65*** (9.46) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 3.13
SBMO 0.83*** (8.51) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.90 0.84*** (7.84) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.44
UN 0.75*** (10.61) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 3.94 0.70*** (9.13) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.92
ABI 0.66*** (6.86) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.69 0.57*** (5.31) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.01
ACKB 0.46*** (3.99) [0.96]† † † [0.00] 0.63 0.42*** (3.26) [0.86]†† [0.00] 0.43
BEFB 0.32*** (3.35) [0.91]† † † [0.00] 0.45 0.36*** (3.09) [0.85]†† [0.00] 0.39
BEKB 0.72*** (6.56) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.81 0.68*** (5.57) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.32
FOR 0.99*** (7.20) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.95 0.82*** (5.57) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.11
KBC 1.06*** (6.88) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.83 0.85*** (4.96) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 0.93
MSTAR 0.45*** (6.09) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.49 0.47*** (5.47) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.24
NYR 0.86*** (6.01) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.52 1.07*** (6.72) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.93
OMEP 0.36*** (3.49) [0.91]† † † [0.00] 0.48 0.35*** (3.00) [0.83]†† [0.00] 0.36
UCB 0.61*** (6.75) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.88 0.57*** (5.52) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.29
Mean All 0.64*** (6.81) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.85 0.65*** (6.23) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.56
Median All 0.60*** (6.69) 1.60 0.61*** (6.20) 1.38
Mean HF 0.66*** (8.35) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.55 0.65*** (7.40) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.99
Median HF 0.63*** (8.32) 2.38 0.62*** (7.43) 1.86
Mean LF 0.56*** (4.76) [0.96]† † † [0.00] 1.01 0.59*** (4.41) [0.91]† † † [0.00] 0.92
Median LF 0.48*** (4.52) 0.76 0.47*** (4.09) 0.61
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Table 2.2 continued.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + u
i
t
Ticker rChit = α+ β
ChibChit−1 + u
Chi
t r
Tur
t = α+ β
TurbTurt−1 + u
Tur
t
bChit−1 b
Tur
t−1
coeff R¯2 coeff R¯2
BNPP 0.84*** (5.99) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.21 5.14*** (4.48) [0.87]†† [0.00] 0.86
EDF 0.48*** (4.94) [0.96]† † † [0.00] 0.84 0.48** (2.54) [0.57]†† [0.00] 0.28
LAGA 0.63*** (5.55) [0.97]† † † [0.00] 1.18 0.61*** (3.96) [0.84]†† [0.00] 0.56
LVMH 0.55*** (4.87) [0.95]† † † [0.00] 0.87 0.90*** (3.28) [0.71]†† [0.01] 0.56
SASY 0.61*** (6.18) [0.96]† † † [0.00] 1.43 0.50*** (4.21) [0.79]†† [0.00] 0.70
SEVI 0.71*** (6.18) [0.95]† † † [0.00] 1.53 0.99*** (3.75) [0.74]†† [0.00] 0.57
SOGN 0.74*** (4.08) [0.92]† † † [0.00] 0.59 0.82*** (3.08) [0.76]†† [0.00] 0.35
STM 0.54*** (4.79) [0.96]† † † [0.00] 0.80 0.78*** (5.52) [0.95]† † † [0.00] 1.06
TCFP 0.45*** (3.77) [0.94]† † † [0.00] 0.52 0.46*** (3.51) [0.82]†† [0.01] 0.42
TOTF 0.55*** (5.64) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.06 0.66*** (5.02) [0.89]†† [0.00] 0.88
COR 0.42*** (4.08) [0.92]† † † [0.00] 0.62 0.42*** (3.95) [0.91]† † † [0.00] 0.56
ELSN 0.47*** (4.44) [0.93]† † † [0.00] 0.72 0.36*** (3.83) [0.92]† † † [0.00] 0.47
FUGR 0.53*** (3.74) [0.88]†† [0.00] 0.58 0.41*** (3.52) [0.81]†† [0.00] 0.51
HEIN 0.45*** (5.30) [0.97]† † † [0.00] 1.03 0.45*** (3.91) [0.85]†† [0.00] 0.56
ING 0.77*** (4.52) [0.94]† † † [0.00] 0.73 0.86*** (3.77) [0.82]†† [0.00] 0.56
ISPA 0.76*** (5.27) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 0.94 0.88*** (3.98) [0.78]†† [0.01] 0.66
PHG 0.76*** (7.05) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 1.68 0.75*** (5.48) [0.91]† † † [0.00] 1.05
RDSa 0.64*** (9.60) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 3.06 0.55*** (6.63) [0.97]† † † [0.00] 1.40
SBMO 0.81*** (5.74) [0.95]† † † [0.00] 1.21 0.74*** (4.40) [0.88]†† [0.00] 0.72
UN 0.65*** (7.70) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.13 0.63*** (6.21) [0.93]† † † [0.00] 1.38
ABI 0.70*** (5.88) [0.99]† † † [0.00] 1.22 1.23*** (4.06) [0.87]†† [0.00] 0.68
ACKB 2.32*** (4.57) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.26 1.17*** (3.76) [0.80]†† [0.02] 1.40
BEFB 1.48*** (4.91) [0.92]† † † [0.00] 1.30 1.12*** (3.24) [0.76]†† [0.06] 1.27
BEKB 1.14*** (4.97) [0.96]† † † [0.00] 0.98 1.22*** (4.88) [0.84]†† [0.04] 1.81
FOR 1.12*** (4.75) [0.91]† † † [0.00] 0.81 -1.10 (1.55) [0.38]† [0.08] 0.27
KBC 1.60*** (4.73) [0.86]†† [0.00] 0.87 1.80*** (3.56) [0.86]†† [0.00] 0.44
MSTAR 0.52*** (3.62) [0.89]†† [0.00] 0.53 1.07*** (3.01) [0.71]†† [0.05] 0.68
NYR 1.31*** (3.95) [0.81]†† [0.00] 0.74 1.17*** (2.59) [0.55]†† [0.03] 0.54
OMEP 1.78*** (2.87) [0.75]†† [0.00] 0.53 0.74*** (2.61) [0.64]†† [0.01] 0.43
UCB 0.61*** (4.47) [0.96]† † † [0.00] 0.76 0.86*** (3.62) [0.78]†† [0.06] 0.85
Mean All 0.82*** (5.15) [0.94]† † † [0.00] 1.06 0.80*** (3.94) [0.80]†† [0.01] 0.75
Median All 0.61*** (5.04) 0.87 0.61*** (4.02) 0.48
Mean HF 0.61*** (6.39) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.47 0.60*** (4.97) [0.88]†† [0.00] 0.92
Median HF 0.58*** (6.48) 1.38 0.55*** (5.13) 0.75
Mean LF 1.59*** (4.25) [0.88]†† [0.00] 0.95 1.09*** (3.43) [0.72]†† [0.03] 1.09
Median LF 1.03*** (4.25) 0.75 0.92*** (3.58) 0.52
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Table 2.2 continued.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + u
i
t
Ticker rBatt = α+ β
BatbBatt−1 + u
Bat
t
bBatt−1
coeff R¯2
BNPP 1.54*** (6.03) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.57
EDF 1.04*** (5.69) [0.92]† † † [0.00] 1.40
LAGA 1.05*** (4.42) [0.85]†† [0.00] 0.93
LVMH 0.74*** (4.38) [0.89]†† [0.00] 0.81
SASY 0.80*** (5.07) [0.94]† † † [0.00] 1.07
SEVI 0.76*** (4.50) [0.89]†† [0.00] 0.92
SOGN 1.53*** (3.73) [0.84]†† [0.00] 0.57
STM 0.64*** (5.11) [0.94]† † † [0.00] 1.01
TCFP 0.53*** (3.31) [0.87]†† [0.00] 0.45
TOTF 0.55*** (4.86) [0.94]† † † [0.00] 0.91
COR 0.90*** (4.78) [0.91]† † † [0.00] 1.11
ELSN 0.41*** (3.76) [0.84]†† [0.00] 0.56
FUGR 0.49*** (2.91) [0.78]†† [0.00] 0.38
HEIN 1.02*** (4.62) [0.83]†† [0.00] 1.21
ING 0.77*** (3.79) [0.90]† † † [0.00] 0.55
ISPA 0.74*** (4.83) [0.97]† † † [0.00] 0.78
PHG 0.61*** (5.13) [0.95]† † † [0.00] 0.89
RDSa 0.57*** (7.99) [1.00]† † † [0.00] 2.15
SBMO 1.06*** (4.74) [0.89]†† [0.00] 0.90
UN 0.59*** (6.41) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.40
ABI 1.01*** (5.69) [0.93]† † † [0.00] 1.33
ACKB 5.70*** (5.10) [0.93]† † † [0.00] 2.27
BEFB 1.12*** (3.92) [0.83]†† [0.02] 1.41
BEKB 2.33*** (6.04) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 1.97
FOR 0.95*** (3.42) [0.68]†† [0.00] 0.56
KBC 4.00*** (7.17) [0.98]† † † [0.00] 2.37
MSTAR 0.45*** (4.06) [0.72]†† [0.04] 1.19
NYR 3.08*** (4.92) [0.85]†† [0.00] 1.46
OMEP 1.06*** (3.62) [0.67]†† [0.03] 1.94
UCB 1.27*** (4.78) [0.92]† † † [0.00] 1.07
Mean All 1.24*** (4.84) [0.89]†† [0.00] 1.17
Median All 0.73*** (4.82) 0.84
Mean HF 0.72*** (5.22) [0.93]† † † [0.00] 1.10
Median HF 0.59*** (5.19) 0.90
Mean LF 2.69*** (4.76) [0.86]†† [0.01] 1.81
Median LF 1.71*** (5.06) 1.36
in fragmentation, but also have very different size, volume and liquidity. The
former consists of large, liquid and actively traded stocks, while the latter are
much smaller and less liquid, with the lower trading volumes and fewer quote
updates. As shown in Tombeur and Wuyts (2015) more actively traded stocks
have a higher return predictability at very short horizons.
When comparing predictability across venues, returns on Euronext are on av-
erage the most predictable (mean t-statistic 6.23, adjusted R2 1.56 percent), fol-
lowed by Chi-X (mean t-statistic 5.15, adjusted R2 1.06 percent) and Bats (mean
t-statistic 4.84, adjusted R2 1.17 percent), and finally Turquoise has the least
predictable returns (mean t-statistic 3.94, adjusted R2 0.75 percent). Lagged
order book imbalances seem to be the best predictors of short-term returns on
the most active trading venues (Euronext and Chi-X). However, while Turquoise
slightly outperforms Bats on most measures of market activity and liquidity, its
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returns are clearly less predictable using the state of the order book. Thus, there
appears to be a ranking as to which returns are the best predictable, and this
ranking is in line with the trading activity and liquidity of these trading venues.
Across stocks, note that for LFrag stocks predictability is lower on all trading
venues, with lower t-statistics, lower adjusted R2 and fewer significantly pos-
itive coefficients. The result that short-term predictability is higher for more
liquid stocks and more competitive trading venues is in line with predictability
being driven by order choice rather than informed trading.
2.5.2 Return Predictability Across Venues
We now turn to return predictability across venues. Table 2.3 presents a sum-
mary of results of Equation (2.3). Each block of three columns shows results for
a different venue (as indicated by the header) and for each venue we display re-
sults for the full sample (All), the high fragmentation stock sample (HFrag), and
the low fragmentation stock sample (LFrag). For each independent variable we
show the mean coefficient estimate, the mean t-statistic (within parentheses),
the fraction of stock-days for which the coefficient is significantly positive, and
the fraction of stock-days for which it is significantly negative (within square
brackets).
As before, own venue order book imbalances can predict returns, while the
order book imbalance from the consolidated competitors only mildly contributes
to return predictability. The contribution is the largest on Euronext, where the
mean adjusted R2 increases slightly by adding bCon\it−1 , from 1.56 to 1.70. Cross-
venue predictability is much smaller on Chi-X, with an increase in mean adjusted
R2 from 1.06 to 1.13. For Turquoise and Bats the contribution of competing
venues to return predictability is almost non-existent, and mean coefficients are
even negative. So similarly as for Equation (2.1), cross-venue predictability of
returns ranks according to venue trading activity and liquidity. Across stocks
competing venues contribute to predictability the most for HFrag stocks, for all
venues. Even on Turquoise and Bats there is an indication that, for these highly
fragmented and more liquid stocks, the order books of competing venues matter
for future returns. For LFrag stocks the opposite is observed. On alternative
venues order book imbalances from competing venues even negatively predicts
returns.
Instead of aggregating the order books of competing venues into one consol-
idated order book, we also look at the contribution of the different venues sepa-
rately by estimating Equation (2.4). Results are summarized in Table 2.4. When
we compare the predictive ability for consolidated market returns across venues
we observe the same pattern as before: the Euronext order book contributes the
most (mean coefficient 0.43, t-statistic 4.00), followed by Chi-X (mean coefficient
0.29, t-statistic 2.73), with no significant contribution of Turquoise and Bats.
Furthermore, results indicate that returns are still best predicted by own venue
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Table 2.3: Return Predictability Across Venues: Order Book Imbalance
This table shows results from the time series Equation (2.3) for the four different trading venues: Euronext (Enx), Chi-X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and Bats
(Bat). The dependent variable is the 10 second midquote return on the trading venue, and the independent variables are the lagged order book imbalance on
the venue itself, and the lagged order book imbalance at the best consolidated market quotes excluding the venue itself. Order book imbalances are defined
in Equation (2.2). We estimate the equation on a daily basis for 30 stocks. For each included venue we display results in three columns, (1) for the full
sample (All), (2) for the five stocks that have the highest fragmentation (HFrag), and (3) for the five stocks that have the lowest fragmentation (LFrag). Each
line shows the average coefficient and the average t-statistic (based on Newey-West standard errors) of the daily estimates, followed by the fraction of days
for which the lagged order book imbalance is significantly positive or significantly negative at the 5% level for that particular stock, and finally the average
adjusted R2. Coefficients of order book imbalances are multiplied by 10,000 for readability. We suppress estimates for the constant α. *, **, *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, based on the average t-statistic. †, ††, † † † indicates that more than 20 percent, 50 percent or 90 percent
of stock-days have either significant positive, or negative coefficients, at the 5% level.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
Con\ibCon\it−1 + ui,t
rEnxt r
Chi
t r
Tur
t r
Bat
t
All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag
bit−1
0.62*** 0.60*** 0.58*** 0.82*** 0.58*** 1.62*** 0.81*** 0.60*** 1.10*** 1.24*** 0.71*** 2.73***
(5.82) (6.72) (4.30) (4.78) (5.84) (4.21) (3.89) (4.98) (3.40) (4.76) (5.10) (4.75)
[0.98]† † † [1.00]† † † [0.90]† † † [0.93]† † † [0.98]† † † [0.89]†† [0.79]†† [0.87]†† [0.72]†† [0.88]†† [0.93]† † † [0.85]††
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
b
Con\i
t−1
0.17 0.20** 0.08 0.05 0.13 -0.15 -0.04 0.02 -0.18 -0.02 0.06 -0.26
(1.64) (2.51) (0.61) (0.97) (1.41) (-0.24) (0.32) (0.55) (-0.38) (0.40) (0.75) (-0.50)
[0.42]† [0.65]†† [0.16] [0.25]† [0.34]† [0.06] [0.15] [0.21]† [0.04] [0.16] [0.24]† [0.04]
[0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.00] [0.11] [0.07] [0.06] [0.12] [0.06] [0.05] [0.16]
R¯2 1.70 2.23 0.97 1.13 1.57 0.99 0.80 0.99 1.13 1.22 1.18 1.86
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Table 2.4: Return Predictability Across Multiple Venues: Order Book Imbalance
This table shows results from the time series Equation (2.4) for the consolidated market and four different trading venues: Euronext (Enx), Chi-X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and
Bats (Bat). The dependent variable is the 10 second midquote return on the consolidated market or the trading venue, and the independent variables are the lagged order
book imbalances on all venues in the sample. Order book imbalances are defined in Equation (2.2). We estimate the equation on a daily basis for 30 stocks. For each included
venue we display results in three columns, (1) for the full sample (All), (2) for the five stocks that have the highest fragmentation (HFrag), and (3) for the five stocks that have
the lowest fragmentation (LFrag). Each line shows the average coefficient and the average t-statistic (based on Newey-West standard errors) of the daily estimates, followed
by the fraction of days for which the lagged order book imbalance is significantly positive or significantly negative at the 5% level for that particular stock, and finally the
average adjusted R2. Coefficients of order book imbalances are multiplied by 10,000 for readability. We suppress estimates for the constant α. *, **, *** denote significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, based on the average t-statistic. †, ††, † † † indicates that more than 20 percent, 50 percent or 90 percent of stock-days have either
significant positive, or negative coefficients, at the 5% level.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 +
∑
j 6=i β
jbjt−1 + ui,t
rCont r
Enx
t r
Chi
t r
Tur
t r
Bat
t
All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag
bEnxt−1
0.43*** 0.39*** 0.45*** 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.56*** 0.10 0.14 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.15 0.00 0.07 -0.29
(4.00) (4.36) (3.32) (5.71) (6.69) (3.89) (1.11) (1.44) (0.06) (0.55) (0.53) (-0.12) (0.48) (0.68) (-0.44)
[0.89]†† [0.94]† † † [0.76]†† [0.97]† † † [1.00]† † † [0.83]†† [0.29]† [0.36]† [0.08] [0.18] [0.18] [0.07] [0.16] [0.19] [0.03]
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.07] [0.04] [0.03] [0.10] [0.05] [0.03] [0.13]
bChit−1
0.29*** 0.33*** 0.11 0.15 0.18** 0.03 0.70*** 0.57*** 1.21*** 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.11 -0.09
(2.73) (3.79) (0.69) (1.31) (2.04) (0.10) (4.84) (5.87) (3.86) (0.30) (0.68) (-0.08) (0.40) (0.95) (-0.29)
[0.65]†† [0.88]†† [0.16] [0.34]† [0.54]†† [0.07] [0.94]† † † [0.98]† † † [0.86]†† [0.12] [0.18] [0.05] [0.12] [0.22]† [0.03]
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.03] [0.07] [0.04] [0.01] [0.09]
bTurt−1
0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.78*** 0.58*** 1.09*** -0.05 0.03 -0.31
(0.13) (-0.53) (0.27) (0.02) (-0.55) (0.25) (0.11) (-0.22) (0.01) (3.73) (4.73) (3.15) (-0.11) (0.25) (-0.48)
[0.12] [0.04] [0.14] [0.10] [0.05] [0.12] [0.08] [0.04] [0.07] [0.78]†† [0.86]†† [0.70]†† [0.06] [0.10] [0.05]
[0.09] [0.15] [0.07] [0.09] [0.16] [0.06] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05] [0.01] [0.00] [0.04] [0.08] [0.04] [0.14]
bBatt−1
-0.01 0.06 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.16 1.21*** 0.69*** 2.59***
(-0.05) (0.70) (-0.38) (-0.24) (0.41) (-0.26) (-0.03) (0.40) (0.07) (0.01) (0.54) (0.19) (4.57) (4.82) (4.41)
[0.09] [0.20] [0.03] [0.06] [0.14] [0.04] [0.06] [0.10] [0.07] [0.08] [0.13] [0.10] [0.88]†† [0.92]† † † [0.84]††
[0.10] [0.04] [0.10] [0.12] [0.04] [0.10] [0.07] [0.03] [0.05] [0.08] [0.03] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
R¯2 1.40 1.74 0.89 1.79 2.27 1.08 1.26 1.65 1.06 0.92 1.09 1.30 1.29 1.25 1.90
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order book imbalances. Only for HFrag stocks on Euronext and Chi-X there
is some contribution of order books across both venues. Overall, these results
present weak evidence at best for Hypothesis 1 that imbalances in the state of
the order book can predict returns across venues.
But Hypothesis 2 states that the relationship between the state of the or-
der book and future returns depends on the relative position of the quotes in
the price grid. We therefore decompose depth that is quoted by all competing
venues into depth quoted at better prices (Con\i(B)), the same prices (Con\i(S))
and worse prices (Con\i(W )) (compared to venue i prices). We regress returns
on lagged classified order book imbalances, bCon\i(B)t , b
Con\i(S)
t and b
Con\i(W )
t , as
indicated by Equation (2.6) and present a summary of results in Table 2.5. We
find that imbalances in the state of the order book of competing venues are the
strongest predictor of returns when these venues are quoting better prices than
venue i. For the full stock sample mean coefficients (t-statistics) are 0.38 (3.40),
0.34 (2.42), 0.41 (2.30) and 0.40 (2.12) for Euronext, Chi-X, Turquoise and Bats
respectively. An explanation for this finding is that queue-jumping from order
book j to order book i is more likely when the former is very competitive. As
such, switching between order books has the strongest effect on quoted prices
(and thus midquote returns) under these circumstances. Our findings are thus
in line with Hypothesis 2.
While imbalances measured at more competitive prices strongly predict re-
turns in the direction of the imbalance, imbalances obtained from worse prices
predict returns in the opposite direction, i.e. reversals. Relatively more bid (ask)
depth on less competitive venues Con\i(W ) predicts the midquote to drop (rise)
on venue i. Suppose a positive order book imbalance is observed at worse prices,
which means that competing venues j are quoting relatively more bid depth be-
hind the best prices of venue i. This provides more incentives for traders to jump
the bid queue on venue i (by submitting a limit buy order on venue j) rather than
vice versa. Furthermore, when competing venues are quoting relatively more bid
depth at a worse price than venue i, it suggests that the bid quote on venue i is
(relatively) too high, e.g., because competition for order execution on the bid side
of venue i has just raised the bid price. This is in line with the model of Goet-
tler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005) who state that, within a single order book, when
the bid (ask) side is thicker behind the best quotes than at the best quotes, this
can signal a midquote above the common value of the asset. The effect is the
strongest on Turquoise (mean coefficient -0.74, t-statistic -2.87) and Bats (mean
coefficient -0.52, t-statistic -2.35) because these venues generally do not have bet-
ter prices than their competitors, but when they do, they are more likely to be
out of line with fundamentals.
For order book imbalances at the same prices (bCon\i(S)t ) the sign of the ef-
fect depends on the venue. On Euronext and Chi-X the queue-jumping from
order book j to order book i dominates and future returns are positively related
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Table 2.5: Return Predictability Across Venues: The Effect of Quote Competitiveness
Note: This table shows results from the time series Equation (2.6) for the four different trading venues: Euronext (Enx), Chi-X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur)
and Bats (Bat). The dependent variable is the 10 second midquote return on the trading venue, and the independent variables are the lagged order
book imbalance on the venue itself, and lagged order book imbalances from competing venues, classified according to the relative position on the price
grid: better than the quotes of venue i (i(B)), at the same quotes as those of venue i (i(S)), and at worse quotes than those of venue i (i(W )). Order
book imbalances are defined in Equations (2.2) and (2.5). We estimate the equation on a daily basis for 30 stocks. For each included venue we display
results in three columns, (1) for the full sample (All), (2) for the five stocks that have the highest fragmentation (HFrag), and (3) for the five stocks
that have the lowest fragmentation (LFrag). Each line shows the average coefficient and the average t-statistic (based on Newey-West standard
errors) of the daily estimates, followed by the fraction of days for which the lagged order book imbalance is significantly positive or significantly
negative at the 5% level for that particular stock, and finally the average adjusted R2. Coefficients of order book imbalances are multiplied by 10,000
for readability. We suppress estimates for the constant α. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, based on the
average t-statistic. †, ††, † † † indicates that more than 20 percent, 50 percent or 90 percent of stock-days have either significant positive, or negative
coefficients, at the 5% level.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
Con\i(B)bCon\i(B)t−1 + β
Con\i(S)bCon\i(S)t−1 + β
Con\i(W )bCon\i(W )t−1 + ui,t
rEnxt r
Chi
t r
Tur
t r
Bat
t
All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag
bit−1
0.43*** 0.38*** 0.47*** 0.72*** 0.47*** 1.35*** 0.52*** 0.33*** 0.75** 0.82*** 0.54*** 1.88***
(3.75) (3.85) (3.41) (3.86) (4.44) (3.13) (2.65) (3.00) (2.36) (3.08) (3.71) (2.85)
[0.86]†† [0.90]†† [0.77]†† [0.87]†† [0.94]† † † [0.78]†† [0.67]†† [0.73]†† [0.62]†† [0.74]†† [0.86]†† [0.69]††
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.03] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02]
b
Con\i(B)
t−1
0.38*** 0.36*** 0.25* 0.34** 0.29*** 0.65*** 0.41** 0.38*** 0.54** 0.40** 0.35*** 0.45
(3.40) (3.61) (1.95) (2.42) (2.74) (2.78) (2.30) (2.94) (2.19) (2.12) (2.92) (1.35)
[0.80]†† [0.89]†† [0.50]†† [0.60]†† [0.70]†† [0.65]†† [0.56]†† [0.70]†† [0.56]†† [0.53]†† [0.72]†† [0.34]†
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
b
Con\i(S)
t−1
0.28*** 0.29*** 0.14 0.02 0.13 -0.12 -0.45 -0.12 -0.79 -0.38 -0.10 -1.06**
(2.95) (3.46) (1.16) (1.05) (1.33) (-0.04) (-0.79) (-0.34) (-1.50) (-0.80) (-0.18) (-2.22)
[0.75]†† [0.88]†† [0.29]† [0.26]† [0.31]† [0.10] [0.05] [0.05] [0.02] [0.06] [0.07] [0.00]
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.10] [0.23]† [0.11] [0.39]† [0.24]† [0.14] [0.53]††
b
Con\i(W )
t−1
-0.13 -0.13* -0.11 -0.21 -0.14* -0.48 -0.74*** -0.51*** -0.91** -0.52** -0.36*** -0.61
(-1.34) (-1.83) (-0.82) (-1.12) (-1.74) (-1.33) (-2.87) (-3.36) (-2.13) (-2.35) (-3.17) (-1.10)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.03]
[0.31]† [0.46]† [0.17] [0.26]† [0.43]† [0.32]† [0.70]†† [0.79]†† [0.56]†† [0.59]†† [0.80]†† [0.30]†
R¯2 2.85 3.55 1.42 1.63 2.13 1.72 2.02 2.56 2.24 2.26 2.48 2.78
72 CHAPTER 2. RETURN PREDICTABILITY IN A FRAGMENTED MARKET
to the order book imbalances from the consolidated competitors Con\i(S). For
Turquoise and Bats the relative over- or undervaluation that is implied by the
relative position of the quotes matters most, and the the order book imbalance
on competing venues bCon\i(S)t is negatively related to future returns. Overall,
the size of the effect is smaller for imbalances at the same prices.
The fact that the relation between order book imbalances and future returns
depends on the relative position of the quotes provides an explanation for the
weak results from Tables 2.3 and 2.4. In order to separate the effect of order book
imbalances from the effect of the relative positions of the quotes on the price grid,
we introduce a new measure to capture the latter: the distance djt between the
midquote of venue i and venue j. Results of Equation (2.8) are presented in Table
2.6 and show that the distance between the midquote of venue i and the midquote
of the consolidated competitors Con\i has a large predictive power for future
venue returns. It is strongly significant for all venues and the mean adjusted
R2 increases from 1.70 to 3.18, from 1.13 to 9.87, from 0.80 tot 15.75, and from
1.22 to 10.60 for returns on Euronext, Chi-X, Turquoise and Bats respectively.
This is in line with Hypothesis 3. Furthermore, the coefficient of lagged order
book imbalance of the consolidated competitors Con\i is now larger and more
significant. In fact, for Chi-X, Turquoise and Bats competing venues seem to
contribute more to predictability than the own venue imbalance, and especially
the lagged distance has quite some explanatory power for returns. These results
suggest that Hypothesis 1 holds when we control for the relative positions of the
quotes.
The large adjusted R2 for returns on alternative venues (primarily Turquoise
and Bats), compared to a relatively low adjusted R2 for Euronext, the listing
exchange, indicate that price discovery is taking place mostly on the latter venue.
New information is first impounded into prices on Euronext, and later prices on
alternative venues tend to adjust.
In Table 2.7 we present a summary of results of Equation (2.9) and explore
return predictability within and across venues into more detail by disentangling
the contribution of the different venues. Order book imbalances and distances
from Euronext and Chi-X significantly predict returns, on the consolidated mar-
ket as well as on separate trading venues, although for LFrag stocks their con-
tribution is lower. By contrast, Bats and Turquoise contribute to a much lesser
extent; for LFrag stocks their contribution is almost non-existent. Even for own
venue returns the predictive ability of Turquoise and Bats order book imbalances
is weaker than that of Euronext and Chi-X. In line with results of Equation (2.8),
the adjusted R2s for the alternative venues are much higher compared to models
that only include order book imbalances.
Overall, we find that returns on a venue i can be predicted by the lagged
state of the order book of venue j and thus we accept Hypothesis 1. Moreover,
also the relative position of the quotes across venues contains information that
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Table 2.6: Return Predictability Across Venues: Order Book Imbalance and Distance
This table shows results from the time series Equation (2.8) for the four different trading venues: Euronext (Enx), Chi-X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and
Bats (Bat). The dependent variable is the 10 second midquote return on the trading venue, and the independent variables are the lagged order book
imbalance on the venue itself, the lagged order book imbalance at the best consolidated market quotes excluding the venue itself, and the lagged
distance between the midquotes of both order books. Order book imbalances are defined in Equation (2.2) and distance is defined in Equation (2.7).
We estimate the equation on a daily basis for 30 stocks. For each included venue we display results in three columns, (1) for the full sample (All),
(2) for the five stocks that have the highest fragmentation (HFrag), and (3) for the five stocks that have the lowest fragmentation (LFrag). Each line
shows the average coefficient and the average t-statistic (based on Newey-West standard errors) of the daily estimates, followed by the fraction of
days for which the lagged order book imbalance is significantly positive or significantly negative at the 5% level for that particular stock, and finally
the average adjusted R2. Coefficients of order book imbalances are multiplied by 10,000 for readability. We suppress estimates for the constant α. *,
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, based on the average t-statistic. †, ††, † † † indicates that more than 20 percent,
50 percent or 90 percent of stock-days have either significant positive, or negative coefficients, at the 5% level.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
Con\ibCon\it−1 + δ
Con\idCon\it−1 + u
i
t
rEnxt r
Chi
t r
Tur
t r
Bat
t
All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag All HFrag LFrag
bit−1
0.44*** 0.40*** 0.46*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.43 0.18 0.23** 0.48
(3.81) (3.99) (3.32) (2.72) (3.79) (0.73) (0.92) (0.70) (1.35) (1.09) (2.00) (1.18)
[0.85]†† [0.88]†† [0.76]†† [0.65]†† [0.83]†† [0.28]† [0.33]† [0.32]† [0.40]† [0.37]† [0.55]†† [0.38]†
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.07] [0.09] [0.12] [0.05] [0.08] [0.03] [0.08]
b
Con\i
t−1
0.31*** 0.34*** 0.21 0.53*** 0.41*** 0.93** 0.64*** 0.60*** 0.59 0.53*** 0.50*** 0.52
(2.82) (3.86) (1.53) (3.05) (3.64) (2.49) (3.22) (4.39) (1.63) (2.76) (3.79) (1.39)
[0.69]†† [0.90]†† [0.37]† [0.74]†† [0.84]†† [0.64]†† [0.71]†† [0.86]†† [0.44]† [0.65]†† [0.83]†† [0.36]†
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] [0.03]
d
Con\i
t−1
0.21*** 0.31*** 0.04*** 0.31*** 0.39*** 0.19*** 0.42*** 0.53*** 0.15*** 0.33*** 0.43*** 0.12***
(3.75) (4.23) (2.59) (13.52) (8.81) (4.55) (15.61) (19.63) (5.39) (11.84) (27.01) (5.13)
[0.77]†† [0.84]†† [0.66]†† [0.86]†† [0.89]†† [0.94]††
†
[0.96]††
†
[0.98]††
†
[0.93]††
†
[0.95]††
†
[0.97]††
†
[0.92]††
†
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
R¯2 3.18 3.88 1.68 9.87 10.15 8.91 15.75 19.83 6.60 10.60 12.39 5.95
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Table 2.7: Return Predictability Across Multiple Venues: Order Book Imbalance and Distance
This table shows results from the time series Equation (2.9) for the consolidated market and four different trading venues: Euronext (Enx), Chi-X
(Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and Bats (Bat). The dependent variable is the 10 second midquote return on the consolidated market or the trading venue,
and the independent variables are the lagged order book imbalances on all venues in the sample, as well as the distance to the midquotes of the
other venues. Order book imbalances are defined in Equation (2.2) and distance is defined in Equation (2.7). We estimate the equation on a daily
basis for 30 stocks. For each included venue we display results in three columns, (1) for the full sample (All), (2) for the five stocks that have the
highest fragmentation (HFrag), and (3) for the five stocks that have the lowest fragmentation (LFrag). Each line shows the average coefficient and
the average t-statistic (based on Newey-West standard errors) of the daily estimates, followed by the fraction of days for which the lagged order book
imbalance is significantly positive or significantly negative at the 5% level for that particular stock, and finally the average adjusted R2. Coefficients
of order book imbalances are multiplied by 10,000 for readability. We suppress estimates for the constant α. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively, based on the average t-statistic. †, ††, † † † indicates that more than 20 percent, 50 percent or 90 percent of stock-days
have either significant positive, or negative coefficients, at the 5% level.
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
jbjt−1 + δ
jdjt−1 + µ
jmsjt−1,τ + γ
jbjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ + λjdjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ + uit
rCont r
Enx
t r
Chi
t r
Tur
t r
Bat
t
All HF LF All HF LF All HF LF All HF LF All HF LF
bEnxt−1
0.31*** 0.30*** 0.34** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.38** 0.34** 0.30*** 0.43* 0.34* 0.30** 0.29 0.25 0.30** 0.05
(2.68) (3.00) (2.37) (3.13) (3.49) (2.54) (2.32) (2.59) (1.66) (1.73) (2.06) (0.94) (1.44) (1.99) (0.40)
[0.66]†† [0.74]†† [0.57]†† [0.74]†† [0.81]†† [0.60]†† [0.59]†† [0.64]†† [0.42]† [0.44]† [0.51]†† [0.27]† [0.37]† [0.48]† [0.15]
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.02] [0.01] [0.06]
bChit−1
0.26** 0.27*** 0.15 0.23* 0.24** 0.16 0.33** 0.33*** 0.13 0.39* 0.34** 0.39 0.36* 0.31** 0.44
(2.16) (2.73) (0.86) (1.90) (2.41) (0.82) (2.56) (3.30) (0.76) (1.88) (2.52) (0.96) (1.72) (2.34) (0.81)
[0.55]†† [0.72]†† [0.19] [0.48]† [0.65]†† [0.17] [0.63]†† [0.79]†† [0.23]† [0.48]† [0.65]†† [0.24]† [0.44]† [0.61]†† [0.21]†
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02]
bTurt−1
0.07 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.28 0.16 0.01 0.62
(0.50) (0.36) (0.38) (0.40) (0.23) (0.32) (0.42) (0.25) (0.46) (0.54) (0.50) (0.70) (0.37) (0.12) (0.84)
[0.13] [0.12] [0.07] [0.11] [0.10] [0.07] [0.14] [0.11] [0.15] [0.25]† [0.27]† [0.25]† [0.14] [0.10] [0.24]†
[0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03] [0.05] [0.02] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] [0.10] [0.12] [0.08] [0.06] [0.08] [0.03]
bBatt−1
0.07 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.18 0.17
(0.54) (1.11) (0.29) (0.54) (1.06) (0.45) (0.50) (1.03) (0.34) (0.44) (0.84) (0.47) (0.72) (1.60) (0.62)
[0.14] [0.26]† [0.10] [0.14] [0.25]† [0.12] [0.14] [0.25]† [0.12] [0.15] [0.22]† [0.17] [0.28]† [0.45]† [0.27]†
[0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.06] [0.05] [0.03] [0.06] [0.09] [0.04] [0.10]
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dEnxt−1
0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02*** 0.00*
(2.51) (2.54) (2.29) (4.20) (4.75) (3.78) (2.61) (2.60) (2.40) (2.19) (2.79) (1.81)
[0.64]†† [0.63]†† [0.62]†† [0.71]†† [0.70]†† [0.84]†† [0.43]† [0.36]† [0.56]†† [0.36]† [0.39]† [0.43]†
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01]
dChit−1
0.19*** 0.23*** 0.03* 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.03* 0.23** 0.27** 0.07* 0.20** 0.23** 0.06
(2.75) (2.64) (1.71) (2.99) (2.84) (1.83) (2.44) (2.53) (1.75) (2.08) (2.31) (1.25)
[0.68]†† [0.68]†† [0.43]† [0.71]†† [0.70]†† [0.46]† [0.59]†† [0.61]†† [0.46]† [0.53]†† [0.57]†† [0.31]†
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.04] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01]
dTurt−1
0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
(1.12) (1.41) (1.14) (0.96) (1.21) (1.01) (1.17) (1.50) (1.29) (1.04) (1.29) (1.23)
[0.27]† [0.35]† [0.19] [0.23]† [0.30]† [0.17] [0.30]† [0.36]† [0.28]† [0.28]† [0.33]† [0.31]†
[0.04] [0.05] [0.01] [0.05] [0.05] [0.01] [0.05] [0.07] [0.01] [0.05] [0.07] [0.01]
dBatt−1
0.05 0.08* 0.01 0.05 0.08* 0.01 0.06 0.09* 0.02 0.09 0.12* 0.04
(1.37) (1.65) (0.82) (1.29) (1.65) (0.78) (1.51) (1.77) (1.11) (1.50) (1.84) (1.42)
[0.34]† [0.40]† [0.19] [0.31]† [0.40]† [0.17] [0.37]† [0.44]† [0.28]† [0.38]† [0.44]† [0.37]†
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.03] [0.05] [0.02]
R¯2 3.76 4.21 2.58 3.91 4.59 2.17 7.47 9.72 5.70 16.72 21.49 6.82 11.62 13.81 6.60
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can be used to predict returns. The relation between returns on venue i and the
lagged state of the order book on competing venue j is stronger when venue j
is relatively more competitive, and thus traders are more likely to queue-jump
to venue i. This confirms Hypothesis 2. We find also that prices adjust across
trading venues as the distance between the midquotes of two trading venues can
predict returns on either of these venues, which confirms Hypothesis 3. Our
findings suggest that the listing exchange (Euronext) is leading in price discov-
ery, while the small and less liquid alternative venues (Turquoise and Bats) are
followers. The strongest competing venue (Chi-X) seems to be an intermediate
case.
2.5.3 The Effect of Fragmentation
The previous results indicate that there is heterogeneity in cross-venue return
predictability between venues, across stocks and also over time. Hypothesis 4
states that cross-venue return predictability is stronger when trading activity
is more fragmented across trading venues. In particular, as a trading venue
attracts more volume, this indicates that both liquidity demanders and suppliers
are finding their way to the venue. In turn, this could induce also other traders
to submit orders to this venue because of a liquidity externality effect (Pagano,
1989). As a venue becomes more relevant in the order choice consideration of
traders, this could reinforce the mechanism that underlies return predictability
across venues.
Panel A of Table 2.8 presents a summary of estimation results of Equation
(2.10), with the Euronext return as the dependent variable, and order book and
price information from alternative venues as independent variables. Panel B
shows results for the same equation estimated with returns from alternative
venues as the dependent variable, and Euronext order book information as inde-
pendent variable. These equations are estimated per stock per year. Interactions
are included between, on the one hand, the lagged state of the order book of venue
j and the lagged distance between midquotes of venue i and venue j, and on the
other hand, the relative market share of venue j (as compared to venue i). We
thus allow predictability of returns using venue j order book information to vary
according to the relative market share of venues j. The goal of the model is to
explain the variation in predictability and it cannot be used to predict returns
because it uses information unavailable at time t− 1.
For Euronext returns we find in Panel A that the order book of alternative
venues j can better predict returns on days when venue j has a relatively larger
market share. For Chi-X the mean interaction with relative market share is 0.49
(t-statistic 2.99), for Turquoise it is 1.32 (t-statistic 3.98), and for Bats it is 1.02
(t-statistic 2.62). The result holds both for HFrag stocks and LFrag stocks, and is
in line with Hypothesis 4. However, we do not find that the market share affects
the predictive ability of the distance between midquotes in a similar way. In fact,
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Table 2.8: Return Predictability Across Multiple Venues: The Effect of Fragmentation
This table shows results from the time series Equation (2.10) for the four different trading venues: Euronext
(Enx), Chi-X (Chi), Turquoise (Tur) and Bats (Bat). The dependent variable is the 10 second midquote return on
the trading venue, and the independent variables are the lagged order book imbalance on the venue itself, the
lagged order book imbalance at one of the competing venues, and the lagged distance between the midquotes
of both order books. Order book imbalances are defined in Equation (2.2) and distance is defined in Equation
(2.7). Furthermore, we include the contemporaneous daily relative market share of the competing venue and
its interaction with the order book imbalance and distance. We estimate the equation on a yearly basis for
30 stocks. For each included venue we display results in three columns, (1) for the full sample (All), (2) for
the five stocks that have the highest fragmentation (HFrag), and (3) for the five stocks that have the lowest
fragmentation (LFrag). Each line shows the average coefficient and the average t-statistic (based on Newey-
West standard errors) of the yearly estimates, followed by the fraction of stocks for which the lagged order book
imbalance is significantly positive or significantly negative at the 5% level for that particular stock, and finally
the average adjusted R2. Coefficients of order book imbalances are multiplied by 10,000 for readability. We
suppress estimates for the constant α. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively,
based on the average t-statistic. †, ††, † † † indicates that more than 20 percent, 50 percent or 90 percent of
stocks have either significant positive, or negative coefficients, at the 5% level. Panel A shows result with
Euronext returns as dependent variable, while Panel B shows results with Chi-X, Turquoise and Bats returns
as dependent variables.
Panel A
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
jbjt−1 + δ
jdjt−1 + µ
jmsjt−1,τ + γ
jbjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ + λjdjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ + uit
rEnxt r
Enx
t r
Enx
t
All HF LF All HF LF All HF LF
bit−1
0.56*** 0.55*** 0.49*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.50*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 0.51***
(49.35) (43.54) (46.36) (76.01) (96.27) (46.86) (68.93) (74.54) (53.97)
[1.00]† † † [1.00]† † † [1.00]† † † [1.00]† † † [1.00]† † † [1.00]† † † [1.00]† † † [1.00]† † † [1.00]† † †
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
j = Chi j = Tur j = Bat
bjt−1
0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.05** -0.13*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(1.54) (1.17) (1.63) (-2.05) (-6.58) (-0.98) (-1.41) (-0.79) (-0.64)
[0.43]† [0.20] [0.40]† [0.23]† [0.00] [0.20] [0.23]† [0.20] [0.20]
[0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.47]† [1.00]† † † [0.20] [0.50]† [0.40]† [0.40]†
djt−1
0.07 0.12** 0.01*** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02*** 0.02** 0.00***
(1.60) (2.00) (2.73) (0.76) (-0.04) (1.55) (2.64) (2.15) (4.64)
[0.47]† [0.40]† [0.80]†† [0.30]† [0.00] [0.60]†† [0.53]†† [0.40]† [0.80]††
[0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.20] [0.00] [0.20] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00]
msjt−1,τ
-0.03 -0.05 -0.11 0.02 0.09 -0.28* -0.07 -0.06 -0.18
(-0.44) (-0.89) (-0.47) (0.00) (0.53) (-1.67) (-0.59) (-0.91) (-0.78)
[0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
[0.17] [0.20] [0.20] [0.07] [0.00] [0.20] [0.10] [0.20] [0.00]
bjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ
0.49*** 0.56*** 0.38* 1.32*** 1.60*** 1.94*** 1.02*** 1.12*** 1.69***
(2.99) (3.44) (1.68) (3.98) (6.26) (4.13) (2.62) (4.53) (2.63)
[0.57]†† [0.80]†† [0.20] [0.67]†† [1.00]† † † [0.80]†† [0.60]†† [0.80]†† [0.60]††
[0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00]
djt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ
-0.06 -0.20 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.03
(-0.16) (-1.44) (1.10) (1.01) (1.16) (0.66) (-0.22) (-0.59) (0.59)
[0.17] [0.00] [0.40]† [0.33]† [0.40]† [0.20] [0.20] [0.00] [0.40]†
[0.13] [0.40]† [0.00] [0.17] [0.00] [0.40]† [0.30]† [0.40]† [0.20]
R¯2 1.77 2.21 0.97 1.41 1.74 0.87 1.48 1.86 0.85
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Table 2.8 continued.
Panel B
rit = α+ β
ibit−1 + β
jbjt−1 + δ
jdjt−1 + µ
jmsjt−1,τ + γ
jbjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ + λjdjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ + uit
rCht r
Tur
t r
Bat
t
All HF LF All HF LF All HF LF
bit−1
0.21*** 0.28*** -0.10 -0.03 0.04 -0.45 -0.08 -0.04 -0.07
(6.08) (7.60) (-0.85) (0.30) (0.33) (-0.71) (0.29) (0.04) (0.63)
[0.67]†† [1.00]† †
†
[0.00] [0.27]† [0.40]† [0.20] [0.33]† [0.40]† [0.40]†
[0.07] [0.00] [0.20] [0.23]† [0.20] [0.40]† [0.33]† [0.20] [0.40]†
j = Enx j = Enx j = Enx
bjt−1
1.10 0.27 3.01 1.65 1.41 -0.56 1.70 0.14 1.90
(0.98) (0.46) (1.48) (0.93) (0.47) (0.61) (0.77) (0.01) (0.75)
[0.23]† [0.20] [0.20] [0.20] [0.00] [0.40]† [0.20] [0.00] [0.20]
[0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.20] [0.10] [0.20] [0.00]
djt−1
1.15 1.10 0.81* 1.65 2.64 -0.48 1.57 1.53 0.00
(1.38) (1.10) (1.91) (1.07) (1.18) (-0.49) (1.31) (1.42) (0.33)
[0.30]† [0.20] [0.40]† [0.33]† [0.20] [0.20] [0.30]† [0.40]† [0.20]
[0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [0.00] [0.40]† [0.07] [0.00] [0.00]
msjt−1,τ
0.06 0.30*** 0.05 0.53 1.04 4.71** 0.99 0.19 1.22
(0.69) (2.90) (0.84) (0.53) (1.63) (2.00) (0.95) (1.14) (1.48)
[0.27]† [0.60]†† [0.40]† [0.27]† [0.40]† [0.40]† [0.40]† [0.40]† [0.40]†
[0.07] [0.00] [0.20] [0.13] [0.00] [0.20] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00]
bjt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ
-0.46 0.47 -2.44 -1.02 -0.84 1.38 -1.21 0.57 -1.69
(-0.17) (0.48) (-0.91) (-0.63) (-0.22) (-0.39) (-0.47) (0.62) (-0.65)
[0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [0.00] [0.20] [0.10] [0.20] [0.00]
[0.10] [0.00] [0.20] [0.10] [0.00] [0.20] [0.20] [0.00] [0.20]
djt−1 ∗msjt−1,τ
-0.85 -0.62 -0.69 -1.28 -2.25 0.69 -1.28 -1.02 0.10
(-0.75) (-0.37) (-1.31) (-0.74) (-0.92) (0.76) (-0.98) (-0.84) (0.09)
[0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.10] [0.00] [0.40]† [0.13] [0.20] [0.20]
[0.13] [0.00] [0.20] [0.17] [0.00] [0.20] [0.30]† [0.40]† [0.20]
R¯2 22.10 24.89 10.95 23.09 27.78 10.42 19.37 35.67 5.07
for some stocks it appears that the predictive ability of the distance between
midquotes is lower when the market share is higher.
By contrast, in Panel B we find that the predictive ability of the listing ex-
change is not affected by its market share. One reason that we find different
results for the listing exchange and alternative venues could be due to Euronext
being such a dominant venue in our sample. Even when Euronext has a rela-
tively low market share, it is still high enough for traders to always condition
their actions on the state of the Euronext order book, no matter how active al-
ternative venues are. Whereas traders condition only on the state of the order
book of alternative venues when they are relevant, i.e. when their market share
is sufficiently high.
In sum, we accept Hypothesis 4 when venue i is the listing exchange and
venue j is an alternative venue. We cannot accept Hypothesis 4 when we try
to predict returns on an alternative venue using information from the listing
exchange.
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2.6 Conclusion
We extend research on high-frequency return predictability from order book in-
formation by examining whether the order book can predict returns within and
across venues. We find that imbalances in the order book of one venue predict
returns on another venue, and their predictive ability depends on the relative
position of the order books on the price grid. Order book imbalances are stronger
predictors of returns on another venue when they are obtained from relatively
more competitive prices. Order book imbalances derived from worse prices may
instead predict reversals, i.e. a price decline (increase) when the bid (ask) depth
is relatively thicker. Because prices across venues tend to adjust to one an-
other throughout the trading day the distance between midquotes of different
order books has the most predictive power for returns. In particular, alternative
venues tend to be followers rather than leading in price discovery, the more so
for venues venues with a smaller market share, Turquoise and Bats, while the
listing exchange, Euronext, is the leading venue. Chi-X, the largest competing
venue is an intermediate case.
Alternative venues contribute more to return predictability when they have a
larger market share of trading volume. Under these circumstances these venues
become a relevant choice for traders to submit their orders to, and thus traders
take the state of the order book on these venues into account when choosing
their order. Our findings are in line with short-term predictability being driven
by order choice considerations.
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Chapter 3
Two Shades of Opacity:
Hidden Orders versus Dark
Trading
3.1 Introduction
Technology has allowed financial markets to become ever more transparent. Trad-
ing venues are now disseminating a great amount of pre- and post-trade infor-
mation in real-time. This is especially the case for equities, where the elec-
tronic limit order book has become the dominant mechanism by which shares
are traded.1 This information has proved to be valuable for market participants,
as it is a growing source of revenues for trading venues (Cespa and Foucault,
2014). Traders use it to update their beliefs on a security’s fundamental value,
but also to adjust their execution strategies (e.g., Ranaldo, 2004). Visible order
submissions thus impact excution probabilities and prices in several ways. Large
limit orders, for instance, provide incentives for arriving traders on the same side
of the market to undercut these orders (Buti and Rindi, 2013). To the extreme,
parasitic traders may engage in predatory strategies aimed at exploiting other
traders’ orders (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005). Transparency therefore goes
hand in hand with increased exposure costs for traders.
To allow traders to mitigate their exposure costs several tools have been de-
veloped that offer traders more possibilities to hide their trading intentions.
1Jain (2005) provides evidence that between 1977 and 2001 the leading exchanges in 101 of 120
countries investigated switched from floor-based trading to electronic trading systems, an evolution
that has continued after the end of his sample period. Furthermore, the proliferation of new trading
venues that have been competing with the incumbent exchanges in the U.S. and Europe has been
driven by advances in information and communications technologies. Indeed, these new market
places are virtual rather than physical.
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These tools, which provide the possibility to submit committed orders without
these being displayed to the market, can be divided into two categories. The first
is that of hidden orders on lit venues, i.e. orders that are submitted to visible
order books, but for which traders do not have to (fully) display the quantity they
are willing to transact. These orders hide among the visible liquidity that is of-
fered in the lit market. We refer to transactions that execute against the hidden
part of the book as hidden order trading activity. The second tool is trading in
completely dark venues. This form of dark trading does not only encompass trad-
ing in traditional dark pools (i.e. trading venues that match third-party orders
without any pre-trade transparency), but also bilateral transactions executed
away from the lit market. The latter includes orders that are internalized (i.e.
client orders that are matched by brokers in-house) and transactions that are ex-
ecuted in the over-the-counter (OTC) market. We denominate these transactions
away from the lit market as dark trading activity.2 We use the term opaque trad-
ing as the general classification for all forms of trading against non-displayed
orders.
Both types of opaque trading are used extensively by traders. De Winne and
D’Hondt (2007) and Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009) show
that around 45% of the order volume submitted on Euronext in a sample of
CAC40 stocks is hidden. Rosenblatt Securities argues there are more than 40
dark pools active in the U.S. with a market share of around 14% (Rosenblatt Se-
curities, 2012) and at least 19 dark pools in Europe with an estimated market
share of about 11% (Rosenblatt Securities, 2013) An even larger part of Euro-
pean dark volume is taking place away from regulated venues, in the OTC mar-
ket, with estimates of up to 40% of volume (Gomber and Pierron, 2010). While
traders have two tools to hide their trading intentions, the academic literature
focuses either on hidden orders or dark venues in isolation. Nevertheless, al-
though it is suggested that hidden orders and dark venues may compete with
each other based on their similarity in allowing for opaqueness, to the best of our
knowledge no prior research exists to evaluate these claims.3 We aim to bridge
this gap in the literature by exploring the interplay between hidden order trad-
ing and dark trading. Furthermore, we are the first to investigate hidden order
trading explicitly in a setting where multiple venues compete for order flow. We
are also the first to examine the determinants of dark trading while making a
distinction between regular-sized and block-sized transaction.
Our key goal and contribution is twofold. First, we investigate the relation
between hidden order trading and dark trading directly using a simultaneous
equations framework. This allows us to asses whether hidden order trading and
2Sometimes the use of completely hidden orders on lit venues, such as hidden midpoint-pegged
orders, are also referred to as a form of dark trading. In a U.S. context trading away from lit venues
would be also referred to as off-exchange trading, as opposed to trades executed on the exchanges.
3See claims in, e.g., Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011); Hautsch and Huang (2012); Boulatov and
George (2013); Buti and Rindi (2013); Foley, Malinova, and Park (2013).
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dark trading are complements or substitutes for traders. It is easy to see in-
tuitively why hidden order trading and dark trading could be substitutes when
traders decide to which venue to route their orders. Indeed, given that a trader
wants to trade opaquely, if the submission of a hidden order is expected to be less
profitable (e.g., due to low execution probabilities), he is likely to choose a dark
order as an alternative, and vice versa. However, both types of opaque trading
can be (strategic) complements due to liquidity externalities. If a trader expects
that more traders will trade opaque, he will be more willing to trade dark as well.
Empirically, this will result in a positive relation between hidden order volume
and dark volume, which can be interpreted as both being complements.
Second, we examine how several market conditions affect both types of opaque
trading. This allows us to observe which market conditions impact hidden order
and dark trading similarly (and thus segment the market into visible volume
and opaque volume), and which conditions have a different impact (and thus
segment into hidden order volume and dark volume). Hidden order trading and
dark trading can be impacted differently when certain market conditions impact
venue selection rather than the order exposure decision itself. Venue selection
entails the choice between a lit trading venue or a dark trading venue, and within
lit venues the choice between the main listing exchange or an alternative venue.
Potential determinants are selected on the basis of theoretical predictions and
previous empirical research.
Understanding the interplay between both types of opaque trading is highly
relevant considering the ongoing debate among regulators, practitioners and aca-
demics on the role of market fragmentation and transparency. The current pro-
liferation of trading venues is a consequence of regulation aimed at fostering
competition between trading venues. However, regulators are increasingly wor-
ried about the growing market share of dark trading and its impact on order
execution quality, price discovery, market liquidity, fair access and market qual-
ity in general (see, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, 2010; European
Commission, 2011, 2014). In a recent speech, SEC Chair Mary Jo White raises
further concerns on the lack of transparency of dark venues and states that “we
must continue to examine whether dark trading volume is approaching a level
that risks seriously undermining the quality of price discovery provided by lit
venues” (White, 2014). A number of empirical researchers find that high levels of
dark trading indeed harm market liquidity (Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel,
2015; Weaver, 2014; Nimalendran and Ray, 2014), price discovery (Comerton-
Forde and Putnin¸sˇ, 2015) or both (Hatheway, Kwan, and Zheng, 2014). However,
Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011), Gresse (2015) and Brugler (2015) find that dark
trading does not harm or even increases liquidity, while Foley and Putnin¸sˇ (2015)
find that the effect depends on the type of dark venue.
By contrast, the use of hidden orders on lit venues is generally not associated
with reduced market quality (Tuttle, 2006; Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar, 2015),
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and may even enhance liquidity under some circumstances (Aitken, Berkman,
and Mak, 2001; Moinas, 2010; Boulatov and George, 2013; Buti and Rindi, 2013;
Gozluklu, 2014). If hidden order trading on lit venues is indeed a substitute for
dark trading, then curtailing dark trading, such as currently proposed by the
European Commission for the MiFID II regulation, could bring opaque trading
back to lit venues, improving market quality. If substitution from dark venues to
hidden orders is less likely, then a regulatory restriction on dark trading might
harm some classes of traders that now rely on dark trading venues.
For our analysis we use a high-frequency dataset (timestamped to the mil-
lisecond) spanning nearly four years, and covering all Dutch large cap index
stocks. For each stock, we have information on trading volume on the main
venue where the stock is listed (Euronext) and on all alternative lit trading
venues where the stock is trading (Chi-X, Turquoise and Bats). Moreover, for
each of these venues, we also have limit order book data. These data allow us
to infer hidden order trading: we compute hidden order executions on lit venues
by matching transaction and order book data on each venue. In addition, we
have trades that are executed away from the lit market. These represent a
collection of dark pool trades, internalized orders and OTC transactions. We
distinguish these transactions into regular dark transactions and block transac-
tions. Because we cannot explicitly distinguish between dark and block trades
as in Comerton-Forde and Putnin¸sˇ (2015) we use a size-based criterion, similar
to Hatheway, Kwan, and Zheng (2014) and Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel
(2015).
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that dark
trading and hidden order trading are substitutes to each other: hidden order
trading and dark trading negatively impact each other. We conjecture that the
order submission decision is a two-stage decision. In a first-stage decision traders
choose their optimal level of exposure in the market: how much of their order
should be hidden from other market participants? In the second stage traders
decide on how or where they want to hide by submitting an opaque order to a fa-
cility that provides this opportunity. This can be a dark venue, but also a hidden
order on an otherwise lit venue. However, dark trading appears to be a better
substitute for hidden order trading than the other way around. We find that
the negative coefficient of hidden order trading is significant in the dark trading
equation, but the effect of hidden order trading on dark trading is insignificant.
A potential explanation lies in the observation that orders placed on dark venues
are relatively more opaque than hidden orders on lit venues. Because the latter
are more easily detectable their use may not be a good substitute for trading on
dark venues. This finding warrants caution for regulators who want to impose
restrictions on the use of dark venues. The curtailing of dark trading could be
harmful for classes of traders who now make heavy use of these venues, as the
lit market does not offer an adequate opaque alternative.
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Secondly, we identify the effect of several market and order book conditions on
hidden order trading, dark trading and block trading. We show that hidden order
trading and dark trading are differently affected by total volume, the quoted
spread, depth and the fraction of traders using smart order routers, while both
types of opaque trading are negatively impacted by algorithmic trading.
The fraction of volume executed against hidden orders is higher on high vol-
ume days, while the opposite is true for the fraction of volume executed in dark
venues. When volume is interpreted as a proxy for trading desire, the execution
probability of hidden orders increases with trading volume because more traders
demand immediacy and thus start trading more aggressively. Dark venues be-
come less attractive compared to lit venues because they provide less immediacy.
Visible depth and the quoted spread are two variables that measure lit mar-
ket liquidity and may affect opaque trading behavior. We find that hidden order
trading is decreasing in visible depth, while dark trading is unaffected. Larger
visible depth decreases the execution probability of hidden orders because visi-
ble depth has execution priority over hidden depth. The effect of visible depth on
dark trading can be twofold, depending on whether liquidity demanders or liq-
uidity providers are affected. A larger hidden depth on lit venues means liquidity
demanders have fewer reasons to submit orders to dark venues, while liquidity
suppliers can be tempted to substitute (hidden) limit orders on lit venues for dark
orders because the lit venue is too competitive. The insignificant coefficient indi-
cates that ultimately both effects balance each other out. A wider quoted spread
diminishes hidden order trading, most likely because a wider spread makes ag-
gressive market orders (that are more likely to trade against hidden depth) more
costly. Furthermore, we find that competition for liquidity provision affects hid-
den order trading across different lit venues, as hidden order traders substitute
lit venues with deeper order books for lit venues with shallower order books to
increase their execution probability.
Two variables are used to capture the characteristics of the population of
traders: a proxy for algorithmic trading and an estimate of the fraction of traders
using smart order routers. Algorithmic trading activity negatively affects hid-
den order trading and dark trading, but positively impacts block trading. One
explanation is that the use of algorithms substitutes for opaque orders. When
algorithms are associated with predatory trading practices, large patient traders
that are likely to use opaque orders may retract from both lit and dark trading
venues and resort to (negotiated) block trades. Moreover, the use of algorithms
also increases competition for liquidity provision on lit venues, reducing the exe-
cution probability of hidden orders. A special case of algorithms are smart order
routers, which are used to tap into the liquidity of different venues at the same
time. When a larger fraction of traders use smart order routers, hidden order
trading diminishes, but dark trading increases. The use of smart order routers
reduces the execution probability of hidden orders, while at the same time con-
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necting more traders to dark venues.
Our research is related to two strands in the empirical literature. First, our
research is related to studies that examine the use of hidden orders in limit or-
der markets. Harris (1996), Aitken, Berkman, and Mak (2001), Tuttle (2006),
De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) and Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkatara-
man (2009) show that hidden orders are used to reduce the cost associated with
order exposure. These studies use order-level data and focus on the submission
of hidden orders to the limit order book. By contrast, we match order book level
and transaction data to infer the part of hidden orders that was actually exe-
cuted while it was opaque to other market participants. A similar measure of
hidden order executions is used by Yao (2012) to study the information content
of hidden orders. Our focus on executed volumes is more in line with the volume
measures typically used to measure trading activity on dark venues. Further-
more, contrary to previous studies, we measure hidden order trading on multiple
lit trading venues.
Second, our findings also relate to the empirical literature on dark trading
activity. Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) argue that dark and lit trading
venues can be ranked according to a pecking order. Midpoint matching dark
venues, which have lower trading costs but offer also lower immediacy, are at the
top of the pecking order, while costly immediacy providing lit trading venues are
at the bottom. They show that exogenous increases in the desire for immediacy
reduce the market share of dark trading venues at the bottom of the pecking
order relatively more. However, they do not explicitly account for the option
to submit hidden orders to lit exchanges. Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011) and
Ready (2014) both study the market share of a selection of dark venues and find
evidence in line with the prediction that more lit market competition for liquidity
supply drives traders to dark venues (Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2015). Using
proprietary order-level data Garvey, Huang, and Wu (2014) show that traders
prefer dark venues when information asymmetry is greater. Kwan, Masulis, and
McInish (2015) find that a differential regulatory treatment in the U.S. allows
dark pools to attract order flow away from traditional exchanges when spreads
are constrained.
Our research is also related to theoretical studies that investigate competition
between lit and dark venues. Most closely related are the models of Buti, Rindi,
and Werner (2015) and Brolley (2015) of competition between a dark venue and
a limit order book, although both models do not incorporate hidden orders. Buti,
Rindi, and Werner (2015) show that patient traders are more likely to substitute
limit orders on the lit venue for dark orders when competition for liquidity pro-
vision in the limit order book is intense, i.e. when spreads are narrow and the
order book is deep. A deeper order book reduces the execution probability for
newly submitted limit orders, while a narrow spread makes midquote execution
of a dark venue relatively more attractive. The model’s results are driven by a
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trade-off in execution probabilities on the lit and the dark venue. Considering the
priority of visible size on lit venues, the order migration to dark venues should
be even stronger for hidden limit orders compared to visible limit orders. Brolley
(2015) incorporates liquidity providers, asymmetric information and a trade-at
rule for dark venues in his model. He shows that the size of the trade-at rule de-
termines the type of traders that migrate to the dark venue. In turn, this affects
the impact that the dark venue has on market quality and welfare.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses
the institutional background and presents the dataset employed in our analysis,
while the main analysis that relates hidden order trading to dark trading is in
Section 3.3. Section 3.4 further investigates the drivers of the different shades of
opaque trading. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and Sample
3.2.1 Institutional Background
Under the impulse of technological innovation and regulatory changes the fi-
nancial market structure has changed from a largely consolidated system into a
market where order flow is fragmented over different trading venues. In the U.S.
today’s equity market structure is determined by Regulation National Market
System (Reg NMS) that was phased in over the course of 2007. It has accom-
plished that the U.S. equity market now comprises several automated trading
venues that are all connected to each other. The European counterpart of Reg
NMS is the Markets for Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), which came
into force in November 2007 in the European Economic Area. It has expanded
the set of regulated trading venues from the Regulated Markets (RMs), which
encompass the traditional national stock exchanges, to also include Multilat-
eral Trading Facilities (MTFs) and Systematic Internalizers (SIs). Both RMs
and MTFs are multilateral trading venues that match third-party order flow.4
Most of these trading venues are also ‘lit’ as they are subject to pre-trade trans-
parency requirements. They operate public limit order books that display a large
amount of the orders that are submitted to their books, which makes them simi-
lar to Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) in the U.S. However, trading
venues can also be granted waivers from pre-trade transparency provided that
they meet certain conditions. This allows for the existence of dark venues and
hidden orders on lit trading venues in Europe.
SIs are investment firms that internalize client orders on a frequent basis and
thus offer an alternative to executions on multilateral trading venues. Also SIs
4An important legal difference between RMs and MTFs is that the latter can be operated both by
investment firms or market operators, while the former can only be operated by market operators. In
practice, the most relevant difference is that RMs provide listing services, while most MTFs do not.
Issuers of shares listed on RMs should comply with relevant EU regulations, while shares listed on
MTFs generally fall outside the scope of these stricter regulations.
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are subject to the pre-trade transparency requirements and must publish firm
quotes in the stocks in which they are dealing. But because the orders from their
books are not exposed to the market directly, transactions on SIs can also be
considered opaque in nature. Next to the regulated trading venues, MiFID also
allows transactions in the dark OTC market. As reported by Gomber and Pierron
(2010) around 40% of volume is in the OTC market, particularly in broker/dealer
crossing networks, which operate in a similar way as some dark venues.
Traders can submit hidden orders on all lit venues from our sample. The main
trading venue (the listing exchange) is Euronext, which allows hidden liquidity
only in the form of reserve orders with fixed peak size replenishments. The most
important alternative trading venues, Chi-X, Bats and Turquoise, allow reserve
orders as well as completely hidden limit orders and pegged hidden orders. As
such, they provide traders with a broader range of options to trade opaquely in
their order books.
MiFID also imposes post-trade transparency rules for shares admitted to
trading on RMs: all transactions within normal trading hours have to be reported
as close to real time as possible, even when they take place outside a regulated
trading venue.5 In any case, post-trade information should be reported either
through facilities provided by a RM or an MTF, third party reporting facilities or
proprietary arrangements.
3.2.2 Data
Data are taken from Thomson Reuters Tick History. Our sample consists of 27
Dutch large cap stocks, listed on Euronext Amsterdam. For these stocks we
have a time series of 738 trading days available, which ranges from November
2007 until end September 2010. This long time window allows us to capture
a variety of market and economic conditions. Moreover, the available data are
very detailed since they comprise data not only of the Regulated Market where
the stocks are listed (Euronext), but also include the other European lit and
dark venues where these stocks are traded. The alternative lit trading venues
cover the most relevant transparent limit order books for our stock sample: Chi-
X, Turquoise ans Bats.6 Chi-X is the only MTF that was operational during
the full sample period. Turquoise was launched during August 2008, and starts
trading most of the stocks in our sample actively on September 1, 2008; Bats
was launched in October 2008 and started trading most stocks in the sample on
November 14, 2008.
5Very large transactions can be exempted and may be reported with a delay, provided that they
meet certain criteria.
6We exclude Nasdaq OMX Europe, Euro TLX, Virt-X, Xetra and a number of local German ex-
changes from our sample. Although these venues may provide depth throughout our sample period,
trading is usually not on a daily basis and in any case trading volume is quite low (less than 0.5% of
the sample). Moreover, not all these venues operate as a fully automated limit order markets with
visible and hidden liquidity, and are therefore less relevant for our research.
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The dataset has three parts. The first part contains trade and quote data,
timestamped to the millisecond, of trades on all lit venues. The second part con-
cerns order book data. These are available for each lit trading venue, also times-
tamped to the millisecond, identifying prices and visible depth for the ten best
quotes available at each point in time. This part of the dataset is used to compute
our measures for hidden order trading, as well as to identify a number of market
variables, such as spreads, visible order book depth, volatility, algorithmic trad-
ing and the fraction of traders using smart order routers. We obtain information
on hidden order trading by matching transaction and order book data. Upon ex-
ecution we detect which part of trading volume is executed against the visible
part of the order book, and which part is executed against hidden depth.
The final part of our dataset further includes transaction data for trades that
are executed away from lit markets, these are so-called MiFID reported trades.
Most of these trades are reported through Markit BOAT, but they can be reported
through facilities provided by lit venues such as Euronext, Deutsche Bo¨rse, the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) or Chi-X as well.7 This part of the dataset allows
us to compute our measure of dark trading. Do note that, in contrast to the lit
venues of the dataset, we only have reported executed volume available, not the
order books of these dark venues.
The fact that we use such long time series of data at a granular level uniquely
distinguishes our research from other recent empirical studies into the determi-
nants of dark trading activity, which focus on broader cross-sections of stocks
(Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2011; Ready, 2014), or a time series analysis at a more
granular level (Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu, 2015). The most closely related to
our study is Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2011), which employ one year of data from
4,482 stocks, but their sample of dark trading activity consists only of eleven
dark venues who report the data voluntarily. Their sample thus excludes other
types of dark trading and does not account for hidden order trading on lit venues.
We filter our data by removing all trades outside the trading hours of the
continuous market session, and in addition all trades that are within a minute
after opening, or a minute before closing of the market. We also winsorize all
variables at the 99% level to remove any effects of potential outliers, i.e. extreme
volume days.
3.2.3 Trading Volume
The focus of our research is on trading volume, and more specifically, on opaque
trading volume. Investigating executed volume instead of submitted volume is
useful since it are executions that finally matter for market participants. Fur-
thermore, the number of limit orders that is now unexecuted because of cancel-
lations has grown dramatically over the last years (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009).
7Some dark trading venues may have proprietary reporting arrangements, and therefore, may
not be included in the sample.
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Total executed trading volume contains four components: visible trading vol-
ume V isVi,t, hidden order trading volume HidVi,t, dark trading volume DarkVi,t,
and block trading volume BlockVi,t. Subscript i refers to the stock and t refers to
days since we aggregate our data at a daily frequency. These measures are the
key variables in our analysis.
To develop a proxy for hidden order trading, we compute executed hidden or-
der volume for stock i on lit venue l during day t, denoted HidVl,i,t. We do this by
matching data on executed trades with limit order book updates. When a market
order executes against a limit order on lit venue l, this affects depth outstand-
ing in the limit order book on l. If it is executed against a visible order, visible
depth at that price is reduced by the same amount as the volume of the order. In
contrast, if the market order executes against a (partially) hidden order, visible
depth is not reduced by that same amount. In fact, visible depth may not be
reduced at all due to a new peak replenishment of a reserve order. The excess of
the order volume that was not executed against visible depth, is executed against
(part of) a hidden order. This volume is categorized as hidden order volume on lit
venue l: HidVl,i,t.8 Hidden order trading volume consolidated over all lit venues
is then defined as HidVi,t =
∑
lHidVl,i,t.
9. By analogy, the visible trading vol-
ume V isVl,i,t for stock i on day t that is executed on venue l is calculated as the
trading volume that is not executed against hidden depth, and which thus can be
matched to a limit order book update. Visible trading volume consolidated over
all trading venues l is denoted by V isVi,t.
Because we find a large dispersion in size for MiFID reported transactions
we segment this volume (which stems from dark venues) into two categories:
dark trading, denoted DarkVi,t, and block trading, denoted BlockVi,t. The first
category comprises of transactions of ‘regular size’, more or less in line with the
transaction size on lit venues (see Panel B of Table 3.1), while a second category
consists of very large trades that are unlikely to find execution as a whole on
lit venues.10 We include in the first category all transactions that are smaller
than 1% of the average daily euro volume on lit venues over the last 30 trading
days. All other dark trades we consider to be ‘block trades’. Although we can-
8Do note the difference between our measure of executed hidden order volume on lit venues and
the volume of hidden orders submitted on lit venues. While the submitted hidden order volume on
the lit venues can be substantial, volume that is executed against the hidden part of the order book
is in the range of 4% to 6% of trading volume executed on lit venues, according to Panel C of Table
3.1. The difference stems from the fact that not all submitted hidden orders find execution, but also
not all orders that were submitted hidden are executed when they are hidden. As the visible part of a
reserve order is executed the peak size is replenished. Orders which were originally hidden may find
themselves visibly executed if traders each time only trade against the visible part of the order book.
9Yao (2012) uses a similar measure of hidden order trading and shows that on average 19% of
shares is executed against hidden depth on NASDAQ. Other studies also use a combination of order
book data and transaction data to infer hidden order executions. Their focus, however, is on the
detection of hidden orders by other market participants (see, e.g., De Winne and D’Hondt, 2007; Frey
and Sandas, 2009; Pardo and Pascual, 2012)
10Depending on the size of the transaction relative to the Normal Market Size of stocks, large
trades can also be eligible for delayed reporting.
CHAPTER 3. TWO SHADES OF OPACITY 91
not identify with certainty which trades are executed in dark pools, SIs or the
OTC market, we believe that a classification based on size can make a mean-
ingful distinction here. Regular sized dark transactions are more likely to be
executed through automated trading venues such as dark pools, while big blocks
of shares are likely executed through designated block trading mechanisms. Typ-
ically these block trades are negotiated bilaterally (over the phone or electronic
networks) or matched in special block crossing networks, such as provided by
Liquidnet. For a large part of the analysis we exclude block trading volume be-
cause it tends to be volatile and dominated by extreme observations. In addition,
hidden orders on lit venues and dark trading venues are more likely to compete
with each other for similar ‘regular size’ transactions, and not block size trans-
actions.
Figure 3.1 shows the monthly cross-sectional average and median levels of
the four volume components, measured in euro, while Figure 3.2 present the
daily cross-sectional average and median levels of the four volume components,
measured relative to the total trading volume. We observe a considerable decline
in total trading volume as of November 2008 due to the financial crisis. Visible
volume is clearly the largest component of trading volume (about 64% on aver-
age), while block volume represents around 27% of volume. Dark volume and
hidden order volume are relatively smaller, representing around 7% and 4% of
trading volume on average, respectively. The division of volume in the four com-
ponents remains relatively stable over the sample period. However, the volume
share of hidden order trading diminishes slightly over the sample period, while
the share of dark trading increases somewhat, but to a lesser extent. Overall,
it is clear that both types of dark trading do not necessarily move together over
time. This observation is at the core of our research questions on how both types
of dark trading relate, under which conditions market participants favor the use
of one type over another, and under which conditions they are reinforcing each
other.
Table 3.1 Panel B further presents statistics on the daily euro volume, aver-
age trade size and number of trades for the four different components of trading
volume. We compute each variable on a stock-day basis and then take the daily
mean and median over all stocks. Total daily transaction volume is 129 million
euro on average, but only 60 million euro for the median stock-day observation.
The large standard deviations for volume measures (183 million euro for total
volume), and the considerable difference between the 95th and 5th percentile
(483 million euro for total volume) imply that there is considerable variation in
volume across stocks and over time. We control for unobserved heterogeneity
driving these differences by employing a standardization procedure to the data
later on that takes into account stock-quarter fixed effects. Furthermore, because
of the large scale differences in volume observations across stocks the standard-
ization re-expresses volume and other variables in terms of standard deviations.
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Figure 3.1: Monthly Volume Levels
This figure presents the monthly cross-sectional average and median values for the levels of the four
components of trading volume that we define: hidden order volume (the volume of trades executed against
hidden depth on lit trading venues), dark trading volume (volume of trades executed on completely dark
trading venues, excluding large blocks), visible volume (the volume of trades executed against displayed
depth on lit trading venues) and block volume (volume of block trades executed on completely dark trading
venues).
(a) Average Monthly Volume
(b) Median Monthly Volume
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Figure 3.2: Daily Trading Volume Relative to Total Volume
This figure presents the daily cross-sectional average and median values for the relative levels of the four
components of trading volume that we define. Panels (a) and (b) show the average and median hidden
order volume (the volume of trades executed against hidden depth on lit trading venues) and dark trading
volume (volume of trades executed on completely dark trading venues, excluding large blocks). Panels (c)
and (d) show the visible volume (the volume of trades executed against displayed depth on lit trading
venues) and block volume (volume of block trades executed on completely dark trading venues). The first
vertical line depicts the entry of Turquoise in the Dutch stock market for most stocks in the sample, the
second vertical line depicts the entry of Bats for most stocks.
(a) Average Daily Relative Dark and Hidden Order Volume
(b) Median Daily Relative Dark and Hidden Order Volume
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(c) Average Daily Relative Visible and Block Volume
(d) Median Daily Relative Visible and Block Volume
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Trading Volume
This table presents summary statistics based on daily observations for a number of volume measures.
Panel A shows the number of stock-days for which there are observations in total, as well as for all the
subsamples based on lit trading venues. MTF is the subsample for which at least one MTF is trading
the stock; CHI is the subsample for which Chi-X is trading; TUR and BAT are similar subsamples for
Turquoise and Bats respectively. Panel B shows statistics concerning the transactions at the consolidated
market level: euro volume (in thousands), euro size, and number of trades. Panel C shows volume statis-
tics across the different trading venues: lit venue euro volume, hidden order euro volume and the fraction
of lit volume executed against hidden orders (in percentage points). In the first two blocks subsample vol-
umes are expressed as a fraction of consolidated lit market volume (%, in percentage points). Subsamples
are defined as follows: Main refers to the main trading venue, Alt refers to the consolidated alternative
trading venues, CHI refers to Chi-X, TUR refers to Turquoise and BAT refers to Bats. Summary statistics
in Panel C are based on observations for which at least one alternative venue trades the stock; for relative
measures: when at least two alternative trading venues trade the stock, such that the total sums to 1.
Panel A: Number of Observations across Lit Venues
Total MTF CHI TUR BATS
N 17,416 15,564 15,556 10,898 10,318
Panel B: Transactions at the Consolidated Level
Mean St. Dev. P5 Med P95
V olume
Total 128,617 183,637 7,521 60,657 490,387
Lit 84,827 104,895 6,480 46,011 304,551
Visible 79,734 98,162 6,149 43,396 286,260
Hidden 5,093 7,749 182 2,410 19,009
Dark 8,614 15,105 102 2,783 38,795
Block 35,176 101,827 0 7,142 149,518
Size
Lit 9,517 6,189 3,772 7,770 22,867
Visible 9,154 5,791 3,695 7,515 21,709
Hidden 12,300 10,155 3,678 9,332 32,233
Dark 57,833 86,934 5,067 25,920 225,038
Block 4,422,763 9,212,945 196,301 1,621,873 18,800,000
NTrades
Lit 8,076 7,845 1,137 5,878 22,971
Visible 7,853 7,578 1,108 5,733 22,285
Hidden 358 453 36 243 1,029
Dark 175 228 7 98 606
Block 7 9 0 5 19
Panel C: Lit Volume across Venue Subsamples
Mean St. Dev. P5 Med P95
Lit V olume 89,458 104,754 7,257 50,501 309,267
%ENX 0.78 0.13 0.58 0.77 0.98
%MTF 0.22 0.13 0.02 0.23 0.42
%CHI 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.29
%TUR 0.04 0.04 - 0.03 0.12
%BAT 0.03 0.03 - 0.02 0.08
Hidden V olume 5,271 7,702 198 2,602 19,386
%ENX 0.82 0.18 0.43 0.88 0.99
%MTF 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.57
%CHI 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.30
%TUR 0.06 0.10 - 0.01 0.27
%BAT 0.02 0.04 - 0.01 0.10
%Hidden V olume 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.11
ENX 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.11
MTF 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.13
CHI 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.12
TUR 0.07 0.11 - 0.03 0.26
BAT 0.06 0.13 - 0.02 0.21
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Upon comparing trade size and the number of trades for block volume with
the other volume components in Table 3.1 Panel B it becomes clear why it is
distinctly different from other types of transactions. Block trades are limited to
a mean (median) of 7 (5) transactions per day, while their average size is 78 times
larger than that of other dark trades and much larger even than that of visible
or hidden transactions. This provides us with a rational for removing these large
blocks from the dark trading component.11
There are four lit trading venues in our data sample. Table 3.1 Panel C
presents volume statistics spread out across the different venues. Euronext is the
listing exchange and main trading venue by volume. Chi-X, Turquoise and Bats
are three alternative venues (MTFs) of which Chi-X is the largest by volume and
the only venue that trades stocks during the entire sample period. Because of
these distinct differences we distinguish between the main trading venue (Main)
on the one hand, and the consolidated alternative trading venues (Alt) on the
other hand. Only a fraction of traders accesses the latter trading venues. We
further distinguish these alternative venues into the largest competitor (Alt L,
i.e., Chi-X) and other trading venues (Alt S, i.e. Turquoise and Bats), the smaller
competitors which are not present during the full sample period, but only start
trading during the last quarter of 2008.
3.3 Hidden Orders versus Dark Trading
3.3.1 Opaque Trading
The order exposure decision is crucial for most traders, especially so when they
trade large sizes. The exposure decision pertains to how, where, when and to who
trading intentions should be revealed to other market participants.12 Order ex-
posure has both benefits and costs associated with it (Harris, 1997). The primary
benefit is that exposed orders can attract natural counterparties. Furthermore,
in most lit trading venues opaque orders loose execution priority over visible or-
ders, while execution probabilities in completely dark venues are generally also
quite low. An increased execution probability is therefore also a major benefit
of order visibility. However, there are also costs associated with order exposure
or visibility because other traders (which do not represent a natural counter-
11Do note, however, that for visible and hidden order trading we are not comparing trade sizes of
submitted limit orders. Large limit orders may be executed against several market orders. When
part of a limit order is submitted as hidden, the limit order can be executed as hidden or visible.
The trade sizes displayed here are that of marketable orders executing against the depth in the limit
order book, either visible or hidden.
12In a broker-oriented trading structure where floor-based trading and electronic trading systems
operate next to an upstairs market in which brokers arrange block trades, the exposure decision is
related to that of broker selection. With the increased automation of financial market infrastructure,
the relative importance of opaque orders submitted to electronic trading systems has grown. In
fact, in automated venues opaque orders are substitutes for some services previously provided by
floor brokers. As multiple automated venues are now competing for order flow, the order exposure
decision today entails order selection as well as venue selection.
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party) can react to the exposed trading intention. Bessembinder, Panayides, and
Venkataraman (2009) show empirically that fully visible orders have higher ex-
ecution costs compared to only partially visible orders.
Exposure costs of visible orders can arise for various reasons. First, traders
that have trading intentions on the same side of the market could engage into
more aggressive trading strategies as a reaction to the visible order. Buti and
Rindi (2013) show that reserve orders, which reduce the visible part of a limit
order, can help to avoid undercutting by aggressive traders. Second, exposure
of trading intentions may lead other traders to engage into parasitic or preda-
tory trading strategies that increase trading costs for the original trader (Harris,
1997; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005). When predatory traders can easily
detect large unfilled orders they can front-run these orders by taking liquidity
from the market ahead of the original trader.13 The third motive to reduce or-
der visibility relates to the option value embedded in limit orders (Copeland and
Galai, 1983). When visible orders provide committed trading options to other
market participants and monitoring the market and adjusting order submissions
is costly, these orders can be picked off by better informed traders (Foucault,
1999). Aitken, Berkman, and Mak (2001) argue that reducing exposure compli-
cates strategies aimed at exploiting the free option value of limit orders because
there is more uncertainty about the total order size. Finally, exposing trading
intentions may cause prices to move in an unfavorable direction because traders
assign an informational value to other traders’ intentions (Harris, 1997). Moinas
(2010) finds in a theory model that both informed and uninformed traders hide
part of their limit orders to soften their informational impact. Boulatov and
George (2013) show that informed traders compete more intensely as liquidity
suppliers when they can hide their orders. In the experimental market designs
of Gozluklu (2014) and Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2015) informed traders
submit opaque orders in an effort to maintain their informational advantage for
a longer period.
In a multi-venue setting, where lit and dark venues compete for order flow,
the exposure decision is typically not explicitly modeled in the literature. Or-
der choice in these models is between a costly market order on a traditional
exchange, or a cheaper dark venue order. The former is more costly because it
provides certainty of execution, whereas execution in a dark venue is more uncer-
tain. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), Degryse, Van Achter, and Wuyts (2009)
and Danie¨ls, Do¨nges, and Heinemann (2013) model the lit venue (or traditional
13In doing so, they drive the market prices in an unfavorable direction and can make a profit
later on by trading against the original trader at these worse prices. A front-running strategy that
is specifically applicable to visible limit orders is quote-matching (Harris, 1996). Quote-matchers try
to trade in front of large limit orders. Similar to other speculative strategies, they earn a profit when
prices move in a favorable direction, while they remain protected from incurring heavy losses by the
free options embedded in the limit order. Limit order traders are harmed because quote-matchers
reduce their execution probabilities and at the same time try to extract the option value from their
limit order.
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exchange) as a dealer market in which traders pay the half-spread for a guar-
anteed execution of their order. In the models by Ye (2011) and Zhu (2014) buy
and sell orders (including those of informed traders) are balanced and the heavier
side incurs a market impact cost. On the lit venue, market impact translates into
a price impact, while on the dark venue market impact results in non-execution
(consistent with empirical evidence by Gresse (2006) and Naes and Odegaard
(2006)). Although not explicitly modeled, the impact of exposure is implicit in
the greater market impact of visible orders on lit venues. A similar reasoning
is followed by Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) who put forward a pecking
order theory of trading venues. They argue that investors trade off trading costs
with their desire for immediacy, for different types of dark and lit trading venues.
The most patient traders transact as much as possible in the cheapest (midquote
matching) dark venues, while the most impatient traders choose for the immedi-
acy offered by lit trading venues.
Hidden orders and dark trading venues have in common that they can be
used to reduce exposure. Furthermore, for both opaque trading types reduced
exposure also comes at the cost of lower execution probabilities. Both hidden
order and dark trading can be considered passive strategies, i.e. they do not
actively react to liquidity offered by other traders, and there is no certainty of
execution. Instead, hidden orders and dark orders both provide opaque liquidity
to other market participants. Uncertainty of execution is further raised because
their opaque nature makes it more difficult to attract counterparties.
Besides similarities there are also important differences between both types
of opaque trading. The main difference is that hidden orders interact with mar-
ketable orders on lit venues, while dark orders interact with similar dark orders.
As such, hidden orders execute against more aggressive active orders. These are
submitted by traders willing to pay for certainty of execution. Because hidden
orders execute against marketable orders on lit venues they are also more easily
detectable, and upon detection their presence is revealed to all traders monitor-
ing the market (De Winne and D’Hondt, 2007; Frey and Sandas, 2009; Pardo and
Pascual, 2012). Dark orders are relatively more opaque. To detect a dark order
traders need to ping for dark liquidity on each of the dark venues separately.
When execution in a dark venue is not continuous detecting dark orders is even
more challenging. Furthermore, access to dark trading venues can be restricted,
while most traders can use some form of hidden orders.
The remainder of this section investigates the interaction between hidden or-
der trading and dark trading, controlling for market conditions. In particular, we
ask the question whether hidden order trading and dark trading behave as com-
plements or substitutes. Dark trading and hidden order trading can positively
affect each other as both are driven by an underlying desire to trade opaquely.
When traders with an opaque trading interest have access to both opaque trad-
ing tools they may decide to split their opaque orders over these alternatives.
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When hidden order trading and dark trading are highly similar, we expect order
submissions and executions using these opaque trading tools to be as well. As a
result, both components of opaque trading volume would move together and we
expect a positive coefficient. However, this does not necessarily imply a causal
relation in the sense that traders are more inclined to trade in a dark venue
when hidden volume on lit venues is increasing or vice versa. The underlying
driver of opaque trading volume is the latent interest in opaque trading, which
is in turn fueled by the general trading interest and the desire to reduce order
exposure costs.
Contrary to the complementary behavior of the opaque trading components
is the assertion that dark trading and hidden order trading are natural substi-
tutes. Even though both types of opaque trading share similarities, under certain
circumstances traders may favor one over the other and therefore do not evenly
split orders over opaque trading alternatives. In addition, when an opaque order
is executed in, say, a dark venue, traders could cancel their opaque orders on lit
venues. Or they may resubmit their unexecuted orders from the dark venue to
a lit venue as hidden orders. Under such circumstances, both types of opaque
trading could indeed serve as substitutes for each other. When sufficient controls
that could proxy for the latent general and opaque trading interest are added
to the model, executed dark trading can negatively affect executed hidden order
trading and vice versa.
3.3.2 Methodology
For each stock we examine the aggregated volume of trading on dark venues and
the aggregate volume of hidden order trading that takes place on the various lit
venues that trade in these stocks. To quantify the contemporaneous impact of
two variables that are determined simultaneously one needs to employ a simul-
taneous equation model. The two endogenous variables of interest, dark trading
activity and hidden order trading activity, are modeled as a function of each other
and variables that are designed to capture prevailing order book and market con-
ditions that potentially impact the volume measures. As these control variables
themselves are potentially endogenous these are also instrumented.
To test whether dark trading and hidden order trading behave as comple-
ments or substitutes we estimate the following panel system of simultaneous
equations:
DarkVi,t = β1,1HidVi,t + β1,2V isVi,t + α1DarkVi′ 6=i,t + γ
′
1Xi,t + λ
′
1Zi,t + υi,t
HidVi,t = β2,1DarkVi,t + β2,2V isVi,t + α2HidVi′ 6=i,t + γ
′
2Xi,t + λ
′
2Zi,t + ηi,t
V isVi,t = β3,1DarkVi,t + β3,2HidVi,t + α3V isVi′ 6=i,t + γ
′
3Xi,t + λ
′
3Zi,t + ωi,t
(3.1)
An intercept is not included because all variables in the model are standardized
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by stock and quarter: we subtract the stock-specific mean of the given quarter
of which day t is a part, and divide by the standard deviation. De-meaning the
variables allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity in volume components
across stocks by quarter. Because we are measuring our variables as deviations
from their stock-quarter specific means, our estimation procedure in effect ex-
ploits the time series variation in volume components within each quarter. By
dividing the variables by their standard deviation we normalize their units to
standard deviations. This allows for an easy economic interpretation of results
and more comparability across firms. A similar procedure is used by Buti, Rindi,
and Werner (2011) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2013).
Our empirical proxies for the different components of trading volume are de-
fined in subsection 3.2.3. We use the levels of volumes as opposed to volumes
relative to the total executed volume because we are interested in the interplay
between trading volume categories, which is quantified by the β coefficients. As
mentioned before, a positive β indicates complementary behavior, while a neg-
ative β is an indication of substitution between the types of trading. If relative
volumes are used a mechanical negative correlation is built in into the analysis
because volume not executed through one of these trading alternatives is exe-
cuted through one of the two other mechanisms.
As the components of trading volume are simultaneously determined we need
instruments that are excluded from the other regressions in the system. We use
as instruments their market levels, i.e. for each stock i and each day t we cal-
culate the cross-sectional average of the volume components DarkVj,t, HidVj,t
and V isVj,t over all stocks j ∈ 1, ..., N excluding stock i. This results in the
instruments DarkVi′ 6=i,t, HidVi′ 6=i,t and V isVi′ 6=i,t. The positive correlation in dif-
ferent volume measures between stock i and the other stocks in the sample (‘the
market’) on day t reflects a commonality in opaque and visible trading volumes.
Intuitively, e.g., a correlated desire to trade in dark venues might be capturing
a latent demand for the services that dark venues provide. In turn, this might
be driven by institutional investors who make trading decisions for portfolios of
stocks at the same time. Their routing and execution strategies are likely to
be correlated across stocks. The inclusion of the exogenous ‘market’ volumes in
each of these equations, that is excluded from the other equations, ensures that
the system is identified. A similar approach is used by Buti, Rindi, and Werner
(2011) to instrument dark trading, by Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015) to
instrument dark trading and visible fragmentation, and by Hasbrouck and Saar
(2013) to instrument low-latency trading. Following Hasbrouck and Saar (2013)
we further exclude stocks that are in the same industry to reduce the potential
of reversed causality even more.
The vectorsXi,t and Zi,t contain endogenous and exogenous market and order
book conditions that we identify as having a potential impact on opaque or visible
trading activity. We discuss their effect into detail in Section 3.4. A similar
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approach is used to instrument the endogenous market and order book conditions
by their ‘market’ versions.
As a robustness test we include block trading volume. Large blocks are trans-
acted through designated mechanisms for which hidden order trading is probably
a poor substitute. We modify Equation (3.1) to include BlockVi,t, which is defined
as the euro volume of block trades that is executed in dark venues for stock i
on day t. These transactions comprise of the truly big blocks of shares that are
usually negotiated or executed by a block crossing network.
DarkVi,t = β1,1HidVi,t + β1,2V isVi,t + β2,3BlockVi,t + α1DarkVi′ 6=i,t
+γ′1Xi,t + λ
′
1Zi,t + υi,t
HidVi,t = β2,1DarkVi,t + β2,2V isVi,t + β3,3BlockVi,t + α2HidVi′ 6=i,t
+γ′2Xi,t + λ
′
2Zi,t + ηi,t
V isVi,t = β3,1DarkVi,t + β3,2HidVi,t + β3,3BlockVi,t + α3V isVi′ 6=i,t
+γ′3Xi,t + λ
′
3Zi,t + ωi,t
BlockVi,t = β4,1DarkVi,t + β4,2HidVi,t + β4,3V isVi,t + α4BlockVi′ 6=i,t
+γ′4Xi,t + λ
′
4Zi,t + ϑi,t
(3.2)
3.3.3 Results
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results of Equation (3.1). We estimate six
specifications: a full specification under header (1), and five specifications that
exclude one or several control variables. We follow this approach because the
instrumentation procedure may decrease the power of our statistical tests. How-
ever, results are fairly robust across specifications. We find that hidden order
trading and dark trading are negatively related to each other, despite both be-
ing driven by an unobservable opaque trading desire in the stock. Hidden order
volume is significantly negatively affected by executed dark volume, while dark
volume is also negatively affected by hidden order trading activity, but not sig-
nificantly. This suggests that both types of opaque trading activity substitute for
each other, rather than that they behave as complements. To understand this
relation, recall that executed volume (or any subdivision or category of volume)
has three determinants: trading desire, submission rate and execution rate. The
inherent trading desire in a stock is likely to be determined by the same (exoge-
nous) factors for both opaque and visible order trading volume (e.g., speculation,
fundamentals or liquidity reasons). Next, the decision to reduce exposure to the
market and thus to submit an opaque order type is driven by the same consid-
erations, irrespective of the chosen type of opaque order. Because both types of
opaque trading are strongly determined by the trading desire in general and the
opaque trading desire in particular both volume measures tend to be correlated
positively. However, we control for these trading interests by including the visible
102 CHAPTER 3. TWO SHADES OF OPACITY
volume for the stock and the market levels of dark or hidden order volume (our
instruments). Because the different types of opaque orders share the important
similarity that they reduce exposure, but may further differ on other character-
istics, hidden orders and dark orders are natural substitutes in a second stage
decision, after deciding to trade opaquely. For instance, traders may choose one
type of opaque trading over another based on perceived market conditions on the
lit venues versus dark venues.
Another aspect that contributes to this result is the existence of a liquidity
externality (Pagano, 1989). When opaque volume gravitates to dark venues the
perceived liquidity on these venues increases and traders who prefer to trade
opaquely become more inclined to route their orders there, further increasing
dark trading activity. Alternatively, when traders perceive liquidity to be low in
dark venues, because they observe lower volumes or worse than expected execu-
tion rates, they become more willing to choose an alternative method of trading
opaquely, e.g. by re-routing their order to a lit venue as a hidden order. The effect
of (perceived) execution probability thus reinforces any substitution effect in the
submission phase. This effect is not entirely similar for dark venues and hidden
orders, because in dark venues both sides of the trade constitute of traders with
a desire to trade opaquely, which causes the liquidity externality on dark venues.
For hidden orders the trader who wants to reduce his exposure is only on one side
of the trade, while the other side constitutes of a more aggressive trader. Hence,
the execution probability of hidden orders is not only determined by traders with
a desire to trade opaquely.
The effect of dark volume on hidden order volume is economically smaller
than the effect of hidden order volume on dark volume (-0.043 compared to -0.127
in the full specification), and insignificant. Dark volume can thus be a good sub-
stitute to hidden order volume, while substitution effects from hidden orders to
dark venues are less likely. A potential explanation is that there remain to be im-
portant differences between both types of opaque trading that make substitution
from dark venues to hidden orders less likely. The most important difference is
that hidden orders are far less opaque than orders on dark venues, because the
former are more easily detectable. When a marketable order trades against a
hidden order on a lit venue it is immediately revealed to all traders that monitor
the market that there is hidden liquidity available. As such, other traders often
adjust their strategies by trading more aggressively against these orders (see,
e.g., De Winne and D’Hondt, 2007; Frey and Sandas, 2009; Pardo and Pascual,
2012). Because dark venues do not have publicly displayed order books (by def-
inition) traders that have an interest in detecting dark liquidity need to exert
much more effort.
Hidden volume also negatively affects visible volume, as hidden and visible
orders substitute for each other within the order books of lit venues. Hidden and
visible limit orders share similarities because they are executed within the same
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Table 3.2: Hidden Order versus Dark Trading: Simultaneous Equation System
This Table presents estimation results of the system of Equations (3.1) for different specifications. The endogenous dependent variables are DarkV the euro
volume of non-block trades executed across all dark venues relative to the total consolidated volume; HidV , the euro volume of hidden orders executed across
all lit venues; and V isV , the euro volume of visible orders executed across all lit venues. Independent variables in the models are: QSpreadLit, the time-
averaged consolidated market quoted bid-ask spread (relative to the midquote); V isDepthLit, the time-averaged consolidated lit market depth quoted within
50 basis points of the midquote, based on Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015); V olat, the daily standard deviation of five-minute midquote returns; ATLit,
a proxy for algorithmic trading based on Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), and SOR, an estimate of the fraction of traders employing smart order
routers, based on van Kervel (2015). Vi′ 6=i is the instrument for the different volume measures, either DarkVi′ 6=i,t, HidkVi′ 6=i,t or V isVi′ 6=i,t. All equations are
estimated by 2SLS on a panel of daily observations for 27 Dutch large cap stocks which spans 738 trading days, from November 2007 until September 2010.
Variables are standardized by stock-quarter by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Endogenous independent variables QSpreadLit,
V isDepthLit and V olat are instrumented by using their ’market version’, i.e. for each stock i and day t we take the cross-sectional mean of the variable
excluding stock i. ATLit and SOR are assumed to be exogenous. Standard errors are Newey-West for panel data, t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and
***, ***, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
DarkV HidV V isV DarkV HidV V isV DarkV HidV V isV
DarkV -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
(-1.22) (-1.03) (-0.96) (-0.41) (-1.23) (-0.99)
HidV -0.127** -0.212*** -0.05 -0.03 -0.140*** -0.246***
(-2.35) (0.00) (-3.26) (-0.95) (-0.61) (-2.68) (-3.80)
V isV 0.150*** 0.175*** 0.177*** 0.229*** 0.154*** 0.174***
(3.55) (4.84) (0.00) (4.25) (6.55) (3.70) (4.85)
QSpreadLit 0.022 -0.004 0.053** 0.007 -0.025 0.022
(1.09) (-0.22) (2.55) (0.34) (-1.42) (1.10)
V isDepthLit 0.038* 0.018 0.068*** 0.016 -0.023 0.017 0.029* 0.019 0.047***
(1.89) (0.98) (3.35) (0.81) (-1.24) (0.80) (1.68) (1.21) (2.57)
V olat 0.129*** 0.176*** 0.282*** 0.016 0.010 0.026 0.140*** 0.175*** 0.313***
(5.72) (8.63) (11.72) (0.81) (0.55) (1.30) (6.56) (8.69) (14.21)
ATLit -0.256*** -0.377*** -0.583*** -0.257*** -0.378*** -0.589***
(-14.29) (-20.08) (-16.93) (-14.28) (-20.87) (-16.93)
SOR 0.031*** -0.033*** 0.037*** 0.030*** -0.033*** 0.035***
(3.62) (-4.88) (4.55) (3.52) (-4.87) (4.28)
Vi′ 6=i 0.596*** 0.542*** 0.870*** 0.604*** 0.615*** 0.919*** 0.597*** 0.543*** 0.878***
(22.85) (14.86) (22.32) (23.27) (16.26) (22.48) (22.82) (15.19) (22.52)
Obs 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416
R2 0.185 0.465 0.404 0.172 0.347 0.238 0.183 0.465 0.395
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Table 3.2 continued.
(4) (5) (6)
DarkV HidV V isV DarkV HidV V isV DarkV HidV V isV
DarkV -0.040 -0.03 -0.030 -0.024 -0.031 -0.022
(-1.16) (-0.81) (-0.87) (-0.54) (-0.90) (-0.47)
HidV -0.151*** -0.263*** -0.125** -0.243*** -0.166*** -0.381***
(-2.90) (-3.94) (-2.32) (-3.04) (-3.15) (-4.09)
V isV 0.171*** 0.182*** 0.222*** 0.272*** 0.262*** 0.296***
(4.32) (5.31) (5.48) (8.85) (6.83) (10.34)
QSpreadLit 0.005 -0.011 0.025 0.075*** 0.069*** 0.200***
(0.29) (-0.75) (1.27) (3.99) (3.95) (8.85)
V isDepthLit 0.012 -0.018 0.012
(0.60) (-1.09) (0.54)
V olat 0.120*** 0.170*** 0.276***
(5.41) (8.87) (11.13)
ATLit -0.258*** -0.373*** -0.605*** -0.236*** -0.348*** -0.631*** -0.223*** -0.322*** -0.658***
(-14.31) (-20.97) (-17.04) (-14.28) (-19.90) (-14.54) (-14.31) (-22.16) (-13.52)
SOR 0.031*** -0.033*** 0.039*** 0.031*** -0.033*** 0.044*** 0.024*** -0.040*** 0.028***
(3.64) (-4.85) (4.59) (3.67) (-4.89) (4.69) (2.92) (-6.18) (2.88)
Vi′ 6=i 0.600*** 0.536*** 0.903*** 0.602*** 0.544*** 1.028*** 0.604*** 0.530*** 1.143***
(22.98) (15.30) (22.51) (23.08) (14.47) (18.84) (23.20) (14.71) (18.14)
Obs 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416
R2 0.183 0.471 0.368 0.189 0.480 0.238 0.190 0.495 0.152
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trading systems against the same marketable order flow. In addition, reserve
orders on lit venues may execute partly hidden and partly visible, as the visible
peak size gets replenished during the trading process.
We estimate equation (3.2), which includes block volume as a fourth category
of volume, using the same procedures as before. The main results are presented
in Table 3.3 and are robust: our coefficients remain of a similar sign, economic
magnitude and statistical significance. We also find that visible volume can be
a substitute for block volume as visible volume is negatively affected by block
volume. For instance, when there is insufficient liquidity in block trading mech-
anisms, block traders are forced to execute their trades in other trading venues,
e.g., by splitting their order in the lit market. Dark trading and block trading
are complementary because there is some overlap in trading venues between
non-block dark trades and block trades. Therefore, both non-block dark trading
and block trading are higher when there is an increased interest in trading away
from regulated and transparent trading venues.
Lastly, it should be noted that there are alternative explanations possible for
the substitution result. This is because we look at executed volumes, which have
multiple drivers, of which order submission is only one component. Interpreta-
tion depends upon the assumptions that are made about which traders are more
likely to switch between certain order types. A potential alternative explanation
is that some traders substitute between orders on dark venues and market or-
ders on lit venues. An increased use of the latter type of orders increases the
execution probability of hidden orders and therefore may also increase executed
volumes of hidden orders. However, we believe that substitution between dark
venue orders and hidden orders is more likely than substitution between dark
venue orders and market orders. First and foremost, dark venue orders and hid-
den orders are both order types that allow traders to trade opaquely and not re-
veal their trading intention. Secondly, both hidden orders and dark venue orders
are relatively passive in nature, are less costly in terms of the bid-ask spread and
price impact, and have an uncertain execution. Market orders, by contrast, are
costly orders with certain execution. This is in line with Buti, Rindi, and Werner
(2015) who show that, when a dark pool is added next to a limit order book, it
are predominantly limit order traders who migrate to the dark pool.
3.4 What Drives Opaque Trading?
3.4.1 Market and Order Book Variables
We now turn to the question of how market conditions affact opaque trading
activity. Most of the market and order book variables we consider have a consol-
idated total market version (i.e., grouped over all trading venues, lit and dark),
denoted by the subscript Tot, a consolidated lit market version (i.e., grouped over
all lit trading venues), denoted by the subscript Lit, and a lit venue-specific ver-
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Table 3.3: Hidden Order versus Dark Trading: Simultaneous Equation System (with Block Volume)
This Table presents estimation results of the system of Equations (3.2) for different specifications. The endogenous dependent variables are DarkV the
euro volume of non-block trades executed across all dark venues relative to the total consolidated volume; HidV , the euro volume of hidden orders executed
across all lit venues; V isV , the euro volume of visible orders executed across all lit venues; and BlockV , the euro volume of block trades executed across all
dark venues. Independent variables in the models are: QSpreadLit, the time-averaged consolidated market quoted bid-ask spread (relative to the midquote);
V isDepthLit, the time-averaged consolidated lit market depth quoted within 50 basis points of the midquote, based on Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015);
V olat, the daily standard deviation of five-minute midquote returns; ATLit, a proxy for algorithmic trading based on Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011),
and SOR, an estimate of the fraction of traders employing smart order routers, based on van Kervel (2015). Vi′ 6=i is the instrument for the different volume
measures, either DarkVi′ 6=i,t, HidkVi′ 6=i,t, V isVi′ 6=i,t or BlockVi′ 6=i,t.
All equations are estimated by 2SLS on a panel of daily observations for 27 Dutch large cap stocks which spans 738 trading days, from November 2007 until
September 2010. Variables are standardized by stock-quarter by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Endogenous independent
variables QSpreadLit, V isDepthLit and V olat are instrumented by using their ’market version’, i.e. for each stock i and day t we take the cross-sectional mean
of the variable excluding stock i. ATLit and SOR are assumed to be exogenous. Standard errors are Newey-West for panel data, t-statistics are shown in
parentheses, and ***, ***, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
DarkV HidV V isV BlockV DarkV HidV V isV BlockV DarkV HidV V isV BlockV
DarkV -0.031 -0.016 0.088* -0.036 -0.011 0.090* -0.031 -0.012 0.088*
(-0.82) (-0.38) (1.86) (-0.89) (-0.25) (1.89) (-0.83) (-0.30) (1.86)
HidV -0.131** -0.204*** -0.049 -0.057 -0.030 0.004 -0.144*** -0.235*** -0.047
(-2.43) (0.00) (-3.15) (-0.73) (-1.12) (-0.57) (0.07) (-2.77) (-3.67) (-0.72)
V isV 0.147*** 0.176*** 0.025 0.171*** 0.229*** 0.039 0.151*** 0.176*** 0.024
(3.48) (4.89) (0.00) (0.50) (4.13) (6.56) (0.78) (3.63) (4.89) (0.49)
BlockV 0.051 -0.038 -0.077** 0.076* -0.001 -0.019 0.049 -0.038 -0.083**
(1.20) (-1.10) (-1.95) (0.00) (1.82) (-0.03) (-0.43) (1.15) (-1.09) (-2.09)
QSpreadLit 0.023 -0.005 0.051** -0.003 0.009 -0.025 0.021 -0.012
(1.15) (-0.28) (2.44) (-0.14) (0.46) (-1.42) (1.07) (-0.57)
V isDepthLit 0.033* 0.021 0.074*** 0.049** 0.010 -0.022 0.018 0.032 0.024 0.022 0.054*** 0.051***
(1.65) (1.13) (3.60) (2.23) (0.52) (-1.23) (0.86) (1.43) (1.38) (1.39) (2.92) (2.60)
V olat 0.129*** 0.175*** 0.279*** 0.053** 0.021 0.010 0.025 -0.024 0.141*** 0.173*** 0.308*** 0.052**
(5.75) (8.57) (11.61) (2.23) (1.04) (0.54) (1.22) (-1.14) (6.64) (8.61) (14.00) (2.27)
ATLit -0.249*** -0.381*** -0.587*** -0.177*** -0.250*** -0.382*** -0.594*** -0.177***
(-12.95) (-19.57) (-16.97) (-9.03) (-12.94) (-20.26) (-17.00) (-9.03)
SOR 0.031*** -0.034*** 0.036*** -0.005 0.030*** -0.034*** 0.034*** -0.005
(3.64) (-4.96) (4.43) (-0.56) (3.54) (-4.95) (4.17) (-0.55)
Vi′ 6=i 0.587*** 0.544*** 0.871*** 0.578*** 0.578*** 0.615*** 0.919*** 0.588*** 0.587*** 0.546*** 0.879*** 0.578***
(21.39) (14.76) (22.31) (18.47) (21.80) (16.14) (22.46) (18.55) (21.35) (15.05) (22.53) (18.46)
Obs 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416
R2 0.192 0.461 0.400 0.103 0.184 0.347 0.236 0.089 0.191 0.460 0.390 0.103
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Table 3.3 continued.
(4) (5) (6)
DarkV HidV V isV BlockV DarkV HidV V isV BlockV DarkV HidV V isV BlockV
DarkV -0.029 -0.012 0.092** -0.009 0.022 0.094** 0.005 0.066 0.096**
(-0.78) (-0.28) (1.95) (-0.26) (0.47) (2.01) (0.14) (1.33) (2.07)
HidV -0.152*** -0.260*** -0.081 -0.128** -0.227*** -0.046 -0.166*** -0.352*** -0.072
(-2.92) (-3.91) (-1.23) (-2.37) (-2.87) (-0.69) (-3.15) (-3.85) (-1.10)
V isV 0.165*** 0.185*** 0.052 0.221*** 0.273*** 0.053 0.262*** 0.297*** 0.070
(4.13) (5.40) (1.07) (5.43) (8.86) (1.06) (6.80) (10.24) (1.41)
BlockV 0.058 -0.033 -0.063 0.032 -0.065* -0.141*** -0.007 -0.109*** -0.264***
(1.42) (-0.97) (-1.56) (0.74) (-1.86) (-3.05) (-0.18) (-3.19) (-5.29)
QSpreadLit 0.009 -0.013 0.021 -0.024 0.076*** 0.066*** 0.193*** 0.019
(0.50) (-0.89) (1.06) (-1.36) (4.06) (3.79) (8.49) (0.94)
V isDepthLit 0.009 -0.013 0.025 0.039*
(0.45) (-0.73) (1.03) (1.81)
V olat 0.122*** 0.168*** 0.273*** 0.043*
(5.51) (8.77) (11.02) (1.83)
ATLit -0.250*** -0.376*** -0.611*** -0.179*** -0.232*** -0.354*** -0.638*** -0.167*** -0.224*** -0.335*** -0.675*** -0.171***
(-12.93) (-20.61) (-17.04) (-9.08) (-12.81) (-19.24) (-14.58) (-9.37) (-12.57) (-20.99) (-13.57) (-10.12)
SOR 0.031*** -0.034*** 0.038*** -0.005 0.031*** -0.034*** 0.043*** -0.005 0.024*** -0.041*** 0.027*** -0.005
(3.67) (-4.92) (4.51) (-0.54) (3.69) (-5.02) (4.49) (-0.55) (2.93) (-6.19) (2.74) (-0.52)
Vi′ 6=i 0.588*** 0.537*** 0.906*** 0.585*** 0.596*** 0.548*** 1.027*** 0.573*** 0.605*** 0.536*** 1.136*** 0.580***
(21.40) (15.24) (22.50) (18.74) (21.58) (14.31) (18.79) (18.54) (21.52) (14.58) (17.99) (19.30)
Obs 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416
R2 0.192 0.469 0.363 0.103 0.194 0.471 0.223 0.105 0.189 0.476 0.091 0.105
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sion which is denoted by the subscript l. We distinguish between the main venue
(Main), the consolidated alternative venues (Alt), and the largest and smallest
alternative venues (Alt L and Alt S respectively). Table 3.4 provides descriptive
statistics on a selection of the market and order book variables. The remainder
of this subsection further discusses the potential impact of these variables on the
various types of opaque trading activity, and how they are empirically proxied.
Volume. We include volume as a market variable and potential determinant
of dark and hidden order trading behavior because it is a proxy for trading in-
terest. Hidden orders are more likely to be executed when there is a heavier
trading interest. When the market is active and trading interest is higher, im-
patient traders are more likely to trade beyond visible depth in the limit order
book to execute their marketable orders. More trading volume thus increases the
execution probability of hidden orders. Similarly, dark orders also have a higher
execution probability when trading interest in dark venues is higher. However,
when the larger trading interest is driven by an increased demand for immedi-
acy, traders may favor lit venues over dark venues, reducing the market share of
dark venues. Volume is either measured as total volume V olumeTot,i,t, lit market
volume V olumeLit,i,t or venue-specific volume V olumel,i,t.
Volatility. Volatility increases the option value of limit orders, which pro-
vides incentives to hide the full order size. Tuttle (2006) shows empirically that
hidden orders are used more for stocks that exhibit a higher volatility and id-
iosyncratic risk. But limit orders also tend to be less aggressively priced when
volatility is larger because picking-off risk is greater (Foucault, 1999). This in-
creases trading costs for marketable orders, which in turn could reduce executed
hidden order volume at the cost of visible order volume. For dark venues, when
volatility proxies for adverse selection, Zhu (2014) predicts that dark pool market
share decreases when volatility increases. Volatility also increases the demand
for immediacy and decreases execution probabilities in dark venues.
Volatility V olati,t is measured only on the market level as the standard de-
viation of five-minute midquote returns using the midquote of the consolidated
limit order book. Table 3.4 shows that our stock-specific daily volatility estimate
V olati,t is 23.45 basis points on average, with 9.01 basis points on low-volatility
days in the 5th percentile and 50.42 basis points on high-volatility days in the
95th percentile.
Spread. Using hidden orders as tools to protect against predatory or com-
petitive behavior of other traders is only useful when the bid-ask spread is suffi-
ciently large. Therefore, hidden order submissions are expected to be more likely
when the spread is larger. However, with regard to execution of hidden orders,
a larger bid-ask spread also increases trading costs for marketable orders. In
turn this reduces the execution probability of hidden depth more than that of
visible depth. For dark venues, Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2015) predict that due
to competition between liquidity providers a narrower spread induces traders
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Order Book and Market Variables
This Table presents descriptive statistics on market and order book variables. The first block shows
visible depth V isDepth measured in euro and the fraction of visible depth (%, in percentage points) that
is quoted on selected subsamples of lit venues. Visible depth is defined as the consolidated lit market
visible depth offered in an interval of 50 basis points around the midquote, based on Degryse, de Jong,
and van Kervel (2015). The second block shows the consolidated quoted spread QSpread, relative to the
midquote (expressed in basis points) across all trading venues, and that of selected subsamples of lit
venues. Both visible depth and quoted spread are based on daily time-weighted averages derived from
minute-by-minute order book snapshots. The third block shows the number of Messages transmitted to
the consolidated market, and the fraction of those messages that (%, in percentage points) is transmitted
to selected subsamples of lit venues. The fourth block shows statistics for algorithmic trading AT at the
consolidated lit market level, and AT on selected subsamples of lit venues. The AT measure is based
on Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011). The next-to-last row presents statistics on the fraction
of traders using SOR based on the γ2 proxy of van Kervel (2015), while the last row presents statistics
on volatility at the consolidated lit market level (expressed in basis points). Subsamples are defined
as follows: Main refers to the main trading venue, Alt refers to the consolidated alternative venues,
Alt L refers to the largest alternative trading venue, Alt S refers to the other alternative trading venues.
Summary statistics in Panel D are based on observations for which at least one alternative venue trades
the stock; for relative measures: when at least two alternative venues trade the stock, such that the total
sums to 1.
Mean St. Dev. P5 Med P95
V isible Depth 409,022 439,459 31,311 273,526 1,270,413
%Main 51.46 8.78 36.83 51.94 65.69
%Alt 48.54 8.78 34.31 48.06 63.17
%Alt L 26.35 6.41 14.95 26.91 35.47
%Alt S 22.20 8.67 11.08 20.43 38.96
Quoted Spread 7.72 5.15 2.97 6.66 16.70
Main 10.38 6.13 4.11 8.95 21.89
Alt 12.96 18.94 3.88 9.03 34.16
Alt L 16.34 24.67 4.34 10.29 47.63
Alt S 17.65 17.69 6.70 12.88 41.45
Messages 378,313 422,321 31,268 236,088 1,188,858
%Main 31.67 10.97 12.54 32.82 48.48
%Alt 68.33 10.97 51.52 67.18 87.46
%Alt L 30.32 9.35 16.60 30.00 46.22
%Alt S 38.01 12.76 21.46 35.85 62.81
AT -4.52 6.61 -19.37 -1.83 -0.41
Main -8.95 11.14 -34.22 -4.45 -1.01
Alt -0.96 0.93 -2.81 -0.69 -0.10
Alt L -1.21 0.98 -3.11 -0.94 -0.18
Alt S -0.44 0.48 -1.29 -0.30 -0.03
SOR 7.43 4.88 0.85 7.03 15.69
V olatility 23.45 15.57 9.01 19.60 50.42
to migrate away from lit venues. A narrower spread makes midquote execu-
tion (which is typical in many dark venues) relatively more attractive for patient
traders. Alternatively, when primarily traders who would otherwise demand liq-
uidity on lit venues substitute the latter for dark venues, dark trading should be
increasing in the size of the spread (Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000; Degryse,
Van Achter, and Wuyts, 2009).
110 CHAPTER 3. TWO SHADES OF OPACITY
QSpreadi,t,l denotes the quoted spread between the best bid and ask quote
for venue l; QSpreadi,t,Lit is the consolidated lit market quoted bid-ask spread.
The bid-ask spread is measured relative to the midquote. It is recorded from the
order book based on one-minute snapshots and then time-weight these observa-
tions to have a daily measure. The consolidated quoted spread QSpreadi,t,Lit is
on average (median) 7.72 (6.66) basis points of the midquote, as can be judged
from Table 3.4. QSpreadi,t,l is the tightest on the main trading venue (10.38 ba-
sis points on average) and the widest on the smaller alternative trading venues
(17.65 basis points on average).
Visible Depth. Because of the lower execution priority of hidden depth over
visible depth, hidden depth is only executed insofar visible depth is depleted.
Hence, when visible depth is larger, the volume share that is executed against
hidden orders is expected to be lower. The lower execution probability further
reduces incentives to submit hidden orders. Both De Winne and D’Hondt (2007)
and Bessembinder, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2009) find that visible depth
on the same side of the market reduces the probability of submitting a hidden
order. In a market where multiple trading venues are competing and offering
options to hide the full order size, more visible depth on one venue should induce
large patient traders to submit their hidden orders on another venue. These
traders are effectively crowded out on the most liquid venue and substitute it
for a venue where less visible depth is offered. For dark venues the prediction
from Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2015) with regard to the effect of depth is similar
to that for the quoted spread: as more liquidity providers compete for execution
in the lit market it becomes deeper, and some traders are crowded out to dark
venues. On the other hand, deeper lit venues may attract order flow away from
dark markets if primarily liquidity demanders substitute between dark and lit
trading venues.
We use the Depth (X) measure from Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015)
as an empirical proxy for visible depth. It is constructed as follows:
Depthask (X) =
J∑
j=1
paskj q
ask
j 1
(
paskj < m (1 +X)
)
Depthbid (X) =
J∑
j=1
pbidj q
bid
j 1
(
pbidj > m (1−X)
)
Depth (X) = Depthask (X) +Depthbid (X)
Where j denotes a level on the pricing grid of a venue and m the midquote of
the consolidated order book across all lit venues. By measuring depth relative to
the consolidated midquote m we take into account that only visible depth that is
relatively close to the best prices of the consolidated market is relevant and com-
petitive. We choose X = 50 basis points. For each venue l we denote own venue
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visible depth as V isDepthi,t,l and aggregated visible depth across the other lit
venues l′ 6= l as V isDepthi,t,l′ 6=l. V isDepthi,t,Lit is the consolidated lit market vis-
ible depth. Similar to the quoted spread, visible depth is calculated from the limit
order book based on one-minute snapshots and then time-weighted throughout
the day to have a daily measure of depth.
In Table 3.4 we find that V isDepthi,t,Lit is on average 409,022 euro, with a
median of 273,526 euro. The large range between the 5th and 95th percentile
that was found for volume measures in Table 3.1, is also found for depth, with
a 1,240,000 euro difference. On average a little bit over half of visible depth
within 50 basis points is quoted by the main trading venue, the remainder by
alternative trading venues. For the alternative trading venues more than half of
depth is quoted by Chi-X, the largest competitor.
Algorithmic Trading. An important feature of today’s markets is the use
of algorithms by several classes of traders. For instance, brokers and buy-side
traders use algorithms to optimally split and time their trades. An important
class of algorithmic trading (AT) is high-frequency trading (HFT).14 The pres-
ence of algorithmic traders (and the strategies they employ) could impact the
use and execution probability of opaque orders. Since ATs are highly competitive
when they provide liquidity hidden orders are not suitable order types because of
their relatively low execution probability. Because ATs compete fiercly with each
other and other liquidity providers for order execution, hidden order executions
are likely to suffer from the presence of ATs. Furthermore, some AT strategies
may be designed to front-run large traders or exploit their orders in some other
way. If large traders fear the presence of ATs they may refrain from trading
opaquely and seek execution of their orders elsewhere (i.e., using block trading
mechanisms). This behavior reduces dark and hidden order trading. In addition,
algorithms can also be used as a substitute to opaque trading by large traders to
split up their order, which further reduces opaque trading.
Our proxy for algorithmic trading AT is related to the message-to-volume
ratio (the number of messages that needs to be transmitted to transact one euro
of volume). We use the measure from Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011)
to proxy for AT on each lit venue l:
ATi,t,l = −
LitVi,t,l
100
Messagesi,t,l
Where LitVi,t,l is the euro volume executed on the lit venue and Messagesi,t,l is
the number of electronic messages or updates in the limit order book until the
tenth best price on either side of the market (which consists of order submis-
14High-frequency traders are proprietary traders who rely on algorithms to make their trading
decisions and compete primarily on speed. They use their speed advantage for a diversity of trading
strategies. Market making is one of the strategies for which HFT technology seems to be advanta-
geous, as high-frequency traders are now responsible for a large part of liquidity provision (see, e.g.,
Menkveld, 2013; Hagstro¨mer and Norde´n, 2013; Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014).
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sions, cancellations and modifications). AT is increasing in algorithmic trading.
ATi,t,Lit is the same measure applied to the consolidated lit market.
On an average day, for the average stock, 378,313 messages are sent to lit
trading venues, but this goes up to 1,188,858 messages for the 95th percentile
of stock-days, as shown in Table 3.4. Less than a third is disseminated to the
main exchange on average days, but again there is considerable variation with
a P5-P95 range from 12.54 percent to 48.48 percent of total messages. A similar
amount of messages is sent to the largest alternative venue (Chi-X) each day,
with up to 38 percent of the messages sent to the smaller alternative venues. Be-
cause volumes are much lower on alternative trading venues, while the amount
of messages sent is similar or even higher, our algorithmic trading proxy indi-
cates that there is more algorithmic trading on these trading venues. The mean
(median) of ATi,t,l is -8.95 (-4.45) for the main venue and -0.96 (-0.69) for the
alternative trading venues.
Smart Order Routers. A fragmented market is characterized by how well
its different trading venues are interconnected. In a European context in which
there is no National Market System or trade-through prohibition this heavily
depends on the use of Smart Order Routers (SOR) by traders and brokers. These
are algorithms specifically designed to tap into the liquidity of multiple trading
venues. The more traders use SOR, the more trading venues are competing with
each other. The use of SOR can turn a fragmented market into a virtually consol-
idated market. Typically, a trader using SOR will first deplete depth at the trad-
ing venue that provides the best price, and then continue to the trading venue
that offers the same price (but smaller depth), until his order is filled or all depth
at the best price is depleted. If the order is not entirely filled it is send to the
venue quoting the second best price and so on. Non-SOR traders are constrained
to trade on a single venue (typically the listing exchange) and therefore often
trade at worse prices. The presence of SOR traders increases competition be-
tween liquidity providers since it increases the visible depth available to traders.
This reduces the execution probability of limit orders on a single trading venue,
and the execution probability of the lower-priority hidden orders relatively more
compared to visible orders. The presence of more SOR traders should therefore
reduce the volume share executed against hidden orders. However, more sophis-
ticated SOR algorithms can also be used to detect the presence of hidden orders,
as these offer an opportunity for depth improvement. Insofar our measure of
SOR usage also captures the use of these more complex SORs, it is a priori un-
clear what effect is to be expected on hidden order trading.
For dark venues the relation between volume and the use of SORs is less
ambiguous: there can only be volume in dark venues when traders access these
venues. The more traders have access to dark venues, the larger the execution
probability of dark orders and thus the more dark trading takes place. If our
measure of SOR usage properly captures multi-market trading, thus including
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dark venues, we expect that SOR usage positively affects dark trading activity.
The fraction of traders that used SOR, SORi,t is measured only on the con-
solidated lit market level.15 We use the measure from van Kervel (2015), based
on the fraction of trades that occurs simultaneously across markets, which are
assumed to originate from SORs. A trade is taken to occur simultaneously with
a previous trade on another venue when the best quotes of the executing venue
have not changed, they are of the same sign and occur within 100 milliseconds.
This leads to a dummy variable Si,t,k equal to one when a trade occurs simulta-
neously.16 To account for the fact that a trade only occurs simultaneously when
depth on one executing venue is not sufficient to fill the trade, the following linear
regression is estimated for each stock i and day t on a trade-by-trade basis:
Si,t,k = SORi,tP (x > T )i,t,k + i,t,k
Where P (x > T ) denotes the probability that an order of size x exceeds the
threshold T . Following van Kervel (2015) we set the threshold Ti,t,k as the depth
of the most liquid venue at time k and assume that order size is distributed ex-
ponentially with mean φi,t, and thus P (x > T )i,t,k = exp(
−Ti,t,k
φi,t
). We estimate
φi,t as the average trade size for stock i during day t.17 18 19
Table 3.4 shows that SORi,t has a value of 7.43 percent on average, with a
median of 7.03. These estimates are relatively low compared to the mean of
40 percent reported by van Kervel (2015), but his sample is characterized by a
relatively larger fragmentation of trading across venues (39 percent is not traded
on the listing exchange, compared to 22 percent on average in our sample, see
Panel C of Table 3.1).
3.4.2 Methodology
We now turn to the question which market conditions affect the share of differ-
ent types of opaque trading, relative to total trading activity. By investigating
the determinants of the volume share of hidden order trading %HidVi,t we gain
insight in which circumstances (1) patient traders choose to submit a hidden or-
15Although the connectivity of traders to alternative trading venues may differ across venues.
16In practice, however, not all trades identified as simultaneous using this method originate from
SORs, which can potentially lead to an overestimation of the fraction of traders using SOR. Simulta-
neous non-SOR trades are more likely on high volume days, hence we control for total volume in the
regressions.
17We also use two alternatives to proxy for the fraction of SOR traders: (1) The daily average of
the dummy Si,t,k , and (2) The fraction of non-trade-throughs, similar to Foucault and Menkveld
(2008). All measures are correlated and lead to qualitatively similar results.
18We only use information from simultaneous trades on lit trading venues. We assume that the
fraction of SOR traders on lit venues is positively related to the fraction of SOR traders in total (i.e.,
the fraction of traders connected to multiple lit venues and dark venues).
19Although both our AT and SOR measures are proxies for algorithmic trading their correlation
is quite low (near zero). This is in line with the assertion that both proxies measure fundamentally
different styles of algorithmic trading. While AT is more likely to capture the behavior of HFT market
makers (Hagstro¨mer and Norde´n, 2013), SOR is more related to optimal order execution.
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der on a lit venue, and (2) impatient traders are more likely to trade against
hidden depth. Similarly, we investigate the determinants of the volume share of
dark trading %DarkVi,t. In addition to our primary definition of dark trading,
the bulk of volume that is transacted in completely dark venues consists of block
trades. Therefore we also examine the market conditions driving this volume
component. Volume shares or relative volume measures are more suited for this
analysis than absolute levels of trading as their scaling makes them indepen-
dent of total trading activity. This makes relative volume a proxy for trading
that relates more to the submission (or routing) decision and execution probabil-
ity than to trading desire. We estimate the following model to asses how market
and order book conditions impact different types of opaque trading.
%OpaqueVi,t = γ
′Xi,t,l + λ′Zi,t,l + ηi,t,l (3.3)
%OpaqueVi,t is either a measures for hidden order trading %HidVi,t,l, our mea-
sure of dark trading %DarkVi,t, or block trading %BlockVi,t. An intercept is not
included because all variables in the model are standardized by stock and quar-
ter. Market and order book characteristics, as defined in subsections 3.2.3 and
3.4.1, are contained in the vector Xi,t,l for the variables we assume to be en-
dogenous (V olumei,t,l, V isDepthi,t,l, QSpreadi,t,l, V olati,t), and in the vector Zi,t,l
for the variables we believe are exogenous (ATi,t,l and SORi,t). Because of their
potential endogeneity we instrument the variables xi,t,l by using their market
version xi′ 6=i,t, as before. This approach is justified by the observation that, on
the one hand, the variables included in our models are known to have a common
market component to them. For instance, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam
(2000) show there is a common market-wide component to liquidity while Has-
brouck and Seppi (2001) document commonality in liquidity, order imbalances,
prices and volatility. On the other hand, it is hard to see how opaque trading
activity in one stock could impact these market variables at the market level.
The full specification is:
%OpaqueVi,t = γ1V olumei,t,Tot + γ2V isDepthi,t,Lit + γ3QSpreadi,t,Lit + γ4V olati,t
+λ1ATi,t,Lit + λ2SORi,t + ηi,t (3.4)
When %HidVi,t,Tot and %DarkVi,t are the dependent variables, they are mea-
sured relative to the total volume excluding block volume. Similarly, on the right
hand side we have total volume V olumei,t,Tot with block volume excluded as a
determinant, because block volume is an outlier-sensitive variable.
As an additional test, we estimate the determinants of hidden order trading
on different subsamples based on trading venues. In these sepcifications we also
distinguish between own venue depth and other venue depth to recognize that
both may have an opposite impact on hidden order volume due to competition be-
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tween trading venues. This leads to the following full specification of the model.
%HidVi,t,l = γ1V olumei,t,l + γ2V isDepthi,t,l + γ2′V isDepthi,t,l′ 6=l + γ3QSpreadi,t,l
+γ4V olati,t + λ1ATi,t,l + λ2SORi,t + ηi,t,l (3.5)
3.4.3 Results
Table 3.5 presents estimation results for different specifications of Equation (3.3).
The results for %HidV are shown in columns (1 – 4), columns (5 – 8) present
results with %DarkV as the dependent variable, while columns (9 – 12) show
results for %BlockV .
Total volume has a significant and strong positive effect on %HidV in all
specifications. From column (1), if total volume increases with one standard
deviation, the fraction of volume executed against hidden orders increases with
0.271 standard deviations. We interpret this as a positive effect from trading
interest in a stock on hidden order trading volume. When the trading desire in
a stock increases, and traders become more anxious to fill their trades, they are
more likely to trade deeper in the limit order book and the execution probability
of hidden orders increases. In contrast to hidden order trading, dark trading
%DarkV is negatively affected by trading interest, as proxied by total volume.
When total volume increases by one standard deviation, the fraction of volume
executed dark decreases by 0.196 standard deviations. When the trading interest
increases, so does the desire to trade immediately. Dark trading venues do not
perform well in providing immediacy (Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu, 2015) and
as a result, traders are more likely to switch to lit venues to execute their trades.
Block trading activity is strongly positively affected by total volume, i.e. when
there is a larger trading desire in the market, a larger portion of trading tends to
go through block trading mechanisms. A one standard deviation increase in total
volume leads to a 0.359 standard deviation increase in block volume. Given that
block volume is about 27 percent of average daily market volume which represent
only 7 trades of about 4.4 million euro on average this is hardly surprising. There
are few alternatives to work trades of this size through the market other than
through designated block trading mechanisms.
Volatility does not have a clear effect on hidden order and dark trading in
our models. Only when volume is excluded from the specification does volatil-
ity become a significantly positive determinant for hidden order trading, and a
negative determinant for dark trading, this due to the high correlation between
volatility and volume measures. Indeed, increased volatility may reflect new in-
formation and induce investors to trade. The positive (negative) effect of volatil-
ity on hidden order (dark) trading activity is thus mainly indirect through vol-
ume. We find no evidence that an increase in volatility directly impacts opaque
trading activity through an increase in hidden order submissions as predicted by
Harris (1996) and Aitken, Berkman, and Mak (2001), or through a decrease in
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Table 3.5: Determinants of Opaque Trading Volume
This Table presents estimation results of Equation (3.3) for different specifications. The dependent variable is either %HidV (the volume of hidden orders executed
across all lit venues relative to the total consolidated volume), %DarkV (volume of non-block trades executed across all dark venues relative to the total consolidated
volume) or %BlockV (the volume of block trades executed across all dark venues relative to the consolidated total volume). Independent variables in the models are:
V olumeTot, the consolidated volume across all venues, excluding block volume; V olumeTot+Block, the consolidated volume across all venues, including block volume;
V olat, the daily standard deviation of five-minute midquote returns; V isDepthLit, the time-averaged consolidated lit market depth quoted within 50 basis points
of the midquote; V isDepthl, the time-averaged lit venue depth quoted within 50 basis points of the consolidated midquote, based on Degryse, de Jong, and van
Kervel (2015); QSpreadLit, the time-averaged consolidated market quoted bid-ask spread (relative to the midquote); ATLit, a proxy for algorithmic trading based on
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), and SOR, an estimate of the fraction of traders employing smart order routers, based on van Kervel (2015).
All equations are estimated by 2SLS on a panel of daily observations for 27 Dutch large cap stocks which spans 738 trading days, from November 2007 until
September 2010. Variables are standardized by stock-quarter by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Endogenous independent variables
V olumex, V olat, V isDepthx and QSpreadx are instrumented by using their ’market version’, i.e. for each stock i and day t we take the cross-sectional mean of the
variable excluding stock i. ATx and SOR are assumed to be exogenous. Standard errors are Newey-West for panel data, t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and
***, ***, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
%HidV %DarkV %BlockV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
V olumeTot 0.271*** 0.302*** 0.288*** -0.196*** -0.167*** -0.178***
(10.50) (13.66) (14.86) (-7.42) (-7.36) (-9.20)
V olumeTot+Block 0.359*** 0.328*** 0.148***
(12.29) (12.94) (6.27)
V olat 0.029 -0.032 0.244*** 0.030 -0.003 -0.126*** -0.307*** -0.277*** -0.088***
(1.17) (-1.37) (12.62) (1.22) (-0.13) (-6.78) (-11.84) (-11.17) (-4.29)
V isDepthLit -0.118*** -0.140*** -0.065*** -0.124*** 0.015 0.008 -0.023 0.009 -0.050** -0.041* 0.022 0.019
(-5.13) (-6.19) (-2.76) (-5.43) (0.71) (0.39) (-1.10) (0.46) (-2.26) (-1.89) (0.93) (0.87)
QSpreadLit -0.144*** -0.151*** -0.188*** -0.132*** 0.021 0.013 0.053** 0.033 0.025 0.031 -0.031 -0.116***
(-5.92) (-6.20) (-7.48) (-6.01) (0.91) (0.59) (2.32) (1.62) (1.01) (1.30) (-1.23) (-5.40)
ATLit -0.131*** -0.246*** -0.126*** -0.075*** 0.009 -0.069*** 0.073*** -0.058*** 0.023
(-8.73) (-25.03) (-8.97) (-5.16) (0.93) (-5.25) (5.07) (-5.72) (1.53)
SOR -0.078*** -0.066*** -0.078*** 0.030*** 0.022** 0.031*** -0.020** -0.008 -0.023***
(-9.24) (-7.67) (9.01) (3.34) (2.45) (3.36) (-2.50) (-0.82) (-2.64)
Obs 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416 17,416
R2 0.123 0.102 0.076 0.125 -0.017 -0.016 0.000 -0.014 0.227 0.214 0.002 0.107
CHAPTER 3. TWO SHADES OF OPACITY 117
dark trading as predicted by Zhu (2014) and Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015).
Volatility has a strong and significant negative effect on block trading with a co-
efficient of -0.307 as traders tend to avoid block trades in volatile markets, either
because the execution uncertainty is too large, or because the price uncertainty
is large.
As expected, consolidated visible depth has a significant negative effect on
hidden order trading, consistent over all specifications. If visible depth increases
by one standard deviation, ceteris paribus, the fraction of volume executed against
hidden orders decreases by 0.118 standard deviations (from column (1)). When
more visible depth is quoted on lit venues this reduces the execution probability
of hidden orders, thereby also reducing incentives to submit hidden orders. Our
other measure of market quality, the consolidated quoted spread, has an opposite
effect: hidden order trading is decreasing in the size of the spread (i.e., increasing
in liquidity). When the spread increases with one standard deviation the fraction
of trades executed against hidden orders reduces by 0.144 standard deviations.
This is somewhat surprising, as theory predicts that patient large traders should
be more likely to submit hidden orders when the spread is wider if hidden orders
are used as a tool to limit competition from other liquidity suppliers (Buti and
Rindi, 2013). However, the relation between the spread and hidden order usage
may be more complex, as De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) also find a negative rela-
tion between spread size and the submission of hidden orders. Furthermore, the
execution probability of hidden orders may also be hampered when the spread is
wider, leading to more executed hidden orders when the spread is narrow.
Contrary to our expectations, lit market quality as measured by visible depth
and the quoted spread does not significantly affect dark trading. One poten-
tial explanation is that market quality affects the venue submission choice for
patient and impatient traders differently. A liquid lit market attracts order flow
away from dark venues from impatient traders, but the increased competition for
(hidden) order execution can crowd out patient traders such that they switch to
another (dark) venue to submit their orders. When both effects offset each other
the combined effect may be zero. For block trading, the coefficient for visible
depth is negative and mildly significant in columns (9) and (10). Block trading
is thus decreasing in lit venue liquidity, which suggests that order splitting in
lit venues can be a substitute for block trading when lit venues are liquid. It is
remarkable then that coefficient for visible depth is insignificant in the model for
dark trading because non-block dark venues are more similar to lit venues than
block venues.
Algorithmic trading consistently has a negative effect of around -0.130 on hid-
den order trading (when not controlled for total volume the effect even becomes
more negative). There are three potential explanations. First, algorithms used
by traders can substitute for hidden orders, reducing the amount of hidden or-
ders submitted to lit trading venues. This is similar to the finding by De Winne
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and D’Hondt (2007) that ‘principal’ orders (which are submitted by brokers for
their own account) are less likely to make use of hidden orders compared to
‘client’ orders (which are submitted by brokers on behalf of clients). The former
are more sophisticated traders who tend to substitute hidden order usage by a
better monitoring of the market. Similarly, algorithms may contain a fair amount
of sophistication, but more importantly, they are designed to constantly monitor
the market and trade whenever opportunities present themselves. Second, the
presence of algorithmic traders increases competition for order flow among liq-
uidity suppliers, especially when they also have a speed advantage, such as the
case of HFTs. The increased competition then decreases the execution proba-
bility of those orders that have the lowest execution priority, i.e. hidden orders.
Third, algorithmic trading is sometimes associated with concerns of predatory
trading. If large patient traders (who would consider hidden orders) observe that
the lit venues are more crowded with algorithms, they may refrain from trading
here.
The presence of algorithmic traders also negatively affects dark trading when
we control for volume. Two potential explanations also hold here. First, algo-
rithms on lit venues may substitute for dark trading if they monitor the market
closely and slice and dice large orders to the market. Second, insofar as algo-
rithmic trading is perceived as toxic and when dark venues are perceived to be
crowded with toxic algorithms, large traders may reduce their dark order sub-
missions. The latter is consistent with the finding that, controlling for volume
and volatility, algorithmic trading is positively related to block trading. When
large traders fear order flow toxicity they may refrain from trading in any venue
to which algorithms have access to, and instead resort to the designated block
trading markets where information leakage is minimal.
The fraction of trades that is executed against hidden orders is also negatively
affected by the usage of SORs by traders. When more liquidity takers use SOR
to trade (simultaneously) on multiple lit venues hidden order trading declines.
A one standard deviation in the fraction of SOR traders decreases the relative
hidden order volume by 0.078 standard deviations. As with algorithmic trading
there are two explanations, depending on who uses SOR. First, SOR can be used
as a substitute by traders to execute their large orders through order splitting
over multiple venues to find cheaper execution. Second, when more traders use
SOR to tap into the liquidity offered at different trading venues the amount of
visible depth with which hidden order traders are competing increases, reducing
their execution probability. In turn this also reduces incentives to submit hidden
orders.
The fraction of SOR traders is positively related to dark trading. When
traders that are using SORs do not only connect to lit venues, but also engage in
searches for liquidity in dark venues, an increase in the fraction of traders using
the technology results in an increase in dark trading. By contrast, SOR usage is
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negatively related to block trading since SORs that split orders over multiple lit
venues can substitute for block trading mechanisms.
In sum, hidden order trading and dark trading are differently impacted by
most market and order book conditions, while both types of opaque trading are
negatively impacted by algorithmic trading activity.
We now turn to the analysis of the determinants of hidden order trading
across different trading venues. Panels A, B, C and D of Table 3.6 present es-
timation results of Equation (3.5) for four subsamples based on the executing
venue. For the main trading venue (Panel A) results are highly similar to those
with consolidated hidden order trading as the independent variable (Table 3.5)
since hidden order volume on the main venue is on average 82 percent of total
hidden order volume. The additional variable V isDepthl′ 6=l has a positive and
significant sign as expected. When visible depth on alternative venues increases
with one standard deviation, the fraction of volume executed against hidden or-
ders on the main venue increases by 0.079 standard deviations. This is in line
with the explanation that as it becomes more difficult to obtain execution for
hidden orders on the alternative venues, traders who wish to trade with hidden
orders substitute those venues for the main venue.
Panels B, C and D show that volume is not a significant determinant of hidden
order trading on alternative venues. Only on the largest alternative venue is
volume significant in 3 out of 4 specifications where it is included, but not the
full specification. An increase in trading interest on alternative venues (volume
on venue l) does not increase hidden order trading on venue l. Own venue depth
remains to have a significantly negative impact on hidden order trading, but
other venue depth is generally insignificant. When visible depth is building up
on competing lit venues hidden order traders do not substitute their venue for
any of the alternative venues. A potential explanation is that hidden depth on
competing lit venues constitutes for a large part of depth quoted on the main
venue, and that the connectivity of traders to alternative venues is too limited to
have a significant impact. The quoted spread, algorithmic trading and SOR have
the same sign as before, and remain significant.
3.5 Conclusion
Financial markets offer different opportunities to trade opaquely. This chapter
studies two forms of opaque trading – hidden order trading that can take place on
several lit trading venues and dark trading, away from lit trading venues. Using
a detailed high-frequency dataset our research provides insight in the segmen-
tation of opaque trading into these two shades of opacity.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, using a simultane-
ous equations framework we show that dark trading and hidden order trading
negatively affect each other. This supports the idea that dark trading and hid-
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Hidden Order Volume Across Venues
This Table presents estimation results of Equation (3.5) for different trading venue subsamples. Panel A presents estimation results for different specifications
for the Euronext subsample, Panel B for the MTF subsample, Panel C for the Chi-X subsample and Panel D for the Other MTF (Turquoise and Bats) subsample.
The dependent variable is %HidVl the volume of hidden orders executed across the lit venue(s) in the subsample relative to the total lit venue volume from
the subsample. Independent variables in the models are: V olumel, the lit venue volume; V olat, the daily standard deviation of five-minute midquote returns;
V isDepthLit, the time-averaged consolidated lit market depth quoted within 50 basis points of the midquote; V isDepthl, the time-averaged lit venue depth
quoted within 50 basis points of the consolidated midquote, based on Degryse, de Jong, and van Kervel (2015); QSpreadLit, the time-averaged consolidated
market quoted bid-ask spread (relative to the midquote); ATLit, a proxy for algorithmic trading based on Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), and SOR,
an estimate of the fraction of traders employing smart order routers, based on van Kervel (2015).
All equations are estimated by 2SLS on a panel of daily observations for 27 Dutch large cap stocks which spans 738 trading days, from November 2007 until
September 2010. Variables are standardized by stock-quarter by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. Endogenous independent
variables V olumex, V olat, V isDepthx and QSpreadx are instrumented by using their ’market version’, i.e. for each stock i and day t we take the cross-sectional
mean of the variable excluding stock i. ATx and SOR are assumed to be exogenous. Standard errors are Newey-West for panel data, t-statistics are shown in
parentheses, and ***, ***, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Panel A: Main Venue Hidden Order Trading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V olumel 0.275*** 0.351*** 0.285*** 0.280***
(8.64) (14.91) (11.00) (8.65)
V olat 0.018 -0.045* 0.207*** -0.018
(0.73) (-1.90) (9.71) (-0.76)
V isDepthl -0.219*** -0.207*** -0.203*** -0.223*** -0.202***
(-9.78) (-9.21) (-8.87) (-10.08) (-9.31)
V isDepthl′ 6=l 0.079*** 0.021 0.136*** 0.081*** 0.102***
(3.28) (1.01) (5.93) (3.32) (4.68)
QSpreadLit -0.068*** -0.102*** -0.064*** -0.060***
(-2.98) (-4.83) (-2.77) (-2.73) (0.00)
ATLit -0.180*** -0.333*** -0.178*** -0.194***
(-7.73) (-26.90) (-7.92) (-8.95)
SOR -0.054*** -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.054***
(-6.42) (-6.90) (-6.40) (-6.33)
Obs 15,564 15,564 15,564 15,564 15,564
R2 0.139 0.116 0.101 0.139 0.141
Panel B: Alternative Venue Hidden Order Trading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V olumel 0.000 0.028 0.003 0.035
(0.00) (1.22) (0.15) (1.31)
V olat 0.004 -0.047** 0.004 -0.050**
(0.18) (-2.10) (0.25) (-2.31)
V isDepthl -0.070** -0.154*** -0.070*** -0.070** -0.013
(-2.41) (-5.89) (-2.65) (-2.43) (-0.49)
V isDepthl′ 6=l -0.031 0.070*** -0.031 -0.032 -0.009
(-1.18) (3.08) (-1.25) (-1.20) (-0.33)
QSpreadLit -0.120*** -0.109*** -0.120*** -0.118***
(-5.21) (-4.75) (-5.25) (-5.55)
ATLit -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.211*** -0.208***
(-11.34) (0.00) (-16.52) (-12.05) (-11.21)
SOR -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.107*** -0.100***
(-10.10) (0.00) (-10.18) (-10.22) (-9.61)
Obs 15,564 15,564 15,564 15,564 15,564
R2 0.050 0.012 0.050 0.050 0.050
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Table 3.6 continued.
Panel C: Largest Alternative Venue Hidden Order Trading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V olumel 0.024 0.057*** 0.034* 0.044*
(0.97) (2.65) (1.76) (1.78)
V olat 0.017 -0.044** 0.033* 0.001
(0.72) (-1.95) (1.81) (0.04)
V isDepthl -0.154* -0.040 -0.156* -0.175** 0.021
(-1.86) (-0.49) (-1.89) (-2.15) (0.31)
V isDepthl′ 6=l -0.093 0.036 -0.101 -0.110 0.050
(-1.16) (0.48) (-1.28) (-1.39) (0.71)
QSpreadLit -0.080*** -0.070*** -0.084*** -0.078***
(-3.18) (-2.82) (-3.37) (-3.15) (0.00)
ATLit -0.199*** -0.210*** -0.196*** -0.187***
(-11.12) (0.00) (-17.25) (-11.53) (-10.48)
SOR -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.066***
(-7.31) (0.00) (-7.09) (-7.39) (-6.88)
Obs 15,564 15,564 15,564 15,564 15,564
R2 0.040 0.005 0.041 0.040 0.042
Panel D: Other Alternative Venue Hidden Order Trading
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
V olumel 0.038 0.031 0.030 0.063*
(1.09) (1.19) (1.05) (1.84)
V olat -0.014 -0.018 0.005 -0.049*
(-0.46) (-0.61) (0.18) (-1.72)
V isDepthl -0.202*** -0.193** -0.203*** -0.192*** 0.007
(-2.65) (-2.51) (-2.66) (-2.56) (0.12)
V isDepthl′ 6=l -0.080 -0.066 -0.093 -0.070 0.116*
(-1.02) (-0.85) (-1.20) (-0.91) (1.78)
QSpreadLit -0.131*** -0.140*** -0.135*** -0.135***
(-4.14) (-4.32) (-4.35) (-4.54)
ATLit -0.150*** -0.170*** -0.152*** -0.145***
(-6.17) (-11.87) (-6.46) (-5.91)
SOR -0.144*** -0.139*** -0.143*** -0.149***
(-11.83) (-11.68) (-12.02) (-12.52)
Obs 11,465 11,465 11,465 11,465 11,465
R2 0.051 0.020 0.050 0.050 0.050
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den order trading, both forms of opaque trading, are substitutes. After deciding
that a trader wants to reduce the visibility of his order in the market he decides
whether he wants to trade in a dark venue, or whether he wants to trade with
a hidden order in the lit market. This decision is likely to be based on personal
preferences, order characteristics and the prevailing market conditions. How-
ever, we also find that the substitution is more likely from hidden orders to dark
orders than the other way around. The effect from dark trading on hidden order
trading is relatively small and insignificant. One explanation is that the relative
difference in opacity between hidden orders and orders on dark venues makes
the use of hidden orders a more inadequate substitute to dark trading than the
other way around.
Second, we establish the determinants of hidden order trading and dark trad-
ing separately. Both are differently impacted by market and order book condi-
tions. This is in line with the finding that both types of opaque trading are substi-
tutes. We show that hidden order trading is increasing in total volume, while the
opposite is true for dark trading. A larger trading desire tends to increase execu-
tions of hidden orders on lit venues, in particular on the listing exchange, while
decreasing executions on dark venues. This is consistent with the conjecture
that traders choose to trade on venues that offer more liquidity and immediacy
when they have a stronger trading desire. Hidden order trading is decreasing in
the size of visible depth offered, and is increasing as the spread narrows. Both
measures of liquidity directly impact the execution probability of hidden orders.
Contrary to the predictions of Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2015) dark trading is
largely unaffected by market quality measures on lit venues, possibly because
too few traders have access to dark venues. Smart order routers reduce the ex-
ecution probability of hidden orders because they increase the competition from
other trading venues. At the same time SORs may provide a substitute for large
patient traders to execute their trades. Overall, hidden order trading is decreas-
ing in the use of SORs, while dark trading is increasing, as more traders tap into
dark liquidity. Algorithmic trading negatively affects both types of opaque trad-
ing, either because algorithms substitute for opaque orders, because they reduce
execution probabilities due to a more fierce competition for liquidity supply, or
because they increase the risk of predatory trading too much for large traders.
The latter is consistent with the finding that block trading increases with algo-
rithmic trading.
The large amount of hidden orders on lit venues and the growing market
share of dark venues makes insight into opaque trading activity in all its ap-
pearances relevant for traders, market operators, brokers and regulators. From
the regulatory perspective, the growing amount of dark trading has caused reg-
ulators to be concerned abouts its consequences for market quality and welfare.
In particular, the European Commission’s recent proposals on MiFID II aim to
curb dark trading activity in two ways (European Commission, 2014). First, the
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Commission aims to bring OTC volume to regulated trading venues by forcing
brokers that match client orders to register either as an MTF or as a SI when
trades are internalized. Second, on the regulated trading venues the Commis-
sion proposes to limit the use of the reference price waiver and negotiated trade
waiver by imposing market share caps at 4 percent for an individual trading
venues and 8 percent for the global market. Furthermore, the scope of the refer-
ence price waiver will be narrowed to midpoint matching only. The large in scale
waiver remains unaltered in order to continue to allow the trading of very large
blocks of shares without alerting the market. In addition, the order manage-
ment facility waiver which allows for hidden order trading also remains in place
without restrictions. Our findings suggest that if the proposed legislation comes
into force without any further adjustments, traders who now make heavy use
of dark trading venues, may have trouble in finding an suitable opaque alterna-
tive. Although dark trading can be a substitute for hidden order trading, hidden
orders appear to be a less adequate substitute for dark venues. It is therefore
questionable whether lit venues can offer truly opaque trading alternatives.
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Concluding Remarks
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the micro-level structure
of financial markets. It contains three empirical studies that relate to the be-
havior of traders and how this affects market outcomes, in both a transparent
and an opaque setting. While the first chapter is situated in a concentrated
market, the second and third chapter explicitly take into account the effects of
market fragmentation. The first and second chapter focus on information that is
publicly available from transparent order books. By contrast, the third chapter
specifically focuses on trading activity from opaque mechanisms. Results in each
chapter are driven by order choice, either between different order types within a
single venue, the venue selection itself, or a combination of both. We document
how market outcomes are affected by order choice. On the one hand, order choice
is both a determinant of short-term price effects and a driver of the segmentation
of volume into different classifications. On the other hand, order choice is also
affected by current market conditions, such as the state of the limit order book
or the perceived liquidity across different trading venues.
Chapter 1 investigates why information from the public limit order book helps
to predict short-term returns in order-driven markets. We find that the bulk
of predictability can be explained by order choice considerations of uninformed
traders. As traders predictably condition their order choice on the state of the
book, or gradually switch to more aggressive orders when their previous orders
remain unexecuted, they cause short-term price deviations. We find little evi-
dence for the alternative explanation that relates predictability to informed trad-
ing in the limit order book. In particular, we find that predictability decreases
with the time horizon – but it does not completely vanish. Especially for actively
traded stocks predictability is the highest for shorter horizon returns. This sug-
gests that the transitory (order-driven) component is more important than the
permanent (information-driven) one. Furthermore, there is no clear intraday
pattern that can tie predictability to informed trading. Finally, we show that,
cross-sectionally, predictability is inversely related to informed trading, but posi-
tively to depth. Thus, return predictability is higher when there is less informed
trading and the order book is more competitive. This is consistent with the bulk
of return predictability being driven by order choice, and not informed trading.
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The research on intraday return predictability is extended to a setting where
multiple trading venues compete for order flow in Chapter 2. In particular, we
address whether in a fragmented market, order book imbalances can predict re-
turns on other trading venues, controlling for own venue order book imbalances.
Order book imbalances are shown to be strong predictors of returns on another
venue when they are associated with more competitive prices. We also document
that prices from different trading venues tend to adjust to one another. Our re-
sults suggest that the listing exchange is the leading venue for trading activity
and price discovery. However, the order book from an alternative venue can also
contribute to return predictability, and it does so relatively more when its mar-
ket share is larger. This is in line with traders adjusting their order choice to the
state of all relevant order books.
Chapter 3 investigates two distinct ways in which traders can hide their trad-
ing intentions. One the one hand, they can choose to submit hidden orders on
lit trading venues and hide within the visible limit order book. On the other
hand, traders can also choose to submit orders to completely dark venues. We
examine the relation between executed hidden order volume and dark volume,
and find that dark trading and hidden order trading are substitutes. However,
dark trading appears to be a better substitute for hidden order trading than the
other way around. Furthermore, a number of market conditions differently af-
fect hidden order trading and dark trading. In particular, hidden order trading
is preferred over dark trading on high volume days, when the visible part of the
order book shows more depth, the bid-ask spread is narrow and fewer traders
employ smart order routers. Algorithmic trading negatively affects both types of
opaque trading.
Our findings have implications for traders, market operators and regulators.
As the amount of information that is now disseminated by trading venues and
other data vendors is growing, financial markets are becoming ever-more trans-
parent. Today’s traders increasingly rely on this information as an input for
their trading strategies. This holds for human traders, who try to keep track of
information on multiple trading screens, but even more so for the myriad of algo-
rithms that are shaping the way modern financial markets work. For instance,
traders engaging in a market making strategy need to constantly adapt their
best estimate of a security’s fundamental value as they receive new information,
as well as make forecasts about transient (liquidity-driven) price movements.
Our results imply that information on the current state of the limit order book
can be used by traders to predict short-term returns, and that these price effects
are mostly transient. Optimally traders should use information obtained from all
trading venues in order to improve their predictions. Not all information should
be weighted equally though, as order book imbalances between the bid and ask
side obtained from the quotes of more competitive trading venues strongly pre-
dict positive returns, while imbalances obtained from less competitive venues are
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weak predictors, or even predict reversals.
The advances in market automation and heavier reliance on algorithms are
developments that go hand in hand with the increased market fragmentation. As
trading activity becomes more dispersed across different mechanisms (limit or-
der books, dark pools, broker/dealer crossing networks or internalizers), traders,
especially institutions, need to exert more effort in the search for liquidity. Al-
gorithms can play a key role in this search. But our results imply that not all
algorithms are equal. For instance, we find that when traders rely more heavily
on smart order routers, volumes on dark trading venues increase. Our proxy for
algorithmic trading in general, which is based on the message-to-volume ratio
and is likely to pick up HFT market making activity, negatively affects hidden
order and dark trading, but positively affects block trading activity. The frag-
mentation of trading volume into different mechanisms, and the accompanying
search for liquidity, remains to be one of the key challenges for today’s traders.
The growing amount of market information that is disseminated, together
with the increasing pace at which traders can react to it, also boosts the desire
for opacity among large, institutional, traders. While previous research warrants
caution for an over-reliance on dark trading venues in the market, due to poten-
tial negative effects on overall market quality, the fact remains that exposure
costs in the visible market are too high for some traders. From the point of view
of those traders, it is therefore positive that MiFID II will maintain the large in
scale waiver (and even plans to expand it by reducing the thresholds), as well as
the order management facility waiver, in order to facilitate some forms of opaque
trading that are deemed less harmful for market quality. But at the same time
MiFID II will introduce a double volume cap for trading on dark venues that do
not fall under the scope of these waivers, i.e. those that fall under the reference
price waiver and negotiated trade waiver. Volume will be capped at the 4 percent
level for the individual trading venue, and 8 percent for the consolidated market.
So in order to keep on trading opaquely, either traders will need to scale up their
order size, or resort more to hidden orders. Our results imply that traders who
currently rely on dark venues may have trouble in finding a suitable alternative,
since hidden orders on lit trading venues are not adequate substitutes. However,
most hidden orders in our sample are reserve orders. Other types of hidden or-
ders, i.e. (midpoint) hidden pegged orders, are more similar to order types on
dark venues, and thus could be better substitutes. In light of the regulatory
changes to come, European market operators and investment firms should take
it as a challenge to incorporate new mechanisms within lit trading venues that
allow to bring back opaque volumes. This is the strategy for instance followed
by the London Stock Exchange, as it announced to introduce midpoint hidden
pegged orders that allow for a minimum execution size specification. The incep-
tion of new trading mechanisms to cater to the needs of large traders, however,
goes beyond the simple dichotomy between hidden orders and dark venues. For
128 CONCLUDING REMARKS
instance, Bats Chi-X recently launched a lit periodic auctions book that operates
alongside its existing continuous lit and dark books.
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